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Preface 
SELDOM in American history has a third politicai party had 
such impact on contemporary events and been the object of 
such continuing interest among historians as the People's 
party, or Populists, of the 1890's. The colorful characteristics 
of some of the leaders of the party-largely an agrarian one 
-are by no means the sole reason for the continuing attention 
the party receives. Although the flamboyance and eccentricity 
of a few "Pops" caused conservatives at the time, and some 
historians since, to ridicule them as provincial cranks, by no 
means all of the Populist leaders were "sockless," as an enemy 
dubbed Congressman Jerry Simpson of Kansas. 
A young Populist leader and United States Senator from 
North Carolina, Marion Butler, played a central role in the 
political events of 1896. Although he certainly had a farm 
background, as did well over half of the American people at 
the time, Butler was graduated from the University of North 
Carolina. And he was, like many of his coworkers in the 
People's party, an educated man of considerable dignity and 
polish. 
Not their alleged eccentricities then, but the reform ideas 
and efforts of the Populists account for their lasting im-
portance. Their demands foreshadowed a considerable part 
of the achievements of the Progressives and New Dealers in 
the twentieth century. In their own time, the Populists 
exerted great influence not only in the southern and western 
states where they were strongest but also on the political life 
of the nation as a whole. 
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They played a leading role in the rise to ascendancy of the 
free silver issue and, obliquely, in the revolution within the 
Democratic party epitomized by the nomination of William 
Jennings Bryan in 1896. In the campaign that followed, 
easily the most significant one that the nation had known 
since 1865, the Populists occupied strategic ground and, 
mainly, made their greatest national effort for Bryan, whom 
they also nominated as their presidential candidate, and for 
the various reforms that free silver symbolized. 
Despite many studies of different aspects of the "Battle of 
the Standards" in 1896, confusion and error persist concern-
ing the role of the People's party. According to many his-
torical accounts, the Populists were tricked by wily leaders 
into nominating Bryan and allegedly expressed their deepest 
and truest desires only in the nomination of Thomas E. 
Watson of Georgia as their own vice-presidential candidate. 
In the accounts of the campaign itself, most historians depict 
Watson as the ill-treated martyr of Populism who was be-
trayed not only by false Democratic promises but more 
especially by devious Populist leaders. 
A quite different perspective on the Populist part in the 
epochal campaign of 1896 is furnished by the study of a 
large collection of documents in the Southern Historical 
Collection of the University of North Carolina Library. 
These are the papers of Marion Butler, who played a decisive 
role in the controversial Populist convention in St. Louis and 
was elected at the conclusion of that meeting as the national 
chairman of the People's party. Hundreds of letters that 
came to Chairman Butler from Populists all over the nation 
during the campaign, together with two thick letterbooks of 
his outgoing correspondence, afford an inside view and a new 
understanding of the Populist effort both in the nation and 
in most of the states where the third party flourished. 
The two most important studies dealing with the Populists 
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in 1896 remain Professor John Hicks' The Populist Revolt, 
which was first published in 1931, and Professor C. Vann 
Woodward's Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel, which appeared 
in 1938. Professor Hicks' book continues to be the most 
comprehensive account of the subject, as is evidenced by the 
fact that it was reprinted in 1961, and is still widely used in 
libraries and classrooms, including my own. Professor Wood-
ward's biography of Watson has also been recently reissued 
and has come to be recognized as a classic portrayal of a social 
class and a section almost as much as a study of its fascinating 
subject. Tom Watson, it so happens, was the first book in 
American history about which I remember becoming deeply 
and personally excited. The Butler papers were not available, 
however, when these two distinguished historians published 
their Populist studies, and both portray the Populist con-
vention and the ensuing campaign in a manner quite different 
from that which follows. 
The purpose of this book, then, is to show first that the 
Populists were not tricked into naming Bryan as their candi-
date and that there was no "conspiracy" at the St. Louis 
convention. Rather, the Populists' nomination of the Ne-
braskan Democrat was not only consistent with their prin-
ciples but was essential if the party was to remain national in 
scope. In the campaign itself, despite embarrassment caused 
by Tom Watson, who had allowed himself to be sadly miscast 
in the political drama, the national leaders of the Populists 
worked out a largely effective policy of electoral-ticket fusion 
with the Democrats. And this policy made possible both the 
preservation of the Populist national and state organizations 
and the participation by the Populists in the great allied effort 
for Bryan and national reforms. The year 1896, in short, saw 
the climax of Populism, the time of its greatest significance 
in American history. 
That McKinley and the status quo triumphed over Bryan 
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and reform was not because of any failure of the Populists. 
They, together with their political allies for silver, concen-
trated their efforts in the campaign on the farmers and 
industrial workers in the pivotal north central states. And 
there, through circumstances largely beyond the control of 
the reform parties, the reformers lost their first great bid for 
progressive change. 
Mostly farmers, the Populists were not spokesmen for a 
static society, nor were they opposing and fleeing from the 
industrial future of the nation. They sought rather to capture 
federal power and use it both negatively to end economic 
abuses that had flourished since the Civil War and positively 
to improve the lot of the farmers and industrial workers of 
the land. The Populists failed in 1896-but their failure was 
by no means ignominious, and in one sense they triumphed 
at a later day when their reforms were introduced under other 
auspices and the "Pops" had become but a fading memory. 
Perhaps two other points should be made here about the 
intensely human and political story that follows. First, 
political "spoils" in the form of salaried offices, high and low, 
did play a large part in the politics of the 1890's, larger 
perhaps than is true of our own prosperous day. This fact was 
true of the Populists· just as it was of the Democrats and 
Republicans, and it did not mean that Americans were then 
more venal or selfish. The reason was simple: the depression 
that began in 1893 was merely the lowest point in a deflation-
ary cycle that reached far back into the Gilded Age. In-
credibly low farm prices, unemployment, and grinding poverty 
made many men desperate for an office-almost any office-
that paid a fixed salary in an era when the dollar grew scarcer 
as its purchasing power increased. 
Secondly, the truism that ours is a federal system of politics 
as well as of government needs repeating in advance. The 
Populists' struggles to reconcile their conflicting sectional 
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interests with their national organization and policies led to 
an amazing complexity in the election of 1896. Indeed, the 
infinite variety of politics in the United States has never been 
more strikingly demonstrated. The reader who remembers 
that American political parties are not and have never been 
primarily concerned about their ideological purity and that 
they are composed of many state and sectional units rather 
than being national monoliths will appreciate rather than 
deplore some of the aspects of the climactic struggle of the 
Populists. 
Fortunately, the Research Council of Duke University has 
patience in good supply. The Council began to assist my 
summertime research into Populism some ten years ago. 
When other projects developed and caused long interruptions, 
the Council raised no objections. It is a pleasure to thank 
them and particularly the chairman, Professor John Tate 
Lanning. 
The most important documents for this study were in the 
Southern Historical Collection of the University of North 
Carolina Library, and Dr. James W. Patton, the director of 
the Collection, and Dr. Carolyn Wallace of his staff were 
particularly helpful. Dr. Mattie Russell, director of the Man-
uscript Division of the Duke University Library, gave as-
sistance ungrudgingly and others in the Duke Library who 
helped were Miss Florence Blakely, Miss Mary Canada, Mr. 
Emerson Ford, Mr. Elvin Strowd, and Mr. Peter Tavernise. 
Likewise the staffs of the Newspaper and Manuscript Divi-
sions of the Library of Congress, the \:Visconsin State Histori-
cal Society, the Minnesota State Historical Society, and the 
State Library of North Carolina facilitated my work. 
In Duke University, Professors Hugh M. Hall, William B. 
Hamilton, I. B. Holley, William T. Laprade, Richard H. 
Leach, Anne F. Scott, and Richard L. Watson have kindly 
read all or parts of the manuscript, which Mrs. Elizabeth 
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McConnell helped to type. A number of students over the 
years have shared ideas about the Populists and 1896, but Mr. 
David Roller and Mr. Bruce Clayton were of special assistance 
in certain aspects of the research. My wife, Anne Oller 
Durden, transcribed documents with me in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota and shared the chore of indexing. 
Portions of the first two chapters of this book have appeared 
in substantially different form in the Mississippi Valley His-
torical Review and the South Atlantic Quarterly. 
Duke University 
August 1963 
RoBERT F. DuRDEN 
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1 
The Crisis for Populism 
ALTHOUGH some historians disparage both William Jen-
nings Bryan and the demand for free silver, few 
deny the significance of the election of 1896. The cry for 
reform, raised sporadically since the late 1860's, had grown 
into a massive roar. Instead of continuing the duet about the 
tariff that economic conservatives had sung meaninglessly at 
every election for a generation, the new elements which had 
captured the Democratic party clamorously advocated change. 
Frightened friends of the status quo rallied behind the 
comfortable conservatism of William McKinley and his astute 
manager, Marcus A. Hanna. The mere possibility of the 
changes threatened by the Bryan Democracy drove a large 
faction of Cleveland Democrats out of the party and into 
either direct or indirect support of McKinley. The over-
whelming majority of the American people at the time, on 
both sides of the politico-economic fence, believed deeply 
that the issues involved were fundamental ones. 
The story of the first Bryan-McKinley campaign is com-
plicated, however, by the fact that the People's party played 
a significant role in it. rThe Populists were important in the 
rise to ascendancy of the silver question; they were a factor 
even in the Democrats' selection of Bryan; and they figured 
largely in the campaign and election that brought his first 
defeat for the presidency. Although much has been written 
about the clash of the "silverites" and the "goldbugs/' 
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misunderstanding and plain error have persisted concerning 
the role of the Populists.1 
Basic to any understanding of 1896 is the currency question. 
Some weeks after the Populist convention Henry Demarest 
Lloyd, a leading reformer and famed author, called free silver 
"the cow-bird of the Reform movement." "It waited until 
the nest had been built by the sacrifices and labour of others," 
Lloyd charged, "and then it laid its eggs in it, pushing out the 
others which lie smashed on the ground."2 
Influential historians have quoted and endorsed Lloyd's 
interpretation, but his denunciation of the silver issue is 
misleading in several ways.3 Lloyd was a socialist, committed 
to government ownership of the means of production and 
distribution as the great principle that would bring justice 
to all. He joined the People's party in an effort to unite 
under its banner both industrial workers and agrarians and 
1 A critical discussion of the most important printed works that deal with 
the Populists in the election of 1896 is given in the Note on Sources. Two 
full-length studies that are available to scholars should be mentioned here: 
Marian Silveus, "The Antecedents of the Campaign of 1896," unpublished 
dissertation at the University of Wisconsin ( 1932), is useful in many respects 
but collapses in its treatment of the Populist convention. Relying only on the 
New York Times for the story, Silveus admits (p. 225) that it was "impos· 
sible to tell just what did happen." Joseph Schafer, Jr., "The Presidential 
Election of 1896," unpublished dissertation at the University of Wisconsin 
( 1941), also has merit but, with respect to the Populist convention and its 
action, closely follows the interpretation of two important leaders, Henry D. 
Lloyd and Tom Watson. For reasons that are explained below, both of these 
men had highly distorted views of the matter. 
2 Lloyd to A. B. Adair, October 10, 1896, in the Lloyd MSS, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin. 
3 Selected examples of historians who incorporate Lloyd's "cow-bird" thesis 
are, in order of publication: C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian 
Rebel (New York, 1938), 278; Matthew Josephson, The Politicos, 1865-1896 
(New York, 1938), 684; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradi-
tion and the Men Who Made It (New York, 1948), 189; Eric F. Goldman, 
Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform (New 
York, 1953), 56; Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890-
1900 in the New American Nation series (New York, 1959), 199; and Paul 
W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People (Philadelphia, 1964), 163 and 
passim. 
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to lead the Populists to a gradual acceptance of socialism.' 
Although the Populists had incorporated a demand for 
government ownership of the railroads and telegraphs in their 
Omaha platform of 1892, neither they nor the Farmers' 
Alliance men were doctrinaire socialists. They were, rather, 
angry agrarian capitalists who found themselves unprotected 
by government from exploitation by the railroads. They 
responded with a pragmatic demand for government owner-
ship, a demand that made many of them uncomfortable but 
which persisted until federal regulation became a meaningful 
reality in the twentieth century. 
Lloyd, on the other hand, advocated government ownership 
to establish a different economic and social order. Even in 
comparatively urban Illinois, Lloyd's efforts came to naught 
many months before the Populist convention in 1896.5 
Herman E. Taubeneck, chairman of the Populist national 
committee, spoke both for the agrarians and for some of the 
urban workers when he greeted Lloyd's collectivist proposal 
with the declaration that if "this is what you came into the 
People's party for, we don't want you. Go back where you 
came [from] with your socialism."6 
4 Caro Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd, 1847·1903 (2 vols.; New York, 
1912), I, 241-43. 
5 At a Populist-sponsored conference in Springfield in May 1894, advocates 
of "Plank 10," calling for government ownership of the means of production 
and distribution, made a determined effort to have the idea endorsed. Repre-
sentatives from the Illinois State Federation of Labor, the Socialist Labor 
Party, the Knights of Labor, and other urban-industrial organizations attended 
along with the Populist delegates. Plank 10 was overwhelmingly rejected. 
Chester M. Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901 (New London, Conn., 
1946), 170. This earlier work of Professor Destler's is more useful and sounder 
on Lloyd's role as a Populist than the same author's recent biography, Henry 
Demarest Lloyd and the Empire of Reform (Philadelphia, 196 3) . 
6 Illinois State Register, May 30, 1894, quoted in Destler, American 
Radicalism, 170. In July 1894 the Illinois State Federation of Labor at first 
rejected Plank 10 but for the sake of harmony "a sugar coated edition of 
'Plank 10' was adopted chiefly through the instrumentality of Henry D. 
Lloyd." This called for collective ownership of all such means of production 
and distribution "as the people elect to operate for the commonwealth." 
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Even one of Lloyd's friends and coworkers, the young 
Clarence Darrow, questioned socialist tactics in trying to 
capture the People's party. Lloyd insisted that the "People's 
Party platform is socialistic as all democratic doctrine is." 
But Darrow had misgivings "as to whether we could claim 
to commit the People[']s party to Socialism." "I think it was 
done too much in the last campaign," Darrow continued; 
"for instance all the literature circulated at the meeting was 
intensely socialistic such as the 'People's party' would not 
indorse and as it was under their auspices it ought not to 
have been such as was antagonistic to a large portion of the 
party."7 
Though Lloyd persisted, the national convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, meeting in Denver late in 
1894, rejected his collectivist proposals. Lloyd did better at a 
conference of Populist leaders at St. Louis in December 
1894, when he was one of the spokesmen who helped lead 
the majority to stand by the comprehensive and many-sided 
Populist platform of 1892 rather than retreat to the silver-
only position that some of the western Populists favored. 
But despite the fluctuations in his hopes, Lloyd's plan to 
unite workers and farmers in a party dedicated to socialism 
failed even in the area and under the circumstances most 
auspicious for the effort. In 1895, Henry Vincent, a Populist 
editor in Indiana who had earlier sympathized with a part of 
Lloyd's program, warned that the "Socialists in their arrogant 
assumption are looking upon the People's party with much 
the same contemplation that a boa constrictor looks upon 
the beast he is shadowing for an early morning meal." If a 
Populist such as Vincent rejected socialism, even when it was 
Edward B. Mittleman, "Chicago Labor in Politics, 1877-1896," Journal of 
Political Economy, XXVIII (May 1920), 424-25. 
7 Lloyd to Darrow, November 23, 1894, and Darrow to Lloyd, "Saturd[a]y," 
quoted in Destler, American Radicalism, 232. 
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diluted and brilliantly presented by a humane intellectual 
such as Lloyd, small wonder that the overwhelming majority 
of the agrarian Populists in the West and South would have 
no part of it.8 
Tom Watson of Georgia, perhaps the best known figure 
amop.g the Populists of the South, spoke for the bulk of his 
party late in 1895 when he vowed that he would go no further 
toward "Socialism and Radicalism" than the Georgia Popu-
lists had gone. That group, Watson reported to Marion 
Butler, had given the "cold shoulder" even to the doctrines 
of JacobS. ("Good Roads") Coxey of Ohio and had adopted 
the "most conservative" platform that the party had ever 
had. Watson urged that Butler and others who favored a 
moderate course should begin to use their newspapers to 
educate public sentiment and thus make it impossible for 
extremists to control the forthcoming national convention. 
That important gathering would need a chairman who "has 
nerve enough to rule with a rod of iron those hot-headed 
recalcitrants who want to load us down with extreme isms." 
Prophetically, and ironically in view of subsequent develop-
ments, Watson at that stage thought that William V. Allen, 
Populist senator from Nebraska, or Marion Butler himself 
would be good men to wield the "rod of iron" against the 
extremists. 9 
Too much should not be made of Watson's comments to 
Butler. Serious differences existed about ideology and strategy 
even among the antisocialist Populists. The point remains, 
however, that to most Populists the real, late-coming "cow-
s Ibid., 230-34, 243. Lloyd was apparently either ignorant of southern 
Populism or unsympathetic with it. He wrote to A. B. McCulloch of Rich-
mond, Virginia, on January 9, 1896, that: "I had supposed until I became 
acquainted with all this [activity in Richmond] that there was absolutely no 
radical thought in the South. But lately the evidences have multiplied that 
it is farther advanced than I had believed." Lloyd MSS. 
9 Watson to Butler, December 23, 28, 1895, in the Marion Butler MSS, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library. 
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bird" of 1896 that tried to capture the Populist nest was 
socialism. As Professor Chester Destler has concluded, the 
fate of the "attempt to graft an alien collectivism into the 
traditional pattern of American democratic radicalism had 
been clearly foreshadowed in Chicago."10 Lloyd would not 
know how completely that attempt had failed until the 
Populist convention in July 1896. His widely quoted and 
influential comments about the action of that body reflect his 
own final, bitter disillusionment more accurately than they 
do the truth about the Populist convention and the free 
silver movement. 
The history of the silver issue cannot be dealt with here, 
but a few general points must be made.U The demand for 
the free coinage of silver was not a late addition to the reform 
movement of the 1890's. A free silver plank was always among 
the numerous demands first of the Farmers' Alliance and then 
of the People's party. Agitation of the question reached back 
to the 1870's; and from 1868 on there was opposition to the 
federal government's deflationary moves that led to the steady 
appreciation of the dollar's value. Events rather than planning 
by any person or group forced the silver issue irresistibly to the 
front in the mid-1890's. 
Two of these events were the catastrophic depression that 
followed the panic of 1893 and the stubbornly conservative, 
deflationary, probusiness, and party-splitting policies of the 
Democratic administration of Grover Cleveland. Neither the 
Populists nor the Bryan Democrats created the popular 
clamor for the restoration of silver to its historic place in the 
currency. Rather, the leaders of both groups were led by 
popular sentiment to emphasize the issue. 
to Destler, American Radicalism, 254. 
11 Lucid accounts may be found in Elmer Ellis, Henry Moore Teller: De-
fender of the West (Caldwell, Idaho, 1941), 184 If., and Paolo E. Coletta, 
"Greenbackers, Goldbugs, and Silverites: Currency, Reform and Policy, 
1860-1897," in H. Wayne Morgan (ed.), The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal 
(Syracuse, 1963), 111-39. 
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Long before the silverites captured the Democratic party 
in 1896, the Populists had discovered in the campaign of 
1892 that among their numerous demands the silver plank 
had the greatest popular appeaP2 True, a majority of the 
Populists were not willing to eliminate demands for other 
important reforms. But Populist leaders were no different 
from those of the older parties in yielding to the drift of 
voters' opinions. B. 0. F1ower, editor of The Arena, one of 
the few national magazines that supported Populism and 
reform in general, advised Marion Butler late in 1894 that 
wise action by the Populists would bring them victory in 
1896. F1ower wanted the Populists to continue to educate 
the people on all lines of reform but especially to emphasize 
the money question now that Cleveland had brought to a 
climax the life-and-death struggle between the "money power" 
and the people. "No more class legislation, more money and 
less misery," would be the winning slogan according to 
F1ower.13 
Marion Butler needed no urging. As the acknowledged 
leader of the Populists in North Carolina and president of 
the National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, he had 
clearly demonstrated the capacity for adroit political leader-
ship. Born on a farm in Sampson County in southeastern 
North Carolina in 1863, Butler was one of a significant 
number of young men who rose rapidly in the political flux 
created by the agrarian revolt of the 1890's. Despite the 
poverty that afflicted Tarheel farmers in the years after the 
Civil War, he managed to graduate from the University of 
North Carolina in 1885. His plans to study law at the Uni-
versity were cut short, however, when his father died, and 
Butler, still in his early twenties, had to assume the responsi-
bility for running the family farm. 
12 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance 
and the People's Party (Lincoln, Nebr., 1961), 301. 
13 Flower to Butler, December 14, 1894, Butler MSS. 
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In addition to farming, Butler conducted an academy for 
the schooling of his younger brothers and sisters together 
with the children of neighbors. When the Farmers' Alliance 
movement, destined to become the most militant agrarian 
combination in American history, spread from the Southwest 
into North Carolina in the late 1880's, Marion Butler im-
mediately joined the organization, which provided him a 
ladder of political opportunity that he climbed with amazing 
speed. Possessing the formal education and literate articulate-
ness which so many of his fellow farmers lacked, he quickly 
became president of the Sampson County Alliance, bought a 
weekly newspaper in the county seat of Clinton (the news-
paper was subsequently moved to Goldsboro and then to 
Raleigh), and in 1890, at the age of twenty-seven, the voters 
sent him to the state senate as an Alliance Democrat.H 
The "Farmers' Legislature" of 1891 in North Carolina 
produced an impressive number of important reform measures, 
such as the creation of a commission to regulate the railroads 
and the establishment of new state colleges for women and 
Negroes. Through his dynamic leadership in the legislature, 
Butler established a statewide reputation. He became presi-
dent of the State Farmers' Alliance in 1891, and was made, 
first, vice president and then, in 1893, president of the Na-
tional Alliance. The Democratic nomination of Grover Cleve-
land in 1892, despite the former president's known hostility 
to silver and his essential conservatism, was a major factor 
behind the organization of the People's party in North 
Carolina in the summer of 1892. Another factor was the 
insistence of the leaders of the North Carolina Democratic 
party that no member could "split the ticket," that is, vote 
Democratic in the state and local elections but not in the 
presidential race. Thousands of members of the Alliance, 
14 Samuel A. Ashe and others, eds., Biographical History of North Carolina 
(Greensboro, N.C., 1917), VIII, 81-90. 
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now led by young Butler after the death of Colonel Leonidas 
L. Polk in June 1892, took a step that required considerable 
courage and even desperation in the South after Reconstruc-
tion: they walked out of the "white man's party," the party 
that had "redeemed" the South from Republican rule in the 
Reconstruction era, and they joined the new third party that 
had already developed in the West and was now appearing in 
both the upper and deep South.15 
The Populist presidential candidate in 1892, General James 
B. Weaver of Iowa, polled over a million popular votes and 
won twenty-two electoral votes, which was an impressive 
showing for a new third party. In North Carolina the Popu-
lists entered the campaign too late to hope for much, yet the 
Tarheel Populists and Republicans together polled a larger 
vote than the Democrats, whose penny-pinching economies 
and exclusive claims to "honesty and good government" 
during the two decades since Reconstruction had clearly lost 
much of their appeal. Marion Butler now emerged as the 
nemesis of North Carolina Democrats, who tagged him "the 
sly fox of Sampson county," for in the state elections of 1894 
he led the Populists into cooperation with the Republicans. 
Both Populists and Republicans deeply resented the tricky, 
even dishonest, election laws and procedures that the Demo-
crats had utilized to remain in power since Reconstruction; 
both also scorned the centralization of all political power in 
the legislature whereby Democrats monopolized local offices 
in numerous counties where their opponents had strong 
majorities. In order to gain reforms in these and other state 
matters, and simply for the satisfaction of beating the Demo-
crats, the Populist-Republican "fusionists," as their enemies 
called them, joined together in the state elections of the non-
15 Hicks, Populist Revolt, 241 ff. Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk: 
Agrarian Crusader (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1949), is the best account of the 
Alliance in North Carolina down to Polk's death. 
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presidential year and swept to an astonishing victory that 
gave them safe majorities in both houses of the legislature. 
In other states the Populists in 1894 were not generally so 
successful as in North Carolina. But the election of a Populist 
governor in Nebraska, other scattered victories, and a sharp 
increase across the nation in the total Populist vote cast 
encouraged the party leaders. Most important, the acute 
economic stagnation after the panic of 1893 and President 
Cleveland's unyieldingly conservative policies led to astonish-
ing defeats for the Democratic party throughout the country. 
True, the Republicans were the prime beneficiaries in 1894 
from the increased unpopularity of the Democrats. But 
Populists, looking ahead, saw the Democratic party gradually 
disappearing, as had other major parties in American history, 
and the People's party emerging as the great national party 
of reform and the rival of the Republicans. Marion Butler 
was only one of many Populist spokesmen who envisioned 
such a bright future for the new party.16 
Butler's immediate reward for his generalship in the cam-
paign that brought the Tarheel Democrats their first statewide 
defeat since Reconstruction was a seat in the United States 
Senate. There he promptly proceeded to shock the veteran 
members by his vigorous advocacy of reform and to take his 
place alongside other agrarian champions of the silver cause. 
A journalist described the youthful senator as "a tall, broad 
shouldered, rather angular man, who swings down the street 
with that long stride that seems typical of his political career." 
In addition to a head of thick, dark hair, he wore a full but 
neatly trimmed beard, and as he talked he was said to narrow 
his deep-set, piercing eyesP His youth probably inspired him 
16 Hugh T. Lefler and Albert R. Newsome, North Carolina: The History of 
a Southern State {Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963), 507-17; Hicks, Populist Revolt, 
321-39. 
17 Carl Snyder, "Marion Butler," Review of Reviews, XIV (October 1896), 
431-32. 
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not only to grow the beard but also to accentuate, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, another of his characteristics: 
his utter seriousness and lack of humor. Richly experienced 
for his age, he had come from a poverty-stricken state and 
class where politics was intense and, at times, downright 
dangerous business. It was certainly not in any relaxed or 
detached mood that the new senator from North Carolina set 
about attacking the Cleveland administration, defending the 
income tax, and above all clamoring for financial reform. 
With all of his power, he declared in the spring of 1895, he 
hoped to help make the financial question "the one over-
shadowing issue in the next great struggle between the classes 
and the masses."18 
Unlike some of the Western Populists, however, Butler 
disapproved of obliterating other demands in order to em-
phasize the silver issue. He admitted that government owner-
ship of the railways was not widely popular but insisted 
that no great reform was ever popular at first. He thought that 
the correct solution of the railway problem was almost as 
important as that of the financial question. But the depression 
and money shortage had awakened the public to the silver 
issue and made the time ripe "for concentrating under one 
banner" those who supported reform. After winning the silver 
victory, Butler concluded, "I shall favor making a war to the 
finish on the greedy, grasping, private monopolies, which 
to-day are using and abusing the great functions of govern-
18 Butler to D. H. Gill, May 2, 1895, in Butler's weekly newspaper, the 
Raleigh Caucasian, May 16, 1895. Despite its name the Caucasian, which 
Butler had purchased from a Democrat in the late 1880's, defended the 
Negro and deplored the political use of the race question. For example, the 
Populist paper pointed out that the "talk of 'nigger' and 'white rule' is 
already being started again in North Carolina for campaign purposes." The 
cry, so absurd when only about a quarter of North Carolina's population was 
Negro, had been used for years to hide election frauds and "goldbuggism." 
"What the great masses of the colored people in North Carolina want is fair 
treatment and justice and this they ought to have." Ibid., March 12, 1896. 
12 The Climax of Populism 
ment that should be owned by the people and used by the 
people."19 
In short, what Butler and many other Populist leaders 
across the nation thought they had found by 1894-1895 was 
the common denominator that is essential in the life of a 
major political party in the United States. State and sectional 
groupings that differed widely because of differences in history 
and in economic interests might, with the right and lucky 
denominator, join together to win national victory. Doc-
trinaires and dogmatists saw the matter differently, but most 
of the Populist leaders were politicians who hoped to ride 
the financial issue to that first victory.20 
Hindsight adds to the difficulty of understanding why such 
Populist leaders as Butler, along with numerous others, pro-
ceeded so confidently. The truth was that most of the Popu-
list leaders, as well as large numbers of Republicans and 
Democrats, expected both of the old parties either to reject 
free silver outright or to equivocate. Either way, the Populists 
knew that their party stood to gain, for thousands of members 
19 Butler to Gill, ibid., May 16, 1895. When the members of the supreme 
council of the Farmers' Alliance met in Raleigh to dedicate a monument to 
the late Colonel L. L. Polk, they had issued an address stating that while they 
stood firmly by all of the Alliance demands they recognized that no other 
reform was possible until "the destructive policy of contracting our money 
volume is overthrown, and the banks of the country be forced to retire from 
government business." Since the Alliance's demand for government owner-
ship of all railways had long been a source of disagreement, the council 
proposed that the demand be changed to one for government ownership of 
just enough of competing railway lines to give the government effective 
control of all rate regulations. Ibid., February 14, 1895. The Alliance, in 
other words, had hit on what a later generation would know as the "yardstick 
principle" in connection with the Tennessee Valley Authority and power 
rates. 
2o James A. Barnes, "Myths of the Bryan Campaign," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XXXIV (December 1947), 369, makes virtually the same 
point: "Silver was but a symbol of things deep and fundamental, and its 
wisdom can be denied without lessening the significance of the revolt that 
Bryan led." 
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of the old parties were in no mood for the stale, ritualistic 
discussion of the tariff. 
Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado and other western 
Republicans were staunch friends of silver, but they were 
clearly a small minority in their business-minded party. 
Among the Democrats, such different leaders as Senator Ben 
Tillman of South Carolina and Governor John P. Altgeld of 
Illinois had joined the rebellion against Cleveland and were 
as clamorous for currency reform as any Populist. In the 
South and West the prosilver Democrats grew more numerous 
and vocal throughout 1895, but the extent of the rebellion 
against Cleveland and gold would not be clear until the late 
spring of 1896.21 
Comforting to the Populists was the fact that the Demo-
cratic convention would meet under long-standing rules that 
required a vote of two-thirds of the delegates to name a 
presidential candidate. The Populists thought it almost cer-
tain that the Cleveland administration, with its power over 
patronage and the other resources of the executive branch, 
would have sufficient support from eastern delegates to block 
the nomination of an unequivocal friend of reform. A year 
before the Democratic convention met, Harry Skinner, Popu-
list congressman from North Carolina, pointed to the two-
thirds rule of the Democrats as the sure guarantee that the 
true friends of silver would have no recourse save to become 
Populists.22 
The Populists said a great deal about "putting principle 
above party." Since most of them had walked out of the old 
parties when economic circumstances had become unbearable, 
their political righteousness had a certain legitimacy. To 
21 Harvey Wish, "John Peter Altgeld and the Background of the Campaign 
of 1896," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIV (March 1938), 503-18. 
22 Skinner in the Washington Post, reprinted in the Raleigh Caucasian, 
June 27, 1895. 
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become a third-party man was not easy in most parts of the 
nation, and in the South especially the break from tradition 
required psychological daring and even physical courage. By 
1895-1896, however, the Populist party was an important 
institution. In it many persons had vital interests, interests 
that were partly selfish where offices were concerned and 
partly a reflection of genuine concern for a large mass of 
suffering Americans. The two-thirds rule of the Democrats 
made it vastly easier for General James B. Weaver, the 
Populist presidential candidate in 1892, Chairman Taubeneck, 
Senators Butler and Allen, and others to continue to insist 
on the necessity of putting the silver principle above party 
and to call and work in a variety of ways for a union of all the 
silver forces in 1896. 
Two minority factions within the People's party, for quite 
different reasons, expressed misgivings about the silver-first 
strategy and the constant calling for cooperative action of all 
the friends of silver. The socialist followers of Lloyd, while 
numerically small and unrepresentative, derived their sig-
nificance from the brilliance and literary skill of Lloyd himself. 
The other minority was much larger and consisted principally 
of Populists in the South, especially the deep South, who, 
for sectional reasons, disliked the idea of any cooperation 
between Populists and Democrats. 
Since real Republican organizations scarcely existed in some 
of these southern states, Populists standing alone had to 
contend with the high-handed and often dishonest machina-
tions of the long-entrenched Democrats. Not for silver, or 
for that matter any other essentially national issue, were these 
Populists willing to blur the distinction between themselves 
and the Democrats. Opposing all fusion on principle, they 
styled themselves "middle-of-the-road" Populists. As sincere 
as most of them were in their Populism, the truth was that 
they did not love the Populist party and its program more 
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than did the silver Populists-they only loved it differently 
and for different reasons.23 
The first signs of the uneasiness of the "midroaders" in 
1896 became evident in selecting a time for the Populist 
national convention. A Populist convention before either of 
the other two conventions would lessen the chances of co-
operation or fusion, or cause the fusion, if any, to take place 
strictly on Populist terms with Populist candidates. The 
Populist national committee met in St. Louis on January 17 
to decide when and where the convention would be held. 
The Republican committee had already scheduled their con-
vention for St. Louis on June 16. The Democratic national 
committee met on January 16 and decided to hold their 
convention in Chicago on July 7.24 
Marion Butler, like most of the national leaders of the 
party, favored a late convention. The Populist state chairman 
of Nebraska had urged, as early as August 1895, that the 
Populists hold their national convention after both of the old 
parties had "unquestionably turned their backs upon the 
white metal."25 
On the other hand, from Thomson, Georgia, Watson's 
home, a Populist national committeeman sent Butler his 
proxy along with regrets that he could not be in St. Louis 
and expressed the hope that the committee would call the 
convention for early spring and meet in some Southern city, 
23 For Watson's warning, as early as 1892, through his People's Party Paper 
about the emphasis on silver, see Woodward, Watson, 278 ff. 
24 New York Tribune, January 17, 1896. 
25 J. H. Edmisten, of Lincoln, Nebraska, to Butler, August 14, 1895, Butler 
MSS. Later, on the eve of the national committee's meeting, Mann Page of 
Virginia and others wrote the same thing to Butler and sent him their 
proxies. Bryan himself, who was working mightily to swing the national 
Democratic party to silver, also urged Ignatius Donnelly to help persuade the 
Populists to meet late so that they could "take advantage of the errors of the 
old parties" and more easily "bring about a consolidation of all the silver 
forces." Bryan to Donnelly, January 1, 1896, in Paul W. Glad, The Trumpet 
Soundeth: William Jennings Bryan and His Democracy, 1896-1912 (Lincoln, 
Nebr., 1960), 55. 
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preferably Atlanta.26 The Populist national committee, ap-
parently reflecting the sentiment of the majority of the party 
membership, decided to hold the convention in St. Louis on 
July 22, and invited all opponents of the two old parties 
to cooperate with the Populists.27 
Counting on the Democrats' two-thirds rule to be the final 
making of the Populist party, Butler and the other leaders 
worked diligently for the silver cause throughout the spring 
of 1896. In the Senate Butler attacked the party-first Demo-
crats and Republicans who claimed to be silverites. The 
Atlanta Constitution thought that he had secured "a hearing 
hardly ever given to a Populist" and "smoked out of the 
bushes men who have been playing a hide-and-seek game with 
their constituencies for years."28 
In North Carolina an increasing number of Democratic 
leaders became converts to silver, sometimes from conviction 
and sometimes for expediency's sake. Despite this growing 
Democratic shift, Butler received encouraging signs for Popu-
lism too. A Negro voter wrote: "I am a colored man and a 
Republican and have been for seventeen years; but be it 
thoroughly understood that I am not married to any party 
that will dodge from justice to the people and yield to the few 
who want to enslave the country by a single gold standard 
law." He advised every Negro voter to take the Caucasian and 
"stop going around howling 'straight Republican ticket.' "29 
26 C. H. Ellington to Butler, January 3, 1896, Butler MSS. Hicks, Populist 
Revolt, 350, points out that Harry Tracy's Southern Mercury in Texas favored 
the early convention and said so emphatically and early. The Mercury was 
not, however, as representative of southern Populist opinion as Hicks implies. 
For Tracy, who owned the Mercury, and his even more extreme editor, 
Milton Park, see Roscoe C. Martin, The People's Party in Texas (Austin, 
1933)' 127-29, 246. 
27 New York Tribune, January 18, 1896. 
28 Quoted in the Raleigh Caucasian, January 9, 1896. 
29 Ibid., March 5, 1896. For a similar letter from six Negroes who thought 
that a "little more of the 'stick to your party' will put us in a worse condition 
than we were in the days of chat[t]el slavery," see ibid., March 19, 1896. 
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A white Democrat, preparing to bolt to the Populists, 
wanted to know why it was not "more patriotic and wise" to 
bolt now than it had been for the Southern Democrats to 
bolt the national party in 1860. "The issue confronting the 
American people to-day is the liberty of the laboring people, 
both white and black," the Tarheel declared, "an issue of 
vastly more importance than the enslavement or freedom of 
the negro ever was." Nor had the depression abated to make 
the cry for reform less urgent. One old farmer reported: "If 
Miss Prosperity has made her appearance in this section, she 
certainly has appeared wrong end forward, for there never 
has been, since Adam was a boy, such weeping, wailing and 
gnashing of teeth known here among the poor."30 
The Republican convention that opened on June 16 de-
clared itself "unreservedly for sound money" and opposed to 
the free coinage of silver "except by international agreement 
with the leading commercial nations of the earth, which 
agreement we pledge ourselves to promote." The Republicans 
also equivocated on their candidate by naming William 
McKinley of Ohio, who preferred to talk about the beauties 
of the high tariff because he had in the past been friendly to 
silver. Senator Teller of Colorado, Senator Richard F. Pet-
tigrew of South Dakota, and other silver Republicans from the 
far West bolted the party and announced their intention to 
organize the Silver Republican party.31 
The plan of the Silver Republicans and the Populist leaders 
was to rally around Senator Teller as the ideal candidate for 
the united silver forces. He had favored the income tax and 
a few other reforms and had stood for years as one of the 
most widely respected spokesmen for silver. If the eastern 
friends of the Cleveland administration had the votes to force 
so Ibid., March 5, 12, 1896. 
31 Detailed studies on this development are Ellis, Teller, 255-64, and the 
same author's "The Silver Republicans in the Election of 1896," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XVIII (March 1932), 519-34. 
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a compromise candidate on the Democratic convention, true 
silver Democrats by the thousands would come to the silver 
banner that would be primarily the property of the Populists. 
If, on the other hand, the admittedly powerful silver wing 
of the Democrats should be in control sufficiently to name 
the candidate as well as to write the platform, the Silver 
Republican and Populist leaders insisted that no candidate 
would be as acceptable as Teller if the silver Democrats were 
sincere about wanting to unite all the silver forces. Taube-
neck, Butler, Pettigrew, Senator Fred Dubois of Idaho, Sena-
tor William M. Stewart of Nevada, and others worked 
arduously for Teller to receive the Democratic nomination.32 
But a veritable revolution had occurred in the Democratic 
party; its full extent could not be measured until the fervent 
silverites began to flock into Chicago for the convention on 
July 7. "The Democratic movement toward silver in the last 
six months before the Chicago convention," Professor Allan 
Nevins has written, "was like an avalanche: a mere whisper 
at first, than a half-imperceptible shift in the landscape, and 
suddenly a roar, a crash, an irresistible cataclysm."33 
Cleveland's last hopes for blocking the nomination of a 
genuine reformer were pinned on William C. Whitney, his 
millionaire adviser and former secretary of the navy. Whitney 
loaded up his "special train of three handsome parlor cars" 
32 Ellis, TeUer, 261 ff. A key source for the plan to secure Teller's nomina-
tion is the correspondence of Butler to Stewart in late June and early July 
1896, in the William M. Stewart MSS, Nevada State Historical Society. 
Photostats of these letters were kindly furnished the author by Professor H. 
Wayne Morgan; the letters are also reproduced in Effie M. Mack, "Life and 
Letters of William Morris Stewart, 1827-1909," unpublished dissertation at 
the University of California ( 1930), 267-71. 
33 Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York, 1934), 689. 
For a recent study that is more sympathetic to Bryan, see Paolo E. Coletta, 
"Bryan, Cleveland, and the Disrupted Democracy, 1890-1896," Nebraska 
History, XLI (March 1960), l-27. J. Rogers Hollingsworth, The Whirligig 
of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan (Chicago, 196 3), is 
helpful on the Democrats but wrong about the Populist convention of 1896. 
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with loyal eastern followers of Cleveland and headed for 
Chicago. Upon arrival there one of these Cleveland Demo-
crats left the special train, with its ample supply of "comes-
tibles and drinkables," to mingle with his assembled fellow-
Democrats. He soon reported to Whitney, "For the first time 
I can understand the scenes of the French Revolution."34 
The jubilant and determined silver Democrats, in easy 
control of the proceedings as soon as the convention opened, 
did want to unite the various reform parties but to antagonize 
as few conservative Democrats as possible in the process. 
Consequently, they rejected Teller despite all the pressure 
that the Populists and Silver Republicans could exert. Teller 
himself had never believed it possible that the Democrats 
would nominate him, and his repeated public statements that 
such an action on their part might be "injudicious" added to 
the difficulty of his supporters' task. Teller also announced 
that he would give his support to any one of several prominent 
silver Democrats. 
More important, leading silver Democrats, especially Alt-
geld, realized that silverite control of the convention would 
mean a bolt from the party by eastern followers of Cleveland, 
a more serious and sizable bolt than the silverites had inflicted 
upon the Republican party. The nomination of Teller would 
only aggravate the problem of holding as many Democrats as 
possible in the party. Altgeld's public statement the day the 
convention opened that he doubted if Teller could carry 
Illinois was a major setback for the Teller boom. 
Populist Chairman Taubeneck's public statement that the 
Populists would not support such partisan Democrats as 
Congressman Richard P. ("Silver Dick") Bland of Missouri 
or Governor Horace Boies of Iowa was one factor that worked 
34 Nevins, Cleveland, 700. Horace S. Merrill, Bourbon Leader: Grover 
Cleveland and the Democratic Party (Boston, 1957), 182 ff., is useful on the 
conservative Democrats. 
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against those two leading contenders for the nomination. 
This situation together with William Jennings Bryan's careful 
preconvention work for support among the delegates, his 
outstanding record in Congress as an able friend of reform, 
his clear record of friendliness to and cooperation with the 
Populists in his home state, and, lastly, his magnetic qualities 
as displayed in his famed address to the convention led to the 
young Nebraskan's nomination by the Democrats.35 
Not only had the Democrats named the most exciting and 
dynamic presidential candidate in well over a generation but 
the platform, in addition to the call for free silver and other 
financial reforms, bore the stamp of Governor Altgeld in its 
denunciation of Cleveland's action in the Pullman boycott 
and of "government by injunction as a new and highly 
dangerous form of oppression." Too often remembered only 
for its assaults on the "anti-American," "British policy" of 
gold monometallism, the Democratic platform also demanded 
stricter federal regulation of the railways, an end to national 
banknotes, a tariff for revenue only (after the money question 
was settled), an income tax, the protection of American labor 
by prevention of the "importation of foreign pauper labor," 
stricter enforcement of antitrust legislation, and various other 
reforms.36 For all the Populists who since the party's birth 
had cried "principle above party" a cruel moment of decision 
had arrived. 
National history made it clear by 1896 that an important 
35 Ellis, Teller, 267-73. Bryan himself said later in The First Battle: A 
Story of the Campaign of 1896 (Chicago, 1896), 296-97, that he believed 
his nomination could be "attributed more to the friendly relations existing 
betweeu Democrats, Populists, and silver Republicans than to any other one 
cause:' A prescient Nebraska Populist had written General Weaver long 
before the national conventions that Bryan was "practically a Populist, except 
in name." Furthermore: "He can carry the solid south. No Populist can do 
that-and we must have the solid south." J. Burrows to Weaver, May, 1896, 
as quoted in Silveus, "The Antecedents of the Campaign of 1896," 211-12. 
ss The document is reprinted in Bryan, First Battle, 406-409. 
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third party faced one of two fates: it died after growing 
strong enough to force one of the major parties to embrace 
its ideas and the bulk of its membership, or, given the right 
set of circumstances, it might become in a time of general 
party disintegration and chaos one of the two major parties. 
The Democrats in 1896, however, had not equivocated and 
dodged in the face of an overwhelming national question as 
the Whigs had tried to do in the decade before the Civil War. 
Although no Populist planned or wished the party's death, 
the western Populists could accept the possibility of this 
uabonal fate for the party with a certain equanimity and a 
redoubled resolve to work for Bryan, silver, and then other 
reforms. Populists in many western states had early begun 
the practice of cooperating or "fusing" with Democrats in 
political battles against Republicans, who were dominant in 
the West. In 1892, in fact, the Democrats, who were almost 
as weak in some of the western states as the Republicans were 
in the South, had helped to elect Grover Cleveland to his 
second term by voting for the Populists' presidential candi-
date, General James B. Weaver. Seeing that their only 
chance of keeping a number of the western states out of the 
Republican electoral column was through support for Weaver, 
thousands of Democrats in Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, 
and other western states voted for the Populist electoral tickets 
and helped the third party to win twenty-two electoral votes, 
an impressive achievement for the national debut of a new 
political party in the United States. 
Nor were the Populists the only beneficiaries of this co-
operative politics in the West. Democratic candidates on 
state and congressional tickets frequently received endorse-
ment by the Populists. Bryan, for example, shared many of 
the reformist views of the Populists, and they had helped 
reelect him to Congress from Nebraska in 1892. Given this 
background, western Populists could hardly be shocked by 
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the possibility of Populist cooperation with, and possible 
absorption on the national scene by, the revitalized Demo-
cratic party of 1896.37 
To the southern Populist, however, absorption by the 
Democrats was a fate too unspeakable to be contemplated. 
No matter what the historic pattern concerning third parties 
or the logic of the national situation might be, sectional 
exigencies in the South demanded the preservation of a 
separate and distinct Populist party. The situation that faced 
the Populists after the Democratic convention in Chicago, 
therefore, seemed to be this: if the Populists did not fall in 
line behind Bryan and free silver, the bulk of the western 
strength of the party would be lost as Populists there left the 
party to march under the Democratic banner of reform. If 
the Populists did nominate Bryan, and run the risk of having 
the Democrats swallow the third party on the national level, 
the southern Populists to save their local political lives and 
for largely sectional reasons would be sorely tempted to bolt 
the national Populist party. 
Either way, in the short interval between the conclusion 
of the Democratic convention and the opening of the 
Populist meeting in St. Louis on July 22, the split between 
the pro-Bryan Populists and the southern midroaders seemed 
to augur the certain dissolution of the People's party. 
37 Hicks, Populist Revolt, 255-62. During the campaign of 1896, Senator 
Charles J. Faulkner, chairman of the Democratic congressional campaign, 
explained the reasons for the Democratic support of the Populist national 
ticket in many western states in 1892 and declared that "whatever Mr. Bryan 
or any other Democrat did in the support of Weaver was at the request of 
the National Democratic committee." New York Times, September 25, 1896; 
Raleigh News and Observer, September 27, 1896. 
2 
The St. Louis Convention 
SEVERAL prominent western Populists announced shortly 
after Bryan's nomination that they favored Populist 
endorsement of the Democratic national ticket. Butler, Tau-
beneck, and some of the Silver Republican leaders, how-
ever, still favored Senator Teller as the candidate for the 
Populists and for the National Silver party, whose convention 
was also to begin in St. Louis on July 22. Butler's newspaper 
continued to attack the Democratic party on the state and 
national levels, though the Tarheel Populist leader carefully 
refrained from attacking Bryan himself. 
As Butler saw the situation on the eve of the Populist 
convention and described his views to Senator Stewart, there 
were two courses open to the Populists. They could endorse 
Bryan under certain conditions or they could name their own 
candidates, with the understanding that after the election the 
presidential electors would use every honorable effort to com-
bine the votes of all electors who favored silver and opposed 
the rule of the national banks. Butler added that he preferred 
the latter course, which would certainly simplify matters for 
the southern Populists, and believed that it was not only 
necessary but the most promising plan for good results. But 
he did not favor publicity for either of the plans until the 
Populist convention had actually begun.1 
Teller was not available for the Populist-National Silver 
nomination for the simple reason that he supported the 
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Democratic ticket and insisted that all the silver forces should 
do the same. After writing his Republican friends as well as 
Butler, Taubeneck, and other Populists to this effect, Teller 
informed Bryan: "I have written to all the Populist leaders 
that I know and some that I do not urging them to nominate 
you and I made it impossible for my name to be used."2 
Butler's own conversion to the idea of accepting Bryan 
was facilitated by the advice he received from Senator Stewart, 
who had attended the Democratic convention. The Nevadan 
informed Butler that the Democrats who controlled the Chi-
cago convention "were as emphatically Populists in their senti-
ments and actions as yourself" and that the "platform is 
radical enough for you or me." Since Bryan was "more of a 
Populist than a Democrat," Stewart continued, the western 
Populists were emphatically for him. Any attempt to run an 
opposing candidate would not only fail but destroy the party. 
Stewart insisted: "There is no use fighting the movement now. 
We must join with it or be destroyed. There was nothing 
left of the Democratic party at Chicago but the name."3 
Since the Populist response even to the name "Democrat" 
differed greatly according to sectional circumstances, confusion 
and anxiety mounted as the Populists began to converge on 
St. Louis. Reporters found that some delegates, too poor to 
pay railway fares, had walked long distances to reach the 
convention. Some were forced to sleep in the parks in order 
to afford the "nickel-lunch." Heat gripped the city. Eastern 
newsmen, like their publishers and editors, were apt to be 
1 Photostat of Butler to Stewart, July 13, 1896, Stewart MSS. Also the 
Raleigh Caucasian, July 16, 1896. For Pettigrew's plea to Teller on July 10, 
begging him not to endorse Bryan so that the Populists and National Silver 
party could nominate Teller at St. Louis and "after McKinley is beaten 
unite our electors on some man for President," see Ellis, "The Silver 
Republicans in the Election of 1896," 5 31. 
2 Teller to Bryan, July 18, 1896, Bryan MSS, Library of Congress. 
3 Stewart to Butler, July 14, 1896, as cited in Mack, "Life and Letters of 
Stewart," 272-73. 
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intolerant of the desperate farmers. The correspondent for 
the New York Times wrote: "The crazy people who fancy 
that some one is always sneaking paris green into their 
chowder or needles into their hash are not more suspicious 
than this body of 1, 400 more or less 'touched' would-be rulers 
of the country."4 
Marion Butler refused interviews and kept quiet as he had 
said he would, but few other Populist leaders chose that 
course. Captain Reuben F. Kolb, prominent leader of the 
Alabama delegation, declared strongly for Bryan: "I am will-
ing to make the fight on one plank, so long as it is monetary 
reform. That is the paramount issue. I'm a middle-of-the-road 
Populist, but I've got sense enough to walk around a mud 
hole." From Texas, where anti-Bryan and midroad sentiment 
was strongest, a delegate asserted that a straight Populist 
ticket would be named because "Texas is going to run this 
convention and dictate the nominations." Although Tom 
Watson had chosen not to attend the convention, he had 
dispatched the Georgia delegation with instructions to stand 
by the full Populist platform and fight fusion with the 
Democrats. 6 
At the other extreme from Watson and the Texans, most 
western Populists were loud in their praises for the Democratic 
candidates and platform. Representative Jerry Simpson of 
Kansas told the large and generally approving Kansas delega-
tion that the "issue is paramount, and men dare not play 
politics at such a time as this. If this Convention should 
refuse to indorse Bryan the Populist party would not contain 
a corporal's guard in November."6 
4 New York Times, July 25, 1896. 
5 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 21, 1896, has the quotations and 
identifies the Texan delegate as Judge Lee M. Callaway of Corsicana; Wood-
ward, Watson, 293. 
6 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 21, 1896. Hicks, Populist Revolt, 357, 
describes and quotes Simpson's views and adds this sentence: "So also 
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Out of this babel a plan emerged. The party not only made 
nominations but was also largely held together. Leadership, 
bold and imaginative as the difficult situation required, played 
a key role. The fundamental fact was that most Populists 
wanted free silver as the first step and symbol of overdue 
reforms. Most Populists wanted also to maintain their party 
organization intact for the national purpose of keeping the 
Democrats "honest" and out of the hands of Cleveland men 
and for various local purposes that differed according to 
geography and circumstance. Henry D. Lloyd's widely ac-
cepted charge that the Populist leaders at St. Louis "tricked 
and bulldozed and betrayed" as they carried out a program to 
destroy Populism is not only untrue but also ignores the 
dilemma that faced the party.7 
No one can say with assurance who first suggested that the 
Populists should nominate Bryan, reject the Democrats' 
vice-presidential nominee, Arthur Sewall of Maine, and put 
up their own candidate for the vice-presidency. Senator 
Marion Butler, however, carefully considered the plan and 
its complications before arriving in St. Louis, and he early 
and energetically identified himself with this method of saving 
both the Populist party and the unity of the silver forces. 
As unprecedented and fraught with difficulty as the plan was, 
it alone seemed to meet the complexities of the party situation 
thought Weaver and Allen and a host of minor lights, some of whom had 
an eye on the loaves and fishes." This impugning of the motives of the 
Populists who supported Bryan is hardly fair. The argument could also be 
made, though it should not be, that southern midroaders feared fusion 
with Democrats because their local offices would be jeopardized by such a 
program. The correspondent for the Democratic Atlanta Constitution, for 
example, charged on July 23, 1896, that the "whole fight of every 'middle 
of the road' man is for the possession of office, to get some one in a snug 
berth." 
7 Lloyd to A. B. Adair, October 10, 1896, Lloyd MSS. Lloyd's important 
article, "The Populists at St. Louis," Review of Reviews, XIV (September 
1896), 298-303, is more sympathetic toward the action of the convention 
than his private comments at the time, although the article too is misleading. 
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that the executive committeemen faced when they gathered 
in St. Louis on Sunday evening, July 19. And this was the 
plan that was ultimately accepted by the great majority both 
of the leaders and of the ordinary delegates who filled the 
hotel lobbies with noisy, often angry debate.8 
Butler arrived with the reputation of being a midroader 
who opposed fusion with the Democrats. He was and con-
tinued to be a moderate one in the sense that he, Taubeneck, 
Senator William A. Peffer of Kansas, and others in the 
majority agreed that the national organization of the Populist 
party should be preserved. It should neither be destroyed by 
a bolt of the extreme fusionists from the West, who favored 
endorsement of both Bryan and Sewall, or by the extreme 
midroaders of the deep South, who insisted on a straight 
Populist ticket, nor should the party be eliminated by being 
absorbed in the Democracy. This sentiment the executive 
committee established at its first meeting.9 
Senator James K. Jones of Arkansas, the Democratic na-
tional chairman, and Governor William J. Stone, Democrat 
of Missouri, met with the Populist leaders and insisted on 
8 For evidence that Butler had a North Carolinian in mind for the 
Populist vice-presidential nomination, possibly Walter Clark, an associate 
justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, see W. J. Peele to Butler, 
July 18, 20, 1896, Butler MSS. In addition to other newspapermen who 
pointed to Butler as the foremost architect of the convention's work, Josephus 
Daniels, who was no friend of Butler's, attended the convention and reported 
to his newspaper: "Butler is being praised and blamed as the author of the 
plan. It was born out of the necessities of the situation. Butler saw what 
other leaders might have seen, and what newspaper men saw. It may truly 
be said that the policy pursued prevented a bolt." Raleigh News and Ob-
server, July 28, 1896. See also Carl Snyder, "Marion Butler," Review of 
Reviews, XIV (October 1896), 429-33. Even Lloyd, in "The Populists at 
St. Louis," 298, declared that one of the best representatives of the con-
vention was Butler, "the handsome young farmer of North Carolina" who 
was "too young to be a candidate" but had "worked his way up from his 
fields through the Farmers' Alliance into a seat in the United States Senate." 
9 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 20, 1896; St. Louis Republic, July 20, 
1896. Since no official record of the Populist convention was ever pub· 
lished, the historian must rely largely on contemporary accounts in the 
newspapers-and be accordingly alert for the difference between fact and rumor. 
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full endorsement of the Democratic ticket or nothing. Bryan's 
spokesmen emphatically rejected, as did the western Populists, 
the idea that Butler and others presented of an independent 
Populist ticket with Populist candidates, to be followed by 
fusion with the other silver groups on the electoral ticket 
according to the proportionate strength of the various parties 
in each state. One alleged spokesman for Bryan, Matt Ward 
of Omaha, Nebraska, declared flatly that, "This talk about 
dividing electors will not be allowed; it can't go. I have Mr. 
Bryan's ultimatum in my pocket, and will deliver it to the 
Populists at the proper time."10 
Butler had discovered, even before arriving in St. Louis, 
that while it was both difficult and impolitic to attack Bryan 
himself, the same was not true of the Democratic vice-
presidential nominee. Arthur Sewall was a well-to-do ship-
builder who had, at one time or other, been connected with 
a national bank and with railway and other corporations. He 
also believed in free silver and was nominated because he was 
from Maine and would furnish a sectional balance for a ticket 
headed by a Nebraskan. Any hope that his eastern "respect-
ability" would help hold irate Cleveland Democrats in the 
party proved futile. 
The most enthusiastic Democrat knew that Bryan had 
about the same chance in New England as McKinley had in 
the deep South. Both the extremist minority of midroad 
Populists, who were ready to split the party rather than accept 
Bryan, and the more moderate leaders, who searched for a way 
to save the party and the silver cause, announced that Sewall 
could never be accepted by the Populists.U 
Capitalizing on this anti-Sewall feeling, Butler conferred 
10 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 20, 1896. 
11 For Butler's initial hostility to Sewall, see Raleigh Caucasian, July 16, 
1896; for the same sentiment among a larger group of Populist editors in the 
Reform Press Association which met in St. Louis on the eve of the Populist 
convention, see St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 20, 1896. 
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again with Senator Jones on Monday, July 20, and proposed, 
according to apparently reliable press accounts, that the 
Populists endorse Bryan if the Democrats would drop Sewall 
and accept the Populist nominee for vice president. When 
Jones refused to listen to this proposal, Butler reported1y 
became angry and assailed the Democrats for "wanting the 
earth." Butler's later statement to newsmen revealed little 
other than his hope for a way out: "Some seem to think that 
there is a danger of a split, but there will be none. The dif-
ferent elements will put their heads together and agree on a 
plan of action."12 
Just as Jones rebuffed Butler, \Veaver and other spokesmen 
for the complete Bryan-Sewall ticket rejected the same propo-
sition when James H. ("Cyclone") Davis of Texas and 
Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota presented it on behalf of 
the Populist executive committee. Any attempt to displace 
Sewall, according to Jones and his allies, would lead to 
irreconcilable complications and place both parties in a 
ridiculous attitude. "The committee," Jones declared, "must 
be as loyal to the vice presidential nominee as to the presi-
dential candidate."13 
In spite of Jones's refusal to talk about a sacrifice of 
Sewall, a key group of Populist leaders, including Marion 
Butler, had decided by Tuesday, July 21, the day before the 
convention opened, that the exigencies of the situation called 
for the nomination of Bryan and a southern Populist on a 
Populist ticket backed by a Populist platform. But this 
program would have to be fought for in open convention, 
12 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 21, 1896. 
13 Ibid. Jones also attempted to block the movement to ignore Sewall by 
promising that Populist endorsement of the Democratic ticket would be 
followed by his naming two or three Populists to the executive committee 
that would manage Bryan's campaign. New York Herald, July 21, and St. 
Louis Globe-Democrat, July 22, 1896. The Herald reporter mixed all sorts 
of rumors designed to discredit Jones and the Democrats in his detailed 
stories. 
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where a slight misstep might see minorities on either extreme 
ganging up to thwart what seemed to be the complicated 
preference of the majority. 
When the Populist national committee met on July 21, 
the executive committee, which had met earlier, recom-
mended and secured Marion Butler's nomination as the 
temporary chairman and keynote speaker of the convention. 
Although "Cyclone" Davis of Texas and General Weaver of 
Kansas had been frequently mentioned by their respective 
factions for the temporary chairmanship, opposition to Butler 
scarcely materialized either in the meeting of the national 
committee or in the convention itself.14 
The convention that finally opened on Wednesday, July 
22, consisted of almost 1,400 hot, confused, and tense dele-
gates. Palmetto fans agitated the stagnant air. The audibility 
of the speakers on the platform was so poor that a big-voiced 
delegate from Wisconsin had to be used as a "repeater." A 
few women and Negro delegates were scattered about the hall. 
Each state was allowed one delegate for every senator and 
representative it had in Congress and additional delegates in 
proportion to the Populist vote cast in the state. This plan 
14 St. Louis Republic, July 20, 1896; Raleigh News and Observer, July 22, 
1896. The latter account describes how the Bryan-Sewall committeemen 
decided to put up General James G. Field of Virginia rather than Weaver 
for the temporary chairmanship and then withdrew Field to allow Butler to 
be nominated by acclamation. The Globe-Democrat, July 22, reports that a 
caucus of the extreme midroaders, led by Texans, was meeting when the news 
came of Butler's nomination as temporary chairman; Harry Tracy and two 
others were sent to invite Butler to address the caucus. Tracy returned to 
report that, "Senator Butler told me he was in favor of adopting a Populist 
platform and tendering the nomination to Bryan." Although hisses greeted 
this news, Davis defended Butler and Jerome C. Kearby, another Texas 
leader, refused to allow his name to be entered against Butler's. The caucus 
finally fixed on an obscure Missourian to run against Butler for the temporary 
chairmanship, as the Silver Democrats had revolted against Senator David Hill 
of New York at their Chicago convention. But the next day when the 
convention actually began the Texans decided not to make the fight-
obviously because such extreme midroadism was in a small minority. 
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of representation meant that New York had only forty-four 
delegates, based mostly on population, while Texas and North 
Carolina each had around a hundred votes, and Kansas, with 
the largest western delegation, had eighty-two. One analysis 
of the convention by sections showed that the South had 
about six hundred delegates, or nearly half; the East, one 
hundred and fifty; the North (including Ohio and to the 
Missouri river but not including Missouri and the Dakotas), 
two hundred and forty; and the West (beyond the Missouri), 
three hundred and fifty-six.15 
With extremists on both sides waiting for their openings to 
yell in uninhibited Populist style, Butler successfully walked 
an oratorical tightrope in his keynote address. He suggested 
that the Democrats, from a mixture of alarm and conscience, 
had committed "petty and grand larceny by stealing the 
People's party platform almost in its entirety." What then 
should the Populists do? They should insist upon putting 
issues above partisanship, as they had traditionally demanded, 
and help settle the financial question so that other funda-
mental matters could be dealt with next. 
But the separate People's party was still absolutely neces-
sary. Without it, "the next Democratic National Convention 
would repudiate the platform it recently adopted at Chicago, 
and Mr. Bryan would stand no more chance four years hence 
of being nominated by that party than Thomas Jefferson 
would if he were alive." Without alluding directly to the 
plan for a southern vice-presidential nominee, Butler con-
15 New York Herald, July 19, 1896. Silveus, "The Antecedents of the 
Campaign of 1896," llO, gives the number of delegates that each state was 
assigned by the national committee's original call for the convention. When 
Texas and some other southern states complained, however, the national 
committee granted them increases in voting strength-in the case of Texas 
from 95 to 103 delegates. The statement in Hicks, Populist Revolt, 361, that 
the plan of representation favored the West at the expense of the South is 
based on Tracy's charge in the Southern Mercury, February 27, 1896, and 
does not appear to be correct about the final composition of the convention. 
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eluded with a plea for unity, which, under the circumstances, 
was hardly mere rhetoric. A party that had raised up a great 
principle and split the two old parties, he argued, "is not 
going to be foolish enough to allow itself to split on methods 
and detail. We will stand together."16 
After the keynote address the convention adjourned until 
evening to give the committee on permanent organization 
time to prepare its report. Since there had been no floor 
fight about Butler's election, all hands prepared for battle 
about the election of the permanent chairman of the con-
vention. The extreme midroaders filled the air with their 
threats of bolting if the leaders tried to force the nomination 
of Bryan. The election of the permanent chairman, as all 
declared at the time, would be the first test of the power of 
the various factions. 
When the delegates reassembled at 8 P.M. they found the 
convention hall in darkness. A few candles at the press table 
cast a weird light as the band played bravely and some of the 
restless delegates tried to sing. Some of the extreme mid-
roaders concluded that the darkness had resulted from a trick 
of the Bryan men. Someone yelled, "Its a scheme of the 
Bryan men" and if "they" nominate Bryan "we'll split this 
convention." "You're a disgrace to the party," came back 
from the dark depths of the hall. One delegate from Texas, 
a congressional candidate, declared, "There has been some 
ugly work, and the culprits had better beware."17 
After the aisles began to choke with pushing and shouting 
delegates, Davis of Texas finally got the attention of the 
16 Bryan, First Battle, 259-64, reprints the text. The New York Herald, 
July 23, 1896, reported that Butler's "adroit" speech made such a strong 
impression that many delegates were mentioning him for the vice-presidential 
nomination. His age, however, would have made that constitutionally impos-
sible, since he was only thirty-three. 
17 Raleigh Caucasian, July 30, 1896, has many of these details in a firsthand 
account that was probably written by the editor, Hal Ayer, who was also a 
delegate to the convention; see also St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 23, 1896, 
and Raleigh News and Observer, July 24, 1896. 
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crowd: "As his tall form and broad, sweeping sombrero 
came within the narrow ring of light from the tallow dip, 
the delegates immediately recognized him, and there were 
shouts of 'shut up,' 'keep quiet,' 'Listen to Cyclone.' " He 
yelled that the "electric wires were 'disaffected' " but would 
be repaired soon. Nevertheless, at 8:45 P.M. Butler, probably 
fearing greater chaos in the darkness, announced that the 
accident in the lighting would prevent the committees from 
reporting that night and declared the convention recessed 
until the following morning.18 
This episode is important both because it illustrates the 
mood of certain elements of the convention and because it 
has been cited by various historians as a mysterious develop-
ment that Butler and other "manipulators" may really have 
been responsible for, a part of the "conspiracy" for Bryan at 
St. Louis. The simple truth was that the heat in St. Louis, 
which had reached a point that inspired editorial comment, 
exploded about 6 P.M. in a rain and electrical storm that 
knocked down some power lines.19 
Regardless of the lights, those delegates who would proceed 
with passionate disregard of the danger of splitting the party 
were in a minority. Certainly the voting on the permanent 
chairmanship proved that the next day (Thursday, July 23). 
The majority report of the committee on permanent organiza-
tion recommended Senator William Allen of Nebraska, a 
fervent supporter of Bryan who was also believed by most 
observers to favor Sewall. The minority report named James 
18 Raleigh Caucasian, July 30, 1896; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 23, 
1896. 
19 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 23, 1896; Raleigh News and Observer, 
July 23, 1896. The correspondent of the Atlanta Constitution, July 23, 1896, 
referred to a "terrific cyclone" that hit the city as night fell. After quoting 
the editor of the Southern Mercury about the "fusion gang's" plunging 
the hall into darkness to confound the midroaders, Hicks, Populist Revolt, 
361, states: "Whatever the situation might have been had the lights not 
gone out, next morning the fusionists were clearly in the majority." For 
later and continuing charges by Texans about a pro-Bryan plot in connection 
with the episode, see Martin, People's Party in Texas, 241. 
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E. Campion, an obscure extreme midroader from Maine. 
Allen was chosen, 758 to 564. 
Thus a majority of the convention agreed on a Bryan man 
for permanent chairman. An even larger majority later 
accepted the report of the committee on the platform as 
made by General Weaver and rejected proposals backed by 
some of the extremists led by Coxey of Ohio. The platform 
recognized the financial question as the "great and pressing 
issue" before the country, and Populists invited the "co-
operation of all organizations and citizens" who agreed on 
"this vital question." 
In addition to the important cluster of demands dealing 
with finance, the Populists joined the new Democracy in 
calling for an income tax, an end to the misuse of the injunc-
tion in labor disputes, and other reforms. The Populists still 
included several of their usual demands which the Democrats 
had not espoused, such as government ownership of the 
railroads and telegraph, reclamation by the Federal govern-
ment of lands granted to the railroads and other corporations 
in "excess of their actual needs"; direct legislation through the 
initiative and referendum; the election of the president, 
vice president, and senators by a "direct vote of the people"; 
and jobs on public works for the unemployed in times of 
industrial depression. The platform, in short, represented 
the majority's desire to express the independence of the 
Populists as well as to invite cooperation with other reform 
forces on the paramount issue.:ro 
The undecided, crucial question remained: would the 
extreme midroaders bolt, as they constantly threatened, after 
the majority named Bryan as the Populist candidate? The 
extreme fusionists, who insisted that the Populists had to 
20 The platform is reprinted in Bryan, First Battle, 271-76; the New York 
Herald, July 25, 1896, reports its adoption. The Populist platform also 
denounced "the wholesale system of disfranchisement" that Mississippi and 
South Carolina had already adopted. 
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accept Sewall as well as Bryan, were counting on either a 
stampede to Sewall in the enthusiastic aftermath of Bryan's 
nomination or an adjournment after that nomination to give 
them time to woo a majority to Sewall. If the Southern 
extremists bolted, moreover, the task of selling Sewall to the 
delegates remaining in the convention would become that 
much easier.21 
In order to prevent any possibility of Sewall's being 
nominated, the minority report of the committee on rules 
and procedures called for a reversal of the usual order of 
nominations and the naming of the vice-presidential candi-
date first. Texans, Georgians, and others rallied to this idea, 
not only because they were anti-Sewall but also because they 
hoped that somehow the presidential nomination might be 
miraculously saved for a Populist too. The next round of 
voting began. 
North Carolina, which had divided its ninety-five votes 
equally in the Allen-Campion contest for the permanent 
chairmanship, was a key state in the tense fight about the 
order of business. When the roll call reached it, Congressman 
Harry Skinner mounted a chair and shouted: "North Carolina 
stands with Nebraska. When we came here this morning we 
were for the minority report, but since then we have had 
assurances from Kansas, Nebraska, and other ... States that, 
if we would permit the regular order to prevail the cause of 
Populism in the South should be recognized by the nomina-
tion of a Southern candidate for Vice-President. North 
Carolina therefore casts 85 votes for the majority report and 
10 for the minority." 
As the roll call neared the end, rumors began to circulate 
that the Bryanites had narrowly won with the majority report 
21 The National Silver party also began its convention in St. Louis on July 
22 but had little influence on the Populists. After nominating Bryan and 
Sewall on Friday, July 24, the Silver party adjourned without waiting for the 
Populist nominations. 
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for the traditional order of nominations. Southern midroaders 
rushed to beg the North Carolina delegation to change its 
vote. Skinner hurriedly consulted with Butler, rushed back 
to his delegation, and again mounted the chair: "Mr. Chair-
man, North Carolina cast its vote to nominate a President 
first, after pledges from Kansas and other States that after-
wards a [southern] Populist should be nominated for Vice-
President. Are you sincere? I demand to know as I am 
empowered to change the vote of North Carolina." 
Bedlam descended upon the convention. Cries of "yes, 
yes" and "no" filled the air. Thomas Patterson, head of the 
Colorado delegation and a leading supporter for the Bryan-
Sewall ticket, yelled that it was "disgraceful that in a con-
vention like this any such deals should be mentioned." He 
vowed that "Colorado had no part in it." 
Skinner, probably exhausting the patience of many with 
his further remarks about a southern man's deserving the 
vice-presidential nomination, concluded by casting all of 
North Carolina's ninety-five votes for the minority report. 
With the convention again in churning commotion and 
Marion Butler on the platform cheering "as long as his voice 
held out," Allen finally restored order to announce that the 
minority report had carried by 785 votes to 615. A Populist 
vice-presidential candidate would be named first. 22 
The midroaders, both the extreme and moderate ones 
cooperating, had won their first clear victory. They celebrated 
accordingly, the extremists temporarily ignoring the limited 
nature of their victory. The anti-Bryan midroaders hurt their 
own cause through lack of organization and noisy immodera-
tion in general. One sympathetic observer remarked that the 
22 Raleigh Caucasian, July 30, 1896, has the most detailed account of this 
but see also St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 25, 1896, St. Louis Republic, 
July 25, 1896, and Raleigh News and Observer, July 25, 1896. Some accounts 
give the final vote as 738 to 637, but in any case the point is clear that 
North Carolina's votes were necessary for the minority report on the order 
of business to win. 
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large Texas delegation was composed of some of the "best 
men on the American continent" but was handicapped, 
nevertheless, by such "wild fools as a man named Wilkins 
from California, and a high cheeked and peak headed yahoo 
from Missouri, and two or three other similar characters. 
These cranks put the many good men of the mid-road faction 
to disadvantage."23 
Despite these handicaps, the midroaders came into their 
own at about sixteen minutes before 1 A.M. (the appropriate-
ness of the "sixteen to one" amused them) on Saturday, July 
25, when one of their best-loved spokesmen, Tom Watson of 
Georgia, received the Populist nomination for the vice presi-
dency. When the nominating speeches were made Friday 
night, Watson was not the candidate of the extreme mid-
waders; they preferred Frank Burkitt of Mississippi. But 
Watson's name had been mentioned among the delegates and 
in the newspapers in connection with the compromise plan 
that Marion Butler had advocated. Colorado, Kansas, and 
other western states stood by Sewall. When the first ballot 
showed that Watson had a large lead, but not a majority, 
with Sewall running second, Texas changed from Burkitt to 
Watson; Tennessee switched from her favorite son, A. L. 
Mimms, to Watson; as North Carolina prepared to change 
her vote from Harry Skinner to Watson, the chair announced 
that the Georgian had won the nomination.24 
23 Raleigh Caucasian, July 30, 1896. See also the comment in the St. 
Louis Globe·Democrat, July 24, 1896, that the "middle·of.the·road men have 
acted more like a disorganized mob than anything else since they've been in 
St. Louis." 
24 Raleigh Caucasian, July 30, 1896; New York Herald, July 25, 1896; 
Hicks, Populist Revolt, 365; and Bryan, First Battle, 270·71. Mann Page of 
Virginia was also nominated. The New Yorker who placed Sewall's name in 
nomination did not have a happy task: "Mr. Chairman, in order to draw 
the poison quickly, and have it out, let me ... give some reason or try to 
give some reason why we should nominate" Sewall. (Applause and hisses.) 
He concluded: "The Vice President does not amount to much unless the 
President is a consumptive, and 'Billy' Bryan is no consumptive." New York 
Times, July 25, 1896. 
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Just why Tom Watson, with his long record of strong 
opposition to fusion of any kind, had consented to play a vital 
role in a plan designed to bring about quasi-fusion of the 
Populists and Democrats is a puzzle that may never be solved. 
Perhaps the best answer is the one that he himself gave 
shortly after the convention. "I will accept the nomination," 
he explained, "in the interest of harmony and to prevent 
disruption of the Populist party, which seemed imminent." 
Watson added that under the circumstances he fully endorsed 
the convention's action; furthermore, when he and Bryan 
had been in the House of Representatives they had "voted 
together on every measure." Watson subsequently explained 
that he had been sincere in saying earlier that he would not 
accept either place on the straight Populist ticket that he had 
advocated. He added: "I stayed away from the Convention 
partly to avoid prominence, and the Georgia delegation had 
positive instructions not to allow the use of my name. . . . 
When I said I would not accept I did not dream that such a 
crisis could possibly come upon our party."25 
In thinking that his candidacy was necessary to "harmonize 
the factions and save the party" Watson was partly correct. 
He was hardly the only southern Populist who could have 
served the purpose, but he was well qualified, aside from an 
erratic streak that was destined to cause much difficulty in 
the campaign. Where the real trouble came was in the later 
assertion by Watson and some of his followers that unnamed 
Democratic "lobbyists" and Senator Jones had promised that 
if the Populists would nominate Bryan the Democrats would 
manage to get Sewall off their ticket.26 
25 Atlanta Constitution, July 26, 1896; telegram from Watson to New 
York Herald, July 28, 1896. 
26 Alex M. Arnett, The Populist Movement in Georgia (New York, 1922), 
199, names two of the Georgia delegates who made this claim in 1896 and 
then told it to him years later. Arnett adds: "Mr. Watson declared to the 
writer in a recent interview that Jones never denied making such a promise. 
Jones seems to have ignored the charge." Both Watson and Arnett were 
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If any of the Georgia delegates in St. Louis telegraphed to 
Watson that Jones had promised Sewall's withdrawal, and 
memories rather than documents are the only sources for the 
story, they were apparently guilty of either unintelligent 
wishful thinking or distortion of the truth. As early as July 
21 accounts had been published of Jones' refusal to discuss 
any such bargain with Marion Butler; and after a majority of 
the delegates had voted for Allen for the permanent chair-
manship, it was obvious that a solid majority of the Populists 
at St. Louis intended to nominate Bryan for the presidency. 
After that vote on July 23, as before it, Jones and the leaders 
of the extreme fusionists among the Populists worked not to 
conciliate the extreme midroaders but to secure the Populist 
nomination of Sewall as well as of Bryan. Not until Butler 
and the moderate midroaders joined the Texas-led extremists 
in proceeding first with the nomination of the vice-presidential 
candidate did the extreme fusionists see their hopes of 
nominating Sewall too begin to slip away. With a Populist 
majority established for Bryan, why should any of the Demo-
cratic leaders at St. Louis talk about replacing Sewall with a 
southern Populist? 
Aside from these developments at St. Louis, the Democrats 
were confident after the triumph of the reformers at Chicago 
wrong. Newspapers before, during, and after the Populist convention carried 
Jones's emphatic denial of precisely this charge. One example: "I have 
never stated to any one that there is any likelihood of Mr. Sewall with-
drawing from the ticket." Jones to T. M. Patterson, July 24, 1896, in St. 
Louis Globe-Democrat, July 26, 1896. William W. Brewton, The Life of 
Thomas E. \Vatson (Atlanta, 1926), 268-69, tells virtually the same thing 
as Arnett. Brewton, an ardent admirer of Watson who had access to his 
papers after his death, adds that Watson was really not surprised that Sewall 
would not resign and that "it was only" to prevent the split in the party 
that he had "wired his consent to fusion." Hicks, Populist Revolt, 365, states 
that "most of the compromisers at St. Louis" believed that the Democrats 
would withdraw Sewall and cites Arnett and Brewton. Woodward, Watson, 
298, writes that Watson "was given to understand" that the Democrats 
would withdraw Sewall and cites an interview with one J. L. Cartledge of 
Augusta, Georgia, "who wired Watson from St. Louis." 
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that the Bryan-Sewall ticket would win in the South. Thus 
Bryan's running mate had been chosen not from the "safe" 
section but from New England, which was "safe" for the 
Republicans. In all of the southern midroaders' fulminations 
against Sewall there ran a deep, sectional resentment that the 
South had again been bypassed in the selection of candidates 
for the highest national offices. Southern Populists, for all 
their brave, and to a large degree successful, efforts to tran-
scend the old sectionalism, were still Southerners who carried 
their own share of what Professor C. Vann Woodward has 
called "the burden of Southern history." 
That Senator Jones or any other responsible Democrat at 
St. Louis agreed to try to eliminate Sewall from the race is 
altogether improbable. What is much more likely is that 
Marion Butler at St. Louis said, and correctly, that he had 
done, was doing, and would do everything in his ability to 
bring about Sewall's withdrawal. Even a political novice 
might be expected to know that Butler's power concerning a 
nomination already made by a national Democratic conven-
tion was limited. Moreover, his primary purpose was not to 
eliminate Sewall, as desirable as that might be from his view-
point and that of other Populists, but to save the national 
organization of the People's party. This was the purpose 
which had finally inspired so many outstanding Populists 
from all sections of the country to cooperate with Butler in 
the unprecedented program of action undertaken at St. Louis. 
The early morning nomination of Watson brought the 
Populists to the last, and in many ways most delicate, phase 
of their convention, the nomination of the presidential candi-
date. It was delicate because the extreme fusionists had 
argued all along that the nomination of Bryan without Sewall 
was impossible and that Bryan would not, indeed could not, 
accept any such nomination. Could the Populists nominate 
him even if he asked that they not do so? 
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Many delegates were impatient for the answer to that 
question as the celebration following Watson's nomination 
began to die down in the hall. Some had come to the 
evening session with their luggage in tow. But the time was 
about 1 A.M. (Saturday, July 25), the end of a long day's 
exciting developments. Weaver's motion for adjournment 
was declared by the chair to be carried amid confusion and 
shouts of "no."27 
The telegraph, even before the newspapers, kept Bryan in 
Lincoln fully informed of developments in the Populist 
convention. Jones had advised him, however, to ignore all 
embarrassing questions and let his well known record speak 
for itsel£.28 But when the Populists voted to nominate their 
vice-presidential candidate first, and Sewall's chances faded 
accordingly, the Democratic national chairman telegraphed 
Bryan the news, asked him what should be done if Sewall 
were not nominated by the Populists, and advised him that 
in such event he (Jones) favored declining a nomination by 
the Populists. 
Bryan responded, before or about the time that the Popu-
lists were making their speeches naming the various vice-
presidential nominees, that he agreed with Jones and wished 
his name withdrawn from consideration if Sewall were not 
nominated also. These telegrams were in the hands of 
Thomas Patterson of Colorado that evening. The St. Louis 
newspapers as well as every other daily paper of any size in 
27 New York Herald, July 25, 1896. Despite the late hour, the argument 
might be made that Weaver, Allen, and others were afraid to proceed to 
the nomination of the presidential candidate when Populist partisanship 
ran high in the wake of Watson's nomination. On the other hand, Bryan's 
position was still ambiguous as far as most delegates knew at 1 A.M. It 
would be much less so, and more embarrassing for his Populist supporters, 
after the morning newspapers appeared. 
28 Jones to Bryan, telegram, July 21, 1896, Bryan MSS. An example of 
what Jones meant: the Georgia delegation wired Bryan on July 24 asking 
if he would accept the Populist nomination on the Populist platform, and 
the penciled notation on the telegram in the Bryan MSS is "not answered." 
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the nation carried either the texts or the substance of the 
telegrams on Saturday, July 25, 1896.29 
In other words, every Populist who attended the last crucial 
session of the convention on that Saturday had read in the 
morning newspapers or had otherwise heard that Bryan did 
not wish to be nominated by the Populists unless Sewall was 
also. Yet the overwhelming majority of the Populists went 
ahead and nominated the Nebraskan as their own candidate 
for the presidency of the United States. 
They were not tricked into this action. They did it because 
they had to do it for the survival of the national People's 
party and for an excellent fighting chance to win the reforms 
they and many others desired. The Populist leaders were 
gambling, for they did not know what Bryan would do; but, 
being politicians, they knew that candidates never go out of 
their way to reject votes. In his speech nominating Bryan, 
General Weaver first established clearly that he too had been 
won over to the program of Butler and the other moderate 
midroaders. Then Weaver went straight to the embarrassing 
news from Nebraska: "You have all read the papers this 
morning; you have all read the manly dispatch from . . . 
Bryan. No man could have done less and be a man .... But 
. . . this question has reached a point where neither Mr. 
Bryan nor his personal friends have any right whatever to say 
what the action of this convention shall be. This is a greater 
question than the personality of its candidates."30 
29 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, St. Louis Republic, New York Herald, 
Augusta, Georgia, Chronicle (cited by Arnett, Populist Movement in Georgia, 
200), and Atlanta Constitution, all July 25, 1896. 
so Text of Weaver's speech is in Bryan, First Battle, 276-79. Hicks, 
Populist Revolt, 366, Woodward, Watson, 300, and other accounts mention 
Chairman Allen's refusal to read to the convention another telegram from 
Bryan or to allow Democratic Governor Stone of Missouri to read it during 
the roll call of the states for nominations. Although this episode has been 
made a part of the "conspiracy" interpretation, Allen argued that a Demo-
cratic governor had no right to the floor of the Populist convention and that 
he, Allen, was not going to tell the delegates again what they already knew. 
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General Field of Virginia, the vice-presidential candidate of 
the Populists' "blue-gray" team of 1892, seconded Bryan's 
nomination and moved that it be made unanimous. Although 
Allen was at first inclined to rule the motion in order, angry 
cries from the extreme midroaders led to a hasty huddle of the 
leaders on the platform and the decision to proceed with the 
roll call of states. Six more hours of oratory and nominations 
followed. 
The extremists rallied behind S. F. Norton of Illinois, 
editor of a Populist newspaper and author of one of the 
numerous books dealing with the money question. The bal-
loting resulted in 1,042 votes for Bryan, 340 for Norton. 
After the traditional parade of the state banners and noisy 
celebration, which Josephus Daniels found about as enthusi-
astic as the scene he had witnessed when the Democrats 
named Bryan at Chicago, the exhausted Populists prepared 
to leave St. Louis.31 
Henry D. Lloyd commented, soon after the convention, 
that if the "radicals" at St. Louis had only tried they might 
have carried the day against the "stultification" represented 
by Bryan and silver and carried it for "a 'stalwart' ticket" on 
a platform demanding "public ownership of all monopolies." 
Such an interpretation was obviously quite misleading about 
the temper and the composition of the convention. Lloyd, 
moreover, had a telegram in his pocket from Debs saying, 
"Please do not permit the use of my name for nomination." 
It should be noted also that in none of his various telegrams did Bryan say 
categorically that he would not accept a Populist nomination, if it were 
proffered, even in the face of his published request that he not be nominated 
without Sewall. Ignatius Donnelly raised this question without getting an 
answer in the convention's last session. See Martin Ridge, Ignatius Donnelly: 
The Portrait of a Politician (Chicago, 1962), 356. 
31 New York Herald, July 26, 1896; Raleigh Caucasian, July 30, 1896. 
Some accounts give fewer votes for Norton, but 340 seems to be correct. 
Eleven or twelve votes were scattered among Ignatius Donnelly, Eugene Debs, 
and Jacob S. Coxey. 
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And Clarence Darrow, among others, advised Lloyd not to 
make the "radical" speech that he had all ready for delivery 
to convention.32 
Such a struggle as the Populists had waged at St. Louis left 
serious divisions in the party. Yet the important fact was 
that the great majority of the party and its leaders had held 
together thus far for Bryan and national reforms. The cam-
paign ahead posed difficult problems for the Populists as well 
as for Bryan. Tom Watson, as subsequent events would 
reveal, had allowed himself to be sadly miscast in the political 
drama. But under the leadership of Marion Butler, whom the 
Populist national committee elected as national chairman 
of the party at the conclusion of the convention, the bulk of 
the Populists prepared to fight valiantly for Bryan and free 
silver. 
32 Lloyd, "The Populists at St. Louis," 303; Caro Lloyd, Henry D. Lloyd, 
I, 262. Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America: 
Midwestern Populist Thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 103-105, is an 
intellectual history which persuasively argues that fusion meant "the last 
chance to advance radicalism" and was "a long-term groping toward effective 
radical action." 
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The Campaign: First Phase 
As THE Populist delegates returned to their homes from the St. Louis convention, there was much confusion 
as to whether a genuine union of the silver forces had or 
had not been made possible. True, the Populists had nomi-
nated William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic standard 
bearer, as their own candidate for the presidency. But they 
had also rebelled, in order to prevent the threatened bolt of 
a large faction from the South and to preserve the inde-
pendent organization of the party, and had named Tom 
Watson of Georgia as their own vice-presidential candidate to 
run with Bryan. 
Under the presidential electoral system the voter casts his 
ballot for a slate of electors in each state, rather than directly 
for the candidates. Everyone saw, therefore, that if a slate of 
Bryan-Sewall (Democratic) electors competed in each state 
where the Populists were strong with a slate of Bryan-Watson 
(Populist) electors, the effect would be the same as if the 
Populists had not nominated Bryan. The reform vote would 
be split and the Republican chances for victory vastly en-
hanced. 
The solution of cooperative or fusion electoral tickets that 
was eventually worked out in most states may appear, from the 
perspective of hindsight, foreordained. But to contemporaries 
such was certainly not the case, and a welter of conflicting 
ideas and schemes developed before the main outlines of a 
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workable plan of union could emerge. Even then there were 
Populists, and conspicuously Tom Watson, who never ac-
cepted the cooperative plan that the large majority of the 
leaders of both parties came to support.1 
Sewall, the target of bitter attacks from southern Populists, 
played a quiet but on the whole a generous role in the tangled 
situation. Upon learning of his rejection by the Populists, 
Sewall immediately declared to Bryan: "I desire that you will 
do just what you believe is best for the success of the head of 
our ticket. The principles we are fighting for are so paramount 
to any personal relations that the latter should not have any 
weight or influence whatever with your action. I cannot for 
a moment allow myself to be a factor in any action on your 
part that would, in the slightest degree, hazard an electoral 
vote for you."2 
Sewall's personal generosity notwithstanding, Bryan faced 
a difficult situation. He had explicitly requested that the 
Populists not nominate him without also naming his running 
mate from Maine. Now if he repudiated the Populist nomina-
tion he stood to lose hundreds of thousands of votes and make 
union of the nation's reform groups impossible. If, on the 
other hand, he accepted the Populist nomination how could 
he do so without appearing to ignore the interests of Sewall? 
And if he accepted the Populist platform along with the 
1 Samuel W. Williams, a Populist of Vincennes, Indiana, claimed to have 
originated at St. Louis the idea of nominating the vice-presidential candidate 
first. Soon after the convention Williams proposed joint electoral tickets in 
each state; the Democrats would name half of the electors and the Populists 
half. Each party would still run its own ticket, though the electors would 
be the same on each. Then in each state where the Democratic-Populist 
electors won the election the state's total vote would be given, before the 
meeting of the electoral college, to the vice-presidential candidate of the party 
whose ticket had received the most votes in the state. New York Times, 
August 2, 1896. Nothing ever came of this plan at the time, probably 
because at first each side hoped the other's vice-presidential candidate would 
get out of the race. But ultimately a plan partly resembling Williams' 
scheme was adopted, as will be explained below. 
2 Sewall to Bryan, July 25, 1896, Bryan MSS; also Bryan, First Battle, 298. 
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nomination he would surely add strength to the bolt of the 
Gold Democrats, who charged that Bryan was not a true 
Democrat but a Populist anyhow. 
The Nebraskan handled the thorny issue gingerly but 
candidly. In a statement to the reporters crowded into 
Lincoln, Bryan first reviewed the telegrams that he and 
Senator Jones had exchanged during the last two days of the 
Populist convention. "I appreciate the desire, manifested at 
St. Louis, to consolidate all the free silver forces," Bryan 
declared, "and regret that they did not nominate Mr. Sewall 
also. He stands squarely upon the Chicago platform and has 
defended our cause against greater opposition than we have 
had to meet in the West and South." Admitting that the 
Populist platform was "substantially identical" to the Demo-
cratic one on many issues, Bryan pointed out that the 
Populists also endorsed some policies of which he did not 
approve. "All that I can now say is that my action will depend 
entirely upon the conditions attached to the nomination," he 
concluded. "I shall do nothing which will endanger the 
success of bimetallism, nor shall I do anything unfair to Mr. 
Sewal1."3 
Marion Butler, elated over the success of the strategy that 
he had sponsored at the Populist convention, declared that 
only one thing stood in the way of "certain victory" for 
reform since the Populists had met the Democrats more than 
half way: "Now, if Mr. Sewall will be patriotic and withdraw 
from the Democratic ticket as a candidate for Vice-President 
he will remove the only obstacle to a complete unification of 
all the voters who oppose the single gold standard and victory 
will be assured from the hour that he takes that high and 
patriotic position."4 In reply to a similar suggestion from a 
reporter, Sewall fired back: "Resign? I never withdraw and 
3 New York Herald, July 26, 1896; Bryan, First Battle, 297. 
4 Raleigh News and Observer, July 26, 1896. 
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I never resign. I was nominated by the Democratic Conven-
tion and I am a Democrat."5 
In view of the uncertainty about Bryan's acceptance of the 
nomination, one of the last actions of the Populist convention 
had been to grant plenary power, that is, power equivalent to 
that of the party convention itself, to the party's national 
committee. That committee met shortly after the adjourn-
ment of the convention and elected Marion Butler as the 
party's national chairman. Although Butler, at this initial 
stage of the campaign, clearly shared Tom Watson's hope 
of eliminating Sewall, newspaper rumors telling a different 
story added to the confusion. The New York Herald and St. 
Louis Globe-Democrat, for example, carried far-fetched stories 
to the effect that the Populist national committee, after 
conferring with Jones and other Democratic leaders, had 
decided to ask Watson to retire from the Populist ticket so 
that the committee could exercise its plenary power to name 
Sewall as the Populist candidate for the vice presidency.6 
Aside from the question of one or the other vice-presidential 
candidate's withdrawing from the contest, it was also uncer-
tain whether Bryan should be officially notified of his nomina-
tion by the Populists. Ignatius Donnelly, who had finally 
swung around to support the Populist nomination of Bryan, 
had pled to the convention for a generous policy that would 
not put Bryan in an embarrassing position and force him to 
choose between Watson and Sewall. "Neither do I think we 
ought to call upon him to indorse our platform," Donnelly 
had asserted. "Our principles do not exist by the sufferance 
of William J. Bryan or any man on earth."7 
5 New York Herald, July 26, 1896. 
6 July 26, 1896. Other members of the Populist national executive 
committee were: John W. Breidenthal of Kansas, John S. Dore of California, 
J. A. Edgerton of Nebraska, M. C. Rankin of Indiana, H. W. Reed of 
Georgia, James R. Sovereign of Arkansas, Dr. C. F. Taylor of Pennsylvania, 
and George F. Washburn of Massachusetts. 
7 Atlanta Constitution, July 26, 1896. 
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But there were those Populists, mostly midroaders from the 
South, who felt more animosity than generosity toward Bryan 
and who were still grasping at straws to thwart the majority's 
preference. After the adjournment of the Populist conven-
tion, anti-Bryan Texans took over the auditorium and invited 
other midroaders to join them in a caucus. This group of 
dissidents named Henry D. Lloyd and two others as a com-
mittee to ascertain if Bryan in his various telegrams to St. 
Louis had said that he would refuse to accept the Populist 
nomination. Another committee headed by one Henry L. 
Call of New York was empowered to name a full Populist 
ticket headed by Tom Watson in case Bryan had not accepted 
the Populist nomination within thirty days. Although these 
threats of bolting came from small minorities representing 
opposite extremes of the party, their mood is well illustrated 
by the statement allegedly made by Milton Park, Texan 
midroader and editor of the Southern Mercury: "If Bryan's 
name is not taken off the ticket we will go back to Texas and 
raise Old Ned. We will give the Republicans the electoral 
ticket, and we will take the State ticket for our share of the 
fruit." 8 
In the face of such recrimination and confusion, some of 
Bryan's advisers urged him to cut the Gordian knot by 
rejecting the Populist nomination. The Democratic governor 
of Missouri, William J. Stone, did not believe that either of 
the vice-presidential candidates could be withdrawn. Difficul-
ties surrounded the matter of cooperative electoral tickets. 
Therefore, Stone argued, Bryan should encircle himself with 
his prominent Populist supporters such as General Weaver 
and Senator Allen and with Silver Republican leaders and 
tactfully decline to run on the ticket with \Vatson rather 
than imperil the reform cause by running with the two vice-
presidential candidates.9 The Democratic national chairman, 
s New York Herald, July 26, 28; New York Times, July 26, 27, 1896. 
9 Stone to Senator Jones, July 31, 1896, Bryan MSS. 
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fresh from a conference with Bryan, shunned the drastic 
course recommended by Governor Stone and telegraphed the 
Atlanta Constitution that while he could not consider any 
scheme for the withdrawal of Sewall he would promote as 
best he could "any just and fair proposition for fusion on 
electoral ticket."10 
If Jones had next embarked on a studied policy of silence 
while the smoke settled, Bryan's cause would have benefitted. 
But Tom Watson kept the wires warm with his own chal-
lenging statements to the newspapers, and Jones unwisely 
retaliated. In addition to exclusive statements telegraphed to 
the New York Herald and New York World, both of which 
anti-Bryan papers delighted in stirring up as much trouble as 
possible for the silverites, Watson threatened through his 
own weekly organ, the People's Party Paper, that if Sewall 
declined to withdraw for harmony's sake "the rank and file 
of our party may break away from the leaders and refuse to 
vote for Mr. Bryan at all."11 
Provoked by these threats, Senator Jones gave an interview, 
which he subsequently tried to disavow, depicting the South-
ern delegates to the Populist convention as generally "not a 
creditable class" who had practically admitted that "they were 
out for nothing but spoil." He expected these men to "do 
all they can to harass the Democracy and create confusion, 
and in the end they will do just as they are doing now in 
Alabama, fuse with the Republicans and vote for McKinley. 
They will go with the negroes, where they belong." Watson 
might think that he could bluff the Democrats but, Jones 
insisted, "Mr. Sewall will, of course, remain on the ticket, 
and Mr. Watson can do what he likes."12 
10 July 31, 1896. 
11 Atlanta Constitution, July 30, 1896. 
12 New York World, August 3, 1896, as quoted in the Raleigh Caucasian, 
August 6, 1896; also Woodward, Watson, 310. For Jones' prompt denial 
of part of this story see St. Louis Post·Dispatch, August 4, 1896. 
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Marion Butler attempted to halt the fast developing feud 
between Watson and Jones. The Populist chairman an-
nounced that he refused to believe that the Democratic 
chairman had been quoted correctly. "What a humiliating 
and sickening spectacle it would be," Butler remonstrated, 
"should the folly of personal ambition and demon of party 
spirit step into, confuse and divide the allied majority and 
deliver the people into the hands of the enemies of republican 
institutions." He thought that it would be "better for candi-
dates and chairmen to do less talking at the present," for "in 
spite of the indiscretions of individuals and so-called leaders, 
the American people have determined to win the fight and 
they will do it."13 
Despite the difficulties and irritations inevitably connected 
with cooperation between the Democrats and Populists, 
Chairman Butler's optimism was not without a solid base. 
The campaign had not really begun yet, and headquarters had 
not been selected, much less opened. But contemporaries as 
well as historians concur in the generalization that a ground-
swell of enthusiasm for Bryan and silver swept over large 
segments of the population during the late summer. It would 
be October before Chairman Mark Hanna's superb organiza-
tion and unprecedentedly vast treasury would begin to bring 
cheering signs to the Republicans. Meantime, attention dur-
ing August focused on the Populist and Democratic state 
conventions where, often regardless of what national party 
chairmen might prefer, the state party units worked out their 
own versions of cooperation or, in some cases, noncooperation. 
Before the end of the campaign Democrats and Populists 
in twenty-eight states, including all of the crucial states of the 
upper Midwest where the decisive battle occurred, reached 
some type of cooperative agreement on the electoral ticket. 
But that total of twenty-eight states was not reached without 
13 Raleigh News and Observer, August 6, 1896. 
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much complicated maneuvering and negotiating, and there 
were states where fusion failed significantly. 
In Georgia a tense convention of some 5,000 Populists 
responded to Tom Watson's oratory with wild enthusiasm. 
Emphasizing the sectional theme on which he would continue 
to capitalize, Watson attacked Sewall and cried: "My God, 
hasn't the South played second fiddle long enough? Your 156 
votes insure the election of any man who can carry any 
decent support outside of the South. I appeal to Southern 
pride and to Southern manhood to seize the opportunity to 
link with the West and throw off the domination of the 
North and East."14 Despite his declaration that he would try 
to get every vote for Bryan whether he, Watson, went down 
to defeat or not, his strategy aimed at getting Sewall off and 
Watson onto the Democratic national ticket. After injecting 
a new issue into the state campaign by nominating a 
Prohibitionist for governor, the Georgia Populists, with Wat-
son's smiling approval, empowered their state executive com-
mittee to withdraw a fair proportion of the thirteen Populist 
electors for Bryan and Watson and substitute Democratic 
electors but to do this only after Sewall's withdrawal from 
the race. In other words, the Georgia Populists had acted 
boldly in accordance with the slogan that some midroaders 
applauded, "No Watson, no Bryan."15 
In Kansas, the stronghold of western Populism, the matter 
of Bryan's two running mates was viewed quite differently. 
When the Kansas Democrats indicated their willingness to 
let the Populists name the full state ticket in exchange for 
the Democrat's naming all ten of the Kansas electors, the 
14 Atlanta Constitution, August 7, and New York Herald, August 8, 1896. 
15 Atlanta Constitution, August 8, 1896. There was much truth in the 
Constitution's argument that the Populists had named their own vice-
presidential candidate not because they objected to Sewall but in order to 
preserve their party organization; and since \Vatson's nomination was a 
Populist party measure, it should be so accepted without any discrediting of 
Sewall. Thus the Atlanta newspaper favored electoral fusion. Ibid., August 1, 
1896. 
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Populists agreed. In other words, while the Georgia Populists 
maneuvered to give Watson all of Georgia's electoral votes, 
the Kansas Populists agreed, in effect, that Sewall should have 
all of Kansas' votes.16 
Neither the Georgia nor the Kansas Populists typified the 
slowly emerging pattern of national cooperation among the 
reform parties in 1896. North Carolina, as much as any 
important Populist state, would eventually do that. But 
Marion Butler, because he initially hoped to inspire Sewall's 
withdrawal and to do so without Watson's angry and open 
intransigence, was slow to reveal his hand. 
In North Carolina, cooperation between Populists and 
Republicans in 1894 had led to the first defeat of the Demo-
crats since Reconstruction, and the "Fusionist" legislature 
had enacted fairer election laws, restored home rule to the 
counties, and elected Marion Butler and a Republican, Jeter 
Pritchard, to the United States Senate. There was great 
pressure from many Populists in 1896 for a continuation of 
this cooperation in state elections, but the reformers' capture 
of the national Democratic party and the sharpening of 
national political issues complicated the matter. 
Fusion between Tarheel Populists and Republicans was 
never fully developed because Butler and a majority of his 
party refused to support Republican candidates for federal 
office, especially Pritchard for a full term in the Senate, unless 
they gave impressive proof of their support for free silver. 
North Carolina Republicans, like those in the West, did not 
openly embrace the monometallic gold standard, as did east-
ern Republicans and the Cleveland Democrats. Rather, farm-
state Republicans emphasized the call for "international 
bimetallism" in the Republican platform and insisted that the 
surest, safest way to restore silver was to elect McKinleyY 
16 Raleigh News and Observer, August 6; New York Herald, August 8, 1896. 
17 Atlanta Constitution, August 1, 1896; Raleigh News and Observer, 
August 16, 1896. 
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Despite the late and dubious conversion of these Republi-
cans to the cause of financial reform, Butler led a large 
majority of his North Carolina Populist followers in drawing 
a strict line between state and national affairs and doing 
nothing that would imperil or be inconsistent with national 
reforms. Still, because of his continuing hope to have Watson 
become Bryan's only running mate, he refused to rush into 
the electoral fusion which the Democrats proffered in North 
Carolina. 
Resigning his post as state Populist chairman, Butler pro-
ceeded to Washington where the Populist national executive 
committee held its first meeting of the campaign on August 
18. Important decisions desperately needed making, for Popu-
lists throughout the nation were confused as to what their 
policy should be. Were they to put out separate Bryan-
Watson electoral tickets or not? Were they to say, as many 
Texan midroaders did, that if Sewall did not withdraw they 
did not care if McKinley won and might even vote for him?18 
Watson, for some reason still avoiding crucial meetings of 
national Populist leaders, had "other engagements" that kept 
him from sitting with the executive committee. But the 
member of the committee from Georgia, H. W. Reed, had 
Watson's "entire confidence" and would serve as his personal 
representative. Watson reported that many Democrats in the 
South were demanding Sewall's retirement, and he felt sure 
that if the Populist committee took and held a "bold position" 
Jones and his colleagues would surrender.19 
18 The Butler MSS for August 1896 are tilled with inquiries, pleas, and 
threats from Populists across the country. 
19 Watson to Butler, August 8, 1896, Butler MSS. Watson and other 
Populists continually attacked Sewall as a "plutocrat" because of his con-
nection at one time with a national bank and with a railway corporation. 
Ironically, Reed, who served as Watson's representative and traveling 
companion throughout the campaign, was a prominent businessman in 
Brunswick, Georgia, who resigned the presidency of the national bank there 
for the reason that his "connection with the national executive committee 
of the people's party would unquestionably complicate the bank's relations" 
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Meeting, then, without Tom Watson, the Populist leaders, 
like their Democratic counterparts, decided that having cam-
paign headquarters only in Washington would not be strategic 
for the massive effort that was beginning in the upper mid-
west. The Democrats opened their main headquarters in 
Chicago, even though no important daily newspaper there 
supported Bryan. The Populists decided on a branch head-
quarters in Chicago to be run by George F. Washburn, a 
native of Massachusetts and veteran Populist, and by John R. 
Sovereign, head of the Knights of Labor and also a Populist 
executive committeeman. Butler, who would remain in the 
Washington offices, told waiting reporters what the Populists 
leaders had decided in their meeting: "The People's party 
ticket as named at St. Louis is Bryan and Watson, and that 
will be the People's party ticket until the polls close in 
November. Mr. Bryan is as much our candidate as Mr. 
Watson, and as far as this committee has the power it will 
strive just as hard to elect one as the other, and will leave 
nothing in its power undone to help either or both, but it 
will not help one candidate at the expense of the other."20 
As soon as Reed had informed him of the executive com-
mittee's decisions, Watson assured Butler that he was "in 
hearty accord with the conclusions reached." Watson ap-
preciated the "bold position the Committee has taken in 
reference to the St. Louis ticket" and asserted his desire "to 
act in thorough harmony with the Committee."21 But the 
Georgian apparently had misunderstood the true thrust of 
the committee's policy and of Butler's statement. 
The key phrase in the published statement was the last one 
in which the chairman declared that the Populist national 
and because he had to devote his time to the campaign. Earlier, Reed had 
been associated with the Savannah, Florida and Western Railway. Atlanta 
Constitution, August 27, 1896. 
20 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 19, 1896. 
21 Watson to Butler, August 21, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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leaders would "not help one candidate at the expense of the 
other." This phrase really meant that the committee would 
not necessarily support separate Bryan-Watson electoral tick-
ets, which policy Watson insisted upon as long as Sewall 
remained on the Democratic ticket, because the separate 
tickets would hurt Bryan's chances by splitting the reform 
vote. Nor, on the other hand, did Butler and his colleagues 
countenance the Kansas Populists' action which had, in effect, 
sacrificed Watson. In other words, Butler's hope of getting 
Sewall out of the race by an ambiguous policy concerning the 
presidential electoral tickets was coming to a swift end. 
Pressure from Bryan's Populist supporters and confusion 
among all Populists required that ambiguity cease. Populist 
national policy became clearer, therefore, and as the over-
whelming majority of the national Populist leaders called and 
worked for fusion with the Democrats on the various states' 
electoral tickets, Tom Watson's frustration and fury in-
creased. And Marion Butler, more than anyone else, became 
the target for the wrath of the unhappy candidate. 
Butler's initial statement for the committee was followed 
by others which clarified several key matters. A reporter asked 
what the Populist national executive committee thought 
about a state (such as Kansas) in which Democrats and 
Populists fused, with the Populists taking the state ticket and 
the Democrats all of the electors. Butler replied with what 
he described as the unanimous opinion of the executive 
committee: "We have no official information that this has 
been done in any State. If it has been done or is contem-
plated, the National committee will not approve or recognize 
it. The highest law in any party is the action of its National 
convention. No man or State or organization can be disloyal 
to such supreme authority of a party without arraying them-
selves in direct and hostile opposition to the National con-
vention." Butler added that the committee would not insist 
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on straight Bryan-Watson tickets in every state but that 
"wherever Populists and Democrats join forces on the elec-
toral ticket there must be a due and proper recognition of 
each party's candidates by a just and equitable division of 
electors."22 
Although he still had his own private hopes of eliminating 
Sewall, officially and publicly the Populist national chairman 
had retreated along the lines dictated by the wishes of the 
Populist executive committee as well as by the inexorable logic 
of the situation. But Butler blundered when he announced 
that there would be no formal notification of nomination to 
Bryan and Watson. He first said that this was because the 
Populist candidates in 1892 had not been formally notified 
and because it was the "mission of the Populists to depart 
from many of the useless practices and customs followed by 
the old parties."23 
Butler's statement implied that there would be no notifica-
tion at all. But what he probably meant to say, and what the 
committee apparently had decided, was that there would be 
no ceremony or meeting at the time of notification, as was 
traditional with the older parties. Rather, the Populists would 
merely notify by letter and at a time still to be announced. 
Butler's initial statement, however, did suggest that the 
Populists would not notify Bryan and Watson. 
Watson promptly fired back a correction: Generals Weaver 
and Field had been notified by letters in 1892. Furthermore, 
the Populist party would now occupy a humiliating position 
if it "virtually says it fears to notify Mr. Bryan, lest he should 
22 Raleigh News and Observer, August 21, 1896. Privately Rutler took an 
even stronger stand in defense of the Populist party's rights: "The People's 
party is entitled to more electors than its proportional part of the vote will 
justify on the ground that we have already put at the head of our ticket a 
man nominated by the Democrats." Butler to J. H. Hobson of Virginia, 
August 29, 1896, Butler MSS. 
23 New York Herald, August 24, 1896. 
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repudiate the nomination." Watson added that he himself 
would be sorely humiliated to be forced into a canvass without 
having been notified. 
More importantly, Watson now understood the true drift 
of the Populist executive committee's decisions, and he did 
not at all approve. He concentrated on driving Sewall out of 
the race and believed that the only way to do that was for all 
Populists to support only Bryan-Watson tickets. "Every one 
of these 'fusions,' whereby electors are divided between 
Sewall and Watson,'' he declared, "stultifies the Populist who 
votes the fusion ticket." Despite all his talk about objecting 
to fusion on principle, Watson actually objected to Sewall 
rather than fusion, as this statement made clear: "As the 
nominee of our party, I respectfully ask that we repudiate the 
fusion policy-unless Sewall is withdrawn." 
Watson explained that in deference to the committee's 
views he had ceased to edit his People's Party Paper. And as 
for the exclusive articles which he had been giving to New 
York newspapers ever since his nomination at St. Louis, 
Watson stated that he would write no more-without giving 
the committee due notice. "I recognize your right to guide 
the management of the campaign, & will co-operate cordially 
& earnestly," Watson insisted to Butler, "but upon questions 
involving principle I must claim the right to my own opin-
ions."24 Watson and the national leadership of the Populist 
party, as well as the majority of the party's membership 
outside the deep South apparently, were about to come to an 
embarrassing split over the "principle" of Sewall's continued 
candidacy for the vice presidency. 
Actually, the committee meant all along to notify Bryan 
and Watson but to delay doing so until after the Democrats 
and Silver Republicans had notified Bryan on September 8. 
24 Watson to Butler, August 24, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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The Populist leaders also regarded mid-September as an 
auspicious time because this would be immediately after the 
early state election in Maine, where the only question in any-
one's mind was just how large a margin of victory the 
Republicans would have. In the face of the expected crushing 
defeat of the Democrats in Sewall's own state, surely the 
Democratic leaders would be ready to talk about sacrificing 
the hapless Sewall. Pressure from Watson and his midroad 
sympathizers, however, forced the Populist leaders to clarify 
and announce their plans. 
Despite his qualified pledge to cease his personal campaign 
in the newspapers, Watson signed an editorial in his People's 
Party Paper which ripped into the committee and Butler on 
the matter of notification. Anti-Bryan newspapers in New 
York and throughout the nation reveled in the public dis-
harmony in the silver camp, and not only played up Watson's 
attack on the Populist leadership but shed crocodile tears 
over the allegedly shabby treatment being given the Geor-
gian.25 "You must realize as fully as I do," Butler rebuked 
Watson, "that our party is not being benefitted by such 
exhibitions through the press, whether they are correct or 
not." To Reed, who sympathized with Watson but desired 
to "keep a padlock on his centrifugal tendency," Butler re-
monstrated that the executive committee, as Reed well knew 
from his participation in the meeting, had had no purpose "to 
do anything prejudicial" to Watson. "It is impossible to run 
a successful campaign," Butler groaned, "if there is to be 
constant friction advertised in the newspapers between our 
candidates and our committee."26 
25 New York Herald, August 27, 1896; the New York Tribune's applause 
for \Vatson's "courageous and persistent efforts to compel a serious recogni-
tion of his candidacy at the hands of the Altgeld-Tillman-Bryan managers 
and their Populist allies" is quoted in Woodward, Watson, 317. 
26 Butler to Watson, Butler to Reed, August 27, 1896, Campaign Letter-
books, Butler MSS; Reed to Butler, August 30, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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Hasty conferences among the Populist and Democratic 
leaders in Washington led to the decision that the Populists 
should announce their plans to notify their candidates offi-
cially. Bryan had sent his approval of the move, apparently 
on the condition that nothing embarrassing about the vice-
presidential matter be included in the formal letter of notifica-
tion. Bryan did not need to worry on this score since he 
would be notified by one of his staunchest Populist sup-
porters, Senator William V. Allen, who had served as perma-
nent chairman of the St. Louis convention. Butler, who had 
been the temporary chairman, would notify the Populists' 
unhappy vice-presidential candidate.27 
In response to Reed's urgent request for a conference before 
he and Watson left for campaign appointments in Dallas and 
other western cities, Butler agreed to meet them in Atlanta. 
Watson, whose distrust of Butler had quickly taken deep 
root, coolly declared: "As to meeting me in Atlanta, or else-
where, you can exercise your pleasure. Thus far you have 
treated me with no consideration, and a continuance of that 
spirit of disrespect will neither surprise nor offend me."28 
27 New York Herald, August 29, 1896; Butler to L. C. Bateman, August 
29, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. Bateman, a midroader of 
Maine and Populist candidate for governor, wrote Populists around the 
country in an effort to enlist support for a notification designed to put Bryan 
on the spot. Although Bateman styled himself secretary of the notification 
committee, he represented only the caucus of midroaders that had met 
after the adjournment of the St. Louis convention. He had written Butler 
soon after that convention that if Butler and Senator Jones did not persuade 
the Bryan Democrats of Maine to endorse him in his campaign for governor, 
there could be no cooperation between Populists and Democrats on the 
electoral ticket. Bateman failed to gain the Maine Democrats' help and 
became widely publicized during the presidential campaign as a leader (who 
had an infinitesimal local following) of the "No Watson, no Bryan" group. 
Bateman to Butler, July 29, 1896; C. E. Sugg of Henderson, Kentucky, 
was one of several who informed Butler about Bateman's efforts to manage 
the notification; Sugg added that he was not one to work for McKinley's 
election "to spite those with whom I have had conflict." Sugg to Butler, 
August 22, 1896, Butler MSS. 
28 Watson to Butler, September l, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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Butler had, in truth, blundered about the notification. But 
he had promptly retrieved the error, and Watson did him an 
injustice in blaming him for the inevitable difficulties of the 
complicated campaign. With the opening of headquarters, 
Butler was plunged into the political negotiations that were 
proceeding among the various parties supporting Bryan and 
silver in all sections of the country except New England, 
where there were not enough Populists to warrant much 
attention. Butler's bulky campaign letterbooks reveal that 
he stood loyally by Tom Watson. He also journeyed to 
Atlanta for the meeting that Watson seemed to regard with 
indifference. 
The Atlanta Constitution carried a large engraving on its 
front page of the confrontation between Butler and Watson 
in the lobby of Atlanta's Kimball House. Although their 
greetings were reportedly cordial and the private conference 
lasted throughout the day, newspapermen learned little about 
the discussion. Repeating his argument that the Democrats 
should support Watson because he and Bryan truly repre-
sented the same principles, Butler expressed his belief that 
the "people of the south will support Watson," who "repre-
sents southern interests." Georgia Populists concluded from 
Butler's brief statement that he shared their (and Watson's) 
determination to refuse fusion unless Sewall withdrew; but 
to believe this they had to ignore Butler's additional statement 
that there would be no attempt on the part of the Populists 
to embarrass Bryan in the forthcoming notification.29 
The conference in Atlanta clearly removed none of the 
conflicts between Watson's and the executive committee's 
reading of the situation, but there was at least a temporary 
truce. As Watson proceeded to Texas, Butler returned to 
Washington to cope with problems that largely had to do 
29 Atlanta Constitution, September 4, 5, 1896. 
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with the arranging of fusion electoral tickets and the Popu-
lists' acute lack of financial resources. 
At the height of the campaign, Bryan conferred with other 
Democratic leaders. After the conference he told reporters, 
"We are down to our normal condition-without money."30 
This condition characterized the Populists even more than 
the Democrats, and in view of their almost absolute poverty, 
the Populists performed miracles to make the effort in the 
campaign that they did. "If we can have but one cent for 
every ten dollars used by the enemy," Butler proclaimed in a 
public appeal for contributions, "we could carry on a vigorous 
campaign that would mean [McKinley's] defeat."31 At the 
outset of the campaign, Butler hoped that an appeal directly 
to the people for contributions of $1.00 would not only result 
in the collection of a large sum of money but also in "the 
gratuitous performance of work for our cause" that would be 
worth even more than the actual money. Since the corpora-
tion and business sources from whence campaign funds for 
both parties had largely come in the past were all supporting 
McKinley, Butler hoped that the common people would see 
the necessity of uniting and contributing.32 
Such hopes proved illusory, simply because the depression 
that had begun in 1893 still kept the rank-and-file Populists, 
as well as their potential sympathizers, in abject poverty. The 
Populists' national headquarters found it impossible to pay 
expenses of speakers even when they were going into the 
hard-fought states of Indiana and Illinois. Political literature, 
which farmers especially still studied carefully, was available 
from national Populist headquarters but state and county 
committees had to buy it at cost. 
so New York Times, September 30, 1896. 
31 Raleigh Caucasian, September 17, 1896. 
32 Butler to Senator James K. Jones, August 24, 1896, Campaign Letter-
books, Butler MSS. The appeal to the public appeared on September 8, 
1896; see St. Louis Post-Dispatch of that date. 
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State organizations were little better off than national 
headquarters. From Iowa, for example, a farm state that the 
silver forces wanted and needed to win, the secretary of the 
Populist party sent word that literature was essential if the 
state was to be carried for Bryan. He complained that the 
Republicans were receiving literature from their national 
headquarters by the freight-car load and sending it out over 
the state by the wagon load. With $7.00 in cash on hand 
for the Populist fight in Iowa, the secretary confessed to 
feeling discouraged and begged for any free literature that 
might be available.33 
James R. Sovereign, the labor leader and Populist executive 
committeeman, had gone to Chicago to run a "Bryan-Free 
Silver Campaign Labor Bureau." He reported that local labor 
organizations had at least contributed "very limited aid" to 
his operation, but in Arkansas, his native state, the Populist 
voters were so poor that candidates for office were assessed 
before they could get their names on the ticket. Butler 
replied that the news from Sovereign was the same as came 
from the other states. "It is not only very disappointing, but 
it is really very distressing," Butler declared. "Is it possible 
that our people have gotten so poor that they cannot even 
keep headquarters open in making a fight against the ... 
gigantic combination of the enemy?" Although barely able to 
keep stamps and stationery in the headquarters office, Butler 
insisted that the sad state of affairs should be kept from the 
public; it would give too much satisfaction to the enemy.34 
One of the myths that Butler had to fight was that western 
silver magnates were handsomely financing the Bryan crusade. 
He wrote the president of the Western Federation of Miners 
in Colorado that he, Butler, could certainly understand why 
33 E. T. Meredith to J. A. Edgerton, September 11, 1896, Butler MSS. 
34 Sovereign to Butler, September 24, 1896, Butler to Sovereign, September 
26, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
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the miners were outraged by the injustices done them by the 
mine operators; but the miners could not afford to let those 
injustices drive them into helping McKinley in order to hurt 
the operators. Farmers and wage-earners, Butler argued, had 
lost twice as much by the demonetization of silver as the 
mineowners had. Furthermore, Populist headquarters had not 
received "one cent of contribution from the mine owners of 
the West," so the miners themselves had every reason to 
stand by their colaborers all over the country.35 
To the Populist state committees that begged for aid and 
pointed to the lavish assistance coming to local Republicans 
from Hanna's immense funds, Butler replied that, "When-
ever any National committee is able to raise funds to send 
to State committees, you may rest assured that that party is 
mortgaged to those who furnish the money."36 Such philoso-
phizing, however true and penetrating, was probably scanty 
consolation, but it was the best that Butler could do. 
Small contributions did come in, and the headquarters 
offices in Washington and Chicago were kept open and 
functioning throughout the campaign. Butler and his as-
sociates maintained the tremendous correspondence that was 
one of their principal contributions to the fight. And Butler, 
financially harassed as the Populists were, remained firm in 
his belief that "the people are so intensely in earnest on this 
financial question that it will be impossible for the millions 
of Republican money to seriously debauch the election."37 
The lack of money did not prevent the Populist leaders 
from playing key roles in the gradual consolidation of the 
various silver groups. The negotiations were often compli-
cated and tortuous, but in state after state Populists, Bryan 
Democrats, and Silver Republicans were brought into coali-
35 Butler to Edward Boyce, October 5, 1896, ibid. 
36 Butler to James A. Daniel, September 15, 1896, ibid. 
37 Butler to \Vharton Barker, October 2, 1896, ibid. 
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tions that were as harmonious and effective as could be 
expected under the circumstances. The situation differed 
from one state to another, and there were endless complica-
tions with reference to the state and congressional as well 
as the electoral tickets. But a few examples may serve to 
clarify the general outlines of the Populist contribution to 
the allied effort for Bryan and national reforms. 
In North Carolina, which had the strongest Populist party 
in the southeast, all observers agreed that unless the Populists 
and Democrats cooperated on the electoral ticket the Re-
publicans would carry the state for McKinley. Despite this 
situation, Marion Butler, as mentioned earlier, had restrained 
the Tarheel Populists from accepting the offer made at the 
end of July of five of the state's eleven electors. Hoping to 
find some way to inspire Sewall's retirement, Butler had 
refrained from decisive action in the one state where his 
own personal influence was greatest-and where action was 
bound to speak more clearly than all the statements in the 
world. 
There was also the fact that the Democrats in several 
southern states (such as Virginia and the deep southern 
states) felt sure of being able to carry their states without 
Populist help and were accordingly disdainful of cooperation. 
Moderate Populists like Butler as well as the midroad faction 
bitterly resented this Democratic attitude and hoped to hold 
back on cooperation where it was needed in order to secure 
a more favorable treatment of Populists in other states. But 
the hope of downing Sewall loomed largest in Butler's strategy 
of delaying electoral fusion in North Carolina. 
The climax of the Populist campaign to inspire Sewall's 
withdrawal came immediately after the smashing Republican 
victory in Maine in mid-September. Even Sewall had pub-
licly predicted such an outcome, since, according to him, 
three months earlier there had not been "5,000 free silver men 
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in Maine."38 But when the Republicans increased their 
margin of victory even in Bath, Sewall's home, the Populists 
seized on what they hoped would be the final and most 
damning indictment of the Democratic nominee for the vice 
presidency. "Mr. Sewall should certainly withdraw, and the 
State of Maine also says so," George F. Washburn announced 
from the Populists' Chicago headquarters. Washburn thought 
that the critical phase of the campaign had arrived, and the 
"only way to unite" the reform forces was for the Democrats 
to take Watson, whom Butler had notified in a letter that 
went out simultaneously with Allen's to Bryan.39 
Butler conferred at length with Jones when the Democratic 
chairman visited Washington in mid-September. Rumors 
about the withdrawal of Sewall or Watson or of both men 
filled the newspapers, but the actual outcome of the con-
ference was to further the plan of cooperation on the electoral 
ticket. Bryan clearly would hear of nothing else. Sewall had 
repeatedly denied all the rumors about his withdrawal but 
had written Jones that, "In all states where fusions seem to 
you desirable and important for the election of Mr. Bryan, 
I want my personal consideration to be entirely disregarded 
to that end."40 Butler, pressed by reporters and embarrassed 
by midroaders who had attributed certain anti-Sewall state-
ments to him, met the issue straight on: "I have never, either 
directly or indirectly, received any assurance that Mr. Sewall 
would be withdrawn, glad as I should be to receive such 
assurance, believing that it would make the election of Bryan 
absolutely certain."41 
Privately, Butler had finally come to recognize aspects of 
the matter that helped him reconcile himself to Sewall's 
38 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 15, 1896. 
39 New York Herald, September 16, 1896. 
40 Sewall to Jones, August 31, 1896, Bryan MSS. 
41 New York Herald, September 16, 1896. 
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remaining in the race. In several long letters to Washburn, 
written shortly after Butler had conferred with Bryan, the 
Populist chairman analyzed the pros and the cons of the 
vice-presidential situation. Suppose Sewall offered to with-
draw if Watson would do the same? What would Watson 
do? If he refused, would not the Democrats gain moral 
prestige over the Populists? Or if Watson should agree to 
withdraw, would not the midroaders cause even more trouble 
than they already were causing? More importantly, Butler 
faced the question of how Sewall's withdrawal in favor of 
Watson would affect Bryan's chances in the pivotal north 
central states of Indiana, 11linois, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Iowa. Although the Populist vote might be crucial there, 
these were not Populist strongholds nor did they fit easily 
into the sectional pattern of South and West versus East that 
Watson emphasized. Butler thought that if the Democrats 
were to foresee defeat they might be glad to withdraw Sewall 
"so that they could say they acceded to our demands but 
that Watson was the load that defeated the ticket." Even 
though these Democrats might be wrong, Butler felt sure 
that they would use the argument. 
Butler clinched his argument for sitting tight and accepting 
the accomplished fact of Sewall's candidacy with this point: 
"We must remember that the great masses of the voters in 
all parties and especially the silver Democrats and silver 
Republicans whom we hope to gain to our party in the future, 
care nothing about the Vice-Presidency and would feel bit-
terly toward any one who put any obstacle in the way of the 
election of Bryan in this fight." The two most important 
considerations, according to the Populist chairman, were 
whether any change would secure more votes for Bryan, and, 
secondly, how any change might affect the Populist party not 
only in the campaign but in the future. Perhaps something 
about the vice presidency more satisfactory to the Populists 
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could be arranged after Bryan's election but before the 
inauguration.42 
In addition to Butler's more realistic appraisal of the vice-
presidential muddle, the final event that precipitated the 
completion of electoral fusion in North Carolina was Bryan's 
visit to the state. Presidential hopefuls of both parties had 
since the war largely ignored North Carolina, together with 
the rest of the "solidly" Democratic southern states. But 
1896 was different. Several states of the upper South were in 
doubt. Bryan was not just making a polite courtesy call but 
giving North Carolina a sample of the "stumping," hitherto 
unprecedented for presidential candidates, that intrigued the 
nation. 
Most Tarheels, whose real economic interests had long 
been ignored by the nation's leaders, responded to the 
Nebraskan with wild enthusiasm. As he boarded the train 
at Asheville, Bryan's hand was so sore from the thousands of 
handshakes that he pled, "Be easy, don't squeeze boys!" A 
man in the pressing crowd yelled back, "Well, just hang your 
hand out of the window, so we can touch it." A reporter 
described the scene that followed: "Mr. Bryan cut his eyes 
around and smiled a broad amiable smile and put his hand 
out of the window. Then one by one up into the hundreds, 
the men carne and simply touched the back of his hand." 
Bryan's greatest qualities, according to the admiring news-
paperman, were his "constant remembering of others and his 
constant forgetfulness of self." Those were the qualities that 
lay behind "that dignity which was such a gracious dignity-
familiar with no one and with which no one was familiar." 
42 Butler to Washburn, September 21, 24, 1896, Campaign Letter-
books, Butler MSS. Butler viewed the bolt of the Gold Democrats as an 
attempt to insure Bryan's defeat so that they could recapture control of the 
party. This not only made the continuance of the national Populist organiza-
tion essential, he believed, but might lead to its absorbing many Bryan 
Democrats in 1900-if the Gold Democrats should succeed in their designs. 
Butler to J. M. Patterson, August 28, 1896, ibid. 
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Only the "naturalness of his powers" could explain Bryan's 
ability to submit to the grueling campaign schedule that he 
kept, for those men who "looked upon thought as work or 
mixing with plain people as condescension" would surely 
break under such strain.43 
In Raleigh the Democratic state chairman shared the job 
of presiding at the vast rally for the presidential candidate 
with the Populist chairman, who introduced Bryan. Behind 
the scenes Bryan impressed Populist and Democratic leaders 
alike; one of Butler's lieutenants, after riding on the Bryan 
Special Train, reported that the presidential candidate talked 
good Populist doctrine and knew who his true friends were. 
The time had obviously come for complete and final coopera-
tion on the electoral ticket in North Carolina, and the pro-
Bryan parties effected it almost as soon as Bryan left the 
state.44 
The arrangement reached by the Populists and Democrats 
in North Carolina provided for the Democrats to name five 
Bryan-Sewall electors, the Populists five Bryan-Watson elec-
tors, and the National Silver party (Silver Republicans) one 
Bryan-Sewall elector. Each of the parties was to list its slate 
of electors, who would be the same on all three tickets, under 
the party's name. This meant that all of the state's eleven 
electoral votes would, in the event of the expected victory for 
national reform, be cast for Bryan; but six of the electors 
would vote for Sewall for vice president and five of them for 
Watson. 
This was the type of fusion on the electoral ticket that 
Populists around the nation had been suggesting ever since 
their convention in St. Louis, and the silver forces in some 
other states preceded those in North Carolina in effecting the 
43 W. E. Christian, "On the Bryan Special," Raleigh News and Observer, 
September 20, 1896. 
44 James B. Lloyd to Butler, September 19, 1896, Butler MSS; Raleigh 
News and Observer, September 22, 1896. 
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arrangement. But because of the strategic position and 
relative vigor of North Carolina Populism, as well as because 
of Marion Butler's key national role, the final completion of 
electoral fusion in North Carolina marked a significant 
development in the national campaign. 
Attacks on the arrangement came from two different ex-
tremes. Populist midroaders, of whom North Carolina had 
a small but loud share, bitterly fought the plan as a betrayal 
of both Tom Watson and the party. The Progressive Farmer, 
for example, which had diminished in influence since L. L. 
Polk's death and the submergence of the Farmers' Alliance 
by the People's party, tore into the "cringing politicians" who 
had allowed Sewall to remain on the ticket and declared "the 
dangerous Maine plutocrat" to be a "warty excrescence on 
the body politic" which had to be removed.45 
On the other hand, conservative, pro-Cleveland Democrats 
assailed their party's "sellout" to Populism. In North Car-
olina, as in other southern states, the National (Gold) Demo-
crats, who had in early September nominated John M. Palmer 
of Illinois for the presidency and Simon B. Buckner of 
Kentucky for the vice presidency, attracted few followers. 
Even those Democrats in the South who sympathized with 
the Gold Democrats were reluctant to bolt the "party of good 
government and white supremacy." But fusion with "an-
archists and socialists," as many hysterical conservatives over 
the nation labeled the Populists, was too much. The most 
important spokesman for this viewpoint in North Carolina 
was the influential Charlotte Observer. It promptly donned 
the mantle of Democratic super-orthodoxy by insisting that 
since Tarheel Democrats regarded the party's national con-
vention as "the supreme court of the party" many of them 
now denied the "right of a State Democratic committee to 
trade one of the nominees of this convention [Sewall] out of 
45 October 6, 20, 1896. 
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five of the eleven votes to which he is entitled from North 
Carolina." Although actually disgusted by the revolution in 
the Democratic party that had occurred in Chicago, the loyal 
party organ declared: "Men whose boast is that they have 
never scratched the Democratic nominee, cannot afford this 
year to vote for a lot of Populist electors who will vote for a 
Populist for Vice-President against the Democratic nominee. 
It is their duty to scratch the name of every Populist from the 
electoral ticket and to vote only for those men who will vote 
for the Democratic candidate."46 
Bryanites among the southern Democrats, such as Josephus 
Daniels, were both horrified and embarrassed to see party 
orthodoxy thus carried to its logical extreme. On the other 
hand, Sewall's alleged "betrayal" by Bryan and Jones inspired 
false tears in the "goldbug" press of the Northeast. As the 
fusion plans began to emerge, the New York Times, for 
example, carried a story suggesting that the "pretense that 
the Democrats have upon their ticket a conservative man of 
business and property from New England loses its force as an 
argument in favor of its conservative character when plans 
have been made which make it impossible that such a man 
can be elected." The Times, like many other eastern news-
papers, insisted that since Bryan was actually a Populist in 
sentiment the fusion arrangement removed "the last possible 
excuse for any one voting the Bryan-Sewall ticket with the 
notion that it is a Democratic ticket even in its tail."47 
Perhaps the most effective answer to the charge that the 
Democratic nominee for the vice presidency had been be-
trayed in the fusion scheme came from Sewall himself. In a 
move designed to lessen the effectiveness of his self-styled 
"friends," he gave his explicit approval to the union in North 
Carolina between the Populists and Democrats. "I believe 
46 Quoted in the Raleigh News and Observer, September 24, 1896. 
47 August 31, 1896. 
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the friends of bimetallism ought to vote for the electoral 
ticket that will elect Bryan to the Presidency," Sewall 
declared in a letter to the Tarheel Democratic chairman, "and 
I thoroughly approve of the policy which unites the sup-
porters of free silver in your State and every other." Sewall 
hoped that nothing would prevent unity in "the people's 
cause against monopolies."48 
Since Sewall cooperated with the national leadership of his 
party while Tom Watson most emphatically and publicly 
disagreed with that of the Populists, Butler and his committee 
faced special difficulties. Nevertheless, Butler now joined with 
Jones in effecting fusion wherever possible. Butler's volumi-
nous correspondence as well as newspaper accounts suggest 
that the Populists and Democrats arrived at cooperative 
electoral tickets most easily in the critical states of the upper 
Midwest. The one exception was Indiana, where fusion was 
difficult, and the efforts there will be considered in the 
following chapter. But in Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Illinois, and Iowa, all crucial and in considerable doubt, the 
major reform parties achieved fusion on the electoral ticket 
with relative ease.49 
Within the former Confederate states, only in North 
48 Sewall to Clement Manly, September 29, 1896, in Raleigh News and 
Observer, October 2, 1896; also New York Herald, October 4, 1896. Sewall 
had earlier explained, in conjunction with one of his repeated explanations of 
why he would not consider withdrawing, that he understood how Bryan 
might be elected and he, Sewall, not be. "But I am thinking more of free 
silver than of Sewall," he added. "A change in the ticket now is out of the 
question." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 20, 1896. 
49 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1896 (New York, 1897), 770, has a 
convenient list of the twenty-eight states where Democrats and Populists 
cooperated on the electoral ticket. The division in the states mentioned 
above was as follows: Minnesota-4 Democrats, 5 Populists; Michigan-9 
Democrats, 4 Populists; Wisconsin-9 Democrats, 3 Populists; Illinois-20 
Democrats, 4 Populists; and Iowa-10 Democrats, 3 Populists. Eastern states 
which the Bryan forces early conceded to McKinley but where fusion was 
effected were: Massachusetts-13 Democrats, 2 Populists; Connecticut-5 
Democrats, 1 Populist; New Jersey-9 Democrats, 1 Populist; Pennsylvania-
28 Democrats, 4 Populists; and Ohio-18 Democrats, 5 Populists. 
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Carolina, Louisiana, and Arkansas were the Democrats and 
Populists able to come to terms. Electoral fusion failed partly 
because the Democrats in most of the southern states felt 
confident of carrying their states without any help from the 
Populists. But the midroad Populists in the South con-
tributed their influence to blocking fusion too, as in Georgia 
where the Populists agreed to divide the electoral ticket only 
if all the Democratic electors would vote for Tom Watson. 
Butler used every argument he could devise to strengthen 
the Populist position in the South. Immediately after agreeing 
to electoral fusion in North Carolina, he urged Jones to 
secure the same "winning division of electors" in his own state 
of Arkansas. Butler pointed out that one of the difficulties 
in North Carolina had been the Populist fear that in the 
safely Democratic states of the South the Democrats would 
not concede anything. He also argued that once he and 
Jones had gotten their own states safely arranged they would 
have more influence in achieving fusion in other states. "If 
there is one State in the Union where you should see that 
there is a joint electoral ticket," Butler suggested, "it is in 
your own State .... Yet pardon me to say, you should not 
handicap me in my efforts to give Mr. Bryan the electoral 
vote in doubtful States, when you could so easily help me 
by having a division of the electoral vote in your own State." 
The Populist chairman insisted that Jones had earlier agreed 
in conversations in Washington to promote Democratic con-
cessions to Populists in the South but whether that actually 
had been understood or not, Butler concluded, "I insist that 
it is good politics and I know that it will greatly help me in 
my work."50 
Bryan too urged the Arkansas Democrats to make conces-
sions, and when they finally agreed to give the Populists three 
50 Butler to Jones, September 24, 28, 30, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, 
Butler MSS. 
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of the state's eight electors, Butler and Jones tried to use the 
Arkansas arrangement to inspire fusion in Mississippi. 51 Their 
efforts failed there, but in Louisiana Butler had earlier been 
successful in encouraging the Populists to accept the Demo-
cratic offer of four of the state's eight electors. 52 In the border 
states of Kentucky, West Virginia, and Missouri the reform 
parties also achieved electoral fusion: in Kentucky-11 Demo-
crats, 2 Populists; in \Vest Virginia-4 Democrats, 2 Populists; 
and in Missouri-13 Democrats, 4 Populists. 
Texas, which wound up in the Bryan column in November, 
proved to be a special headache for Butler. Populism flour-
ished there but, as the national convention had revealed, 
most of the leaders were extreme midroaders, and there was 
especially bitter feeling between Populists and Democrats. 
\Vhen the two parties failed to agree on any plan of electoral 
fusion, the Texas Populists threatened to strike a political 
bargain that would have been the strangest in a year when 
many unusual political arrangements were being made: in 
exchange for Republican support for the Populist state ticket 
the Populists would vote for McKinley. Presumably this 
Populist-Republican electoral fusion would allow the Popu-
lists to vote for McKinley-Watson electors, though Watson 
himself repudiated the idea. Clearly the cumbersome elec-
toral college was being used in 1896 in a manner which the 
Founding Fathers could never have imagined. 
Butler coped with Texas as best he could from late August 
until the end of the campaign. At first he urged the Texas 
Populist chairman, J. S. Bradley, and Harry Tracy of the 
Southern Mercury to try to get the Democrats to agree on 
giving the state's fifteen electoral votes to Bryan and Watson. 
The Populist strategy in the states that were safe for Bryan, 
51 Butler to R. K. Prewitt, October 12, 1896, ibid.; New York Herald, 
October 11, 1896. 
52 Butler to A. B. Booth, Populist chairman in Louisiana, September 19, 
1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
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Butler explained, was to hold "out stiff to get everything that 
we possibly can for Watson."53 
But after Democrats and Populists in Texas failed to reach 
any agreement and Butler himself had been forced to accept 
the fact that Sewall was in the race to stay, the Populist 
national chairman was horrified by the reports that the Texas 
Populists might aid McKinley in order to hit at the hated 
Democrats. Ignored by Chairman Bradley, Butler wrote 
urgently to other Populists in the state; he admitted that the 
Democrats had acted badly but insisted that no action on 
their part could possibly justify Populist fusion on the elec-
toral ticket for McKinley. "If our people should foolishly 
divide the electoral ticket in your State with the gold men," 
Butler warned, "then you do not only justify the action of 
the Democrats in your State, to a certain extent, but you 
would kill the People's party forever in Texas, as well as give 
it a serious blow all over the country."54 
The national chairman informed another Texan that when 
the Populists at St. Louis nominated Bryan they had hoped 
that Sewall would come down; but, Butler added, there was 
"no contract made or pledge given by anyone, so far as I 
know, representing the Democrats, that this would be done, 
but I think it safe to say that the Convention would have 
nominated Bryan, anyway, if it had been known distinctly 
and positively that Sewall would not withdraw, because it 
was the very best possible thing to do from a party standpoint 
as well as from a broad and patriotic standpoint." When 
Hanna's best hope was to create dissensions among the allied 
silver groups, Butler asked, how could any man who loved his 
country and believed in the principles of Populism help to 
defeat a man like Bryan and elect one like McKinley?55 
53 Butler to Bradley, August 26, 1896, Butler to Tracy, August 29, 1896, 
ibid. 
54 Butler to M. D. Harrell, October 1, 1896, ibid. 
55 Butler to T. J. Middleton, October 12, 1896, ibid. 
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Despite all Butler's letters and warnings, newspaper reports 
from Texas at the time of the simultaneous meetings of the 
Republican state convention and the Populist state executive 
committee continued to mention the possible electoral fusion 
for McKinley. The deal never came off. One reason why it 
did not may have been a long telegram from Butler to the 
Populist chairman that was reported to have knocked the 
"whole combine to pieces."56 
Although different from the embarrassment threatened in 
Texas, trouble for the national leadership of the Populist party 
also resulted from the situation in Kansas. In most of the 
western states the Populists secured recognition on the elec-
toral ticket-in Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, and Wash-
ington, all with three or four electoral votes each, the Popu-
lists had a fair share. In California they got four of the nine 
electors, half of the eight in Nebraska, and three of the 
thirteen in Iowa. In Oregon, all four Bryan electors were 
pledged to vote for Watson for vice president.57 But, as 
mentioned earlier, in Kansas, the western bastion of Populism, 
the Populists accepted ten Democratic electors in exchange 
for Democratic support of the entire Populist state ticket. 
This arrangement, which clearly reflected the Kansas Popu-
lists' unconcern for their party's vice-presidential candidate, 
infuriated not only Tom Watson but Butler and most 
southern members of the party as well. Shortly after open-
ing campaign headquarters, Butler had warned western Popu-
56 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 11, 12, 1896. Martin, People's Party 
in Texas, 243, gives figures which suggest that some Populists in Texas went 
ahead and voted for McKinley in the general election and that many did not 
vote for any presidential candidate. The Republicans supported the Populist 
state ticket. 
57 Concerning the Oregon arrangement, Butler had expressed his apprecia-
tion and declared: "If all the other states had shown the same nerve and 
spirit that you have shown we would elect Tom Watson Vice-President 
beyond question." Butler to W. S. U'ren, August 28, 1896, Campaign 
Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
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lists against trading electors to the Democrats in exchange 
for support on the state ticket. He insisted that the "strength 
and dignity of our party will be tested solidly by the run that 
Watson makes."58 
Butler informed Senator Jones of the fact that the Kansas 
arrangement created dissatisfaction among many Populists 
elsewhere. Midroaders in Kansas, although apparently in a 
distinct minority, were howling loudly and, after Watson's 
speeches in the state, planning for their own convention to 
put out a straight Populist ticket. Butler reminded John W. 
Breidenthal, Populist chairman in the state, that Populists 
of the whole country were accustomed to look to Kansas as 
the "pioneer and bulwark of Populism."59 
Breidenthal, who was also a member of the Populist na-
tional executive committee, explained that he had done all 
that he could do to secure Watson electors. But the Kansas 
Populist convention had ignored his advice and made its own 
decision; he regretted the action, but the time had passed 
when anything could be done about it. Moreover, Breidenthal 
argued, Populist control of the Kansas state government, 
"enabling us to demonstrate what we will do for the people 
in the way of state legislation," and the election of six 
straight Populist congressmen plus a Populist United States 
senator were sufficiently important to make the national 
committee think twice before attempting to upset the ar-
rangement.60 
Despite Breidenthal's defense of the Kansas fusion, Butler 
58 Butler to Harry D. Moore, a Populist leader in Montana, August 31, 
1896, ibid. 
59 Butler to Jones, September 7, 1896, and Butler to Breidenthal, September 
7, 1896, ibid. Butler was wary, however, of the midroad faction and warned 
that the national committee "would not advise anything which would tend 
to help the election of Mr. McKinley, even though the situation was not 
satisfactory from a People's party standpoint." Butler to Abe Steinberger, 
August 29, 1896, ibid. 
60 Breidenthal to Butler, September 14, 21, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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persevered in his efforts to find some way to have the electors 
divided between Sewall and Watson. He suggested at one 
point that he would persuade Jones to get Kansas Democrats 
to divide the electors if the Populists would give the nomina-
tion for chief justice to a Democrat and both parties would 
support a Silver Republican for congressman-at-large. Al-
though he refused to work with the Kansas midroaders, whom 
Breidenthal and other Kansas Populists accused of being 
secretly allied with the Republicans, Butler was never able to 
change the one-sided electoral ticket in Kansas.61 
As Tom Watson grew increasingly uncontrollable and 
antagonistic to the national committee's policy, Butler finally 
took this position toward the Kansas situation: "I cannot ap-
prove, as I have said, of the arrangement which our people 
have made in Kansas, but in as much as nothing in that state 
would satisfy Mr. Watson but all of the electors, neither will 
I approve of endorsing the bolting electoral ticket [of the 
midroaders ], which can have no other purpose or result but 
to tum over that state to McKinley. There has never been 
but one chance of electing Watson Vice President, which 
was to get Sewall to withdraw. I fear that Watson's conduct 
has made this impossible. Then why should we jeopardize 
the state of Kansas, not only giving the electoral vote to 
McKinley, but also defeating six People's party Congressmen 
in that state, as well as a United States Senator, in return for 
nothing?" The national committee would just have to keep 
its "hands off" the Kansas situation and have nothing to do 
with Watson's "little spite game of his own."62 
61 Butler to Breidenthal, September 12, 21, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, 
Butler MSS. 
62 Butler to Washburn, October 3, 1896, ibid. Butler also had a problem 
about Colorado's three electors, all pledged to Sewall, but it did not create 
as much resentment and attract nationwide attention as did the Kansas 
matter. See Butler to T. M. Patterson, September 1, 1896, ibid., where 
Butler appealed to the Coloradan's "sense of fairness and right" and 
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Despite vexatious problems in Kansas, Texas, and elsewhere, 
Butler and his Populist associates threw themselves ener-
getically into the campaign. Fusion had "taken" in more 
states than it had failed in, and the unprecedented exertions 
of Bryan, together with his personal magnetism, seemed to 
fire the loyalty and admiration of those Populist leaders who 
worked with him. Ignatius Donnelly, for example, left the 
St. Louis convention dispirited and unhappy. He had finally, 
after much vacillation and collaboration with the extreme 
midroaders, swung around to support the nomination of W at-
son and Bryan, but his heart was not in the campaign. Stung 
by the Minnesota Populists' failure to support his own can-
didacy at St. Louis, Donnelly published a personal and emo-
tional statement in his newspaper proclaiming that he was 
"weary of this whole business" of politics and would, after the 
campaign, retire to his library.63 
But the popular orator was soon deeply engaged in Bryan's 
behalf. Donnelly went to Lincoln to speak at the Silver 
Republicans' notification meeting for Bryan. "From 4 to 6 
I slept, accumulating electricity, like a torpedo eel," Donnelly 
recorded in his diary, "for the meeting to-night." Then he 
spoke for over two hours to a crowd gathered before the hotel 
and estimated at from five to seven thousand persons. "I was 
pleased & proud to observe that after talking for over 2 hours, 
in the open air, at 64 years of age, I was as fresh as when I 
started," Donnelly noted. As for Bryan, Donnelly believed 
that the Nebraskan was "a very able, shrewd, wise man." 
reminded him of the party's sectional bargain at St. Louis. Patterson replied 
that with half of the Colorado Populists the question was not one of party 
but of the remonetization of silver and that it would have been impossible 
to have the state's Populist convention endorse Watson. Patterson to Butler, 
September 17, 1896, ibid. 
63 The piece is pasted in his diary for 1896 as well as in his scrapbook, 
Donnelly MSS, Minnesota Historical Society; see also Ridge, Ignatius Don-
nelly, 357. 
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And after both Bryan and his wife had finished flattering 
him during dinner, Donnelly speculated: "I have a dim hope 
that I may perchance get a seat in his cabinet if he is elected 
-but I have been disappointed so often that I am not 
sanguine as to any thing."64 
The more he labored for and with Bryan the greater 
Donnelly's zeal grew. A month after his initial encounter 
with Bryan during the campaign, Donnelly shared a vast 
crowd with the presidential candidate in St. Paul. The next 
day he called on Bryan and "his bright-faced, keen-minded 
little wife." Bryan invited him into a bedroom where the tired 
candidate rested. Donnelly showed Bryan a letter from 
Butler and a copy of one of Butler's appeals to Tom Watson. 
The diary entry continued: "We talked over the whole 
situation; and then Mr. Bryan proceeded to tell me what he 
proposed to do if elected president. His purposes are pure 
and noble. He is a great man; and if he is the choice of the 
people he will give the country an administration the greatest 
and best it has ever enjoyed. It seems to me he has been 
raised up by Providence to save the country from sinking into 
old world conditions."65 
Just as Donnelly's admiration increased for the candidate 
that many Populists had accepted reluctantly, so did Marion 
Butler's. He had, since the St. Louis convention, constantly 
emphasized the fact that Bryan was just as much the nominee 
of the Populists as of the Democrats, and Butler, in all his 
correspondence and public statements, had stressed Bryan's 
suitability for the role. But during the midst of the campaign, 
64 Entry for September 7-9, diary for 1896, Donnelly MSS. Describing a 
successful speech to 10,000 persons on October 7, Donnelly observed that he 
found that a tablespoonful of whiskey "just before speaking" helped "not 
only by warming up the intellect, but by helping digestion & preventing the 
formation of gases in the stomach .... As I use stimulants at no other time 
a very little has great effect upon me." 
65 Entry for October 10-11, ibid. 
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and after a personal encounter with the Nebraskan, the 
Populist chairman seemed to acquire a deeper regard for 
Bryan. After the peripatetic candidate passed through Wash-
ington on his way to address "laboring men" in Brooklyn, 
Butler had some striking advice for Senator Jones about "our 
candidate for President." 
First of all, Butler believed that Bryan should not let the 
eagerness of people to see and hear him draw him into making 
too many speeches in one day. His strength could not hold 
out unless he took better care of himself. And even if he 
spoke a dozen times a day only a small percentage of the 
people could hear him; if he only made one speech a day it 
would be reported more connectedly in the great dailies and 
put before the voters of the whole country.66 
The Populist chairman further suggested that the Demo-
cratic national committee, which even though its own funds 
were limited still had more than the Populists did, should 
send a manager along with Bryan to arrange all the numerous 
details "which must be very fatiguing and annoying to a man 
in Mr. Bryan's position." Local committees not only did not 
help the harassed candidate but often were a nuisance. 
Butler continued with a description that suggests the almost 
primitive quality of Bryan's detem1ined bid for the presi-
dency: "Last night, Mr. Bryan was forced to look up the 
schedule from here to Dover, [Delaware] in order to reach 
there by the regular train. He was forced to leave here and 
go part of the way, stop in the middle of the night, get up 
66 The fallacy in Butler's argument here was that many large dailies, such 
as the New York Evening Post and Hartford Courant, made no bones about 
a policy of not giving coverage to "heresy" and "fanaticism." The Post 
argued that there was not and should not be a place in any intelligent 
newspaper, even in the news columns, for the Bryanites' "yawps of ignorance 
and folly." The New York Times, of which Chattanooga's Adolph S. Ochs 
became publisher and general manager in August 1896, dissented from this 
view in an editorial on October 25, 1896. But even the Times' news columns 
were far from objective. 
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early this morning at six o'clock, catch another train in order 
to catch a local train going to his place of speaking. If he had 
had a manager, he could have rested here during the night, 
left this morning and had a special train over the branch 
route of 20 or 25 miles that would have taken him directly 
to his speaking place. The newspaper men who are traveling 
with him, tell me that things of this kind are constantly 
occurring. You may have considered all these matters before, 
but it seems to me that our candidate for President should 
not be forced to look after such annoying details. One of the 
newspaper men told me that Mr. Bryan has often been 
forced to carry his heavy grips from the train some distance 
up the street; that in one place he was forced to walk from 
the train up town, no arrangements having been made to have 
a carriage for him. Mr. Bryan may not object to any of these 
things but yet I do not think it should be allowed."67 Despite 
the campaign's hardships that Butler described, Bryan con-
tinued to evoke powerful responses, not only from the thou-
sands who heard his speeches but from individuals who found 
themselves caught up in the first genuinely exciting and mean-
ingful presidential election in several decades. 
Henry Demarest Lloyd was not, however, one of those in-
dividuals. Finally realizing that the great bulk of the Popu-
lists were not interested in doctrinaire socialism, Lloyd retired 
to his summer home in Rhode Island and more· or less 
washed his hands of the whole business. When a small group 
of the disgruntled midroad Populists in Chicago bolted and 
named Lloyd as their candidate for lieutenant-governor, F1or-
ence Kelley gave him the news. A prominent associate of 
Jane Addams and Governor Altgeld's appointee as Illinois 
factory inspector, she wrote Lloyd: "I wonder whether any 
candid friend has told you that the disreputable end of the 
61 Butler to Jones, September 21, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
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Populists have nominated you and are using your name for 
Lieutenant-Governor. "68 
Although Lloyd refused to allow the midroaders to use his 
name on their ticket, he sympathized with their views and 
remained aloof from the struggle that Florence Kelley regarded 
as so desperate. When Lloyd publicly derided the silver 
issue in a speech towards the end of the campaign, the 
president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America wrote that he had been "grieved" to hear 
Lloyd talk. "We may not think the question deserves all the 
attention it is now receiving," the labor leader declared, "but 
the other parts of the platform are o. k. and again this is a 
fight in which the people are against the organized Plutocrats 
of the country .... Let us hope that the people's Champion 
will Win. "69 
Lloyd could remain coolly detached, but his sister found it 
impossible to remain dispassionate about the question that 
most Americans were excited about. Herself an intellectual 
person who kept up a lively correspondence with her brother 
and knew his political views, Caro Lloyd Withington finally 
confessed: "We illuminated last evening for the Bryan local 
parade, and we hung out Grandpa Lloyd's enormous big 
flag with 26 stars. I couldn't resist putting 'Bryan & Sewall' 
on the edge of our little flag to help on the cause. I can't 
vote you see. I have wanted to vote so in this election, that I 
positively have had a feeling of humiliation that I couldn't." 
68 Florence Kelley to Lloyd, October 1, 1896, Lloyd MSS. Much 
involved in Altgeld's bid for reelection, Florence Kelley bemoaned Lloyd's 
absence: "We miss you very much in the campaign. Things are badly 
muddled, and Governor Altgeld's friends seem few, indeed, in this time of 
need. The Socialists and the laborskates are kicking him alike. The Silver 
Populists and the straight trades-union vote seem to be his main hope 
besides the farmers. And if the working people allow him to be defeated 
now, in the face of his record, surely they deserve to have no other friend 
until this generation dies out and another and better one takes its place." 
69 H. Lloyd of Boston to Henry D. Lloyd, November 1, 1896, ibid. 
84 The Climax of Populism 
Mrs. Withington added that the Bryan club in her home of 
Belleville, New Jersey, had more than double the membership 
of the McKinley club but the Bryanites were "not found in 
our section of the town."70 
When Bryan and silver aroused such enthusiasm in a New 
Jersey town, one can imagine the political atmosphere in a 
bustling, Democratic stronghold like Atlanta. There the Con-
stitution reported that everyone was wearing campaign but-
tons; while mostly they were said to bear Bryan's likeness, 
some astute traveling salesmen were equipped with revolving 
buttons that carried pictures of all the candidates so that no 
customer would be offended. Bryan's "soft alpine hat with 
the stiff brim" had become the rage and was expected to be 
the "predominating headgear among the members of the 
general assembly this year." 
A reporter found the Kimball House lobby and corridors 
seething with "political agitation." Even the men lined up in 
front of the bar were drinking "silver fizzes." The bartender 
confided: "Strange, I've had a huge run on campaign drinks 
this season. It's that way all over the country. I got a letter 
from a friend of mine who runs a hotel bar in Cincinnati . 
. . . Just a little Holland gin with the white of an egg stirred 
in, and you have the silver fizz. Put in the yolk and you have 
a mixture done up to the royal taste of Hanna and the gold 
crowd." 
One newly elected legislator from south Georgia inad-
vertently illustrated the mood of the rural majority of Ameri-
cans. He strolled into the Kimball House with "a wire-grass 
smile on his honest face and a rural splice in his coat which 
proved that he represented the struggling masses." He stop-
ped near the "graphophone" that stood by one of the walnut 
pillars and began to examine with awe the machine and its 
varied repertoire. Finally he inserted his nickel, cranked past 
70 Caro L. Withington to Lloyd, November 1, 1896, ibid. 
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"Just Tell Them that You Saw Me" and a cornet solo, and 
selected a recording of Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech. 
Placing the tubing to his ear, the Georgia Cracker refused 
to allow the machine's nasal tone to diminish his enjoyment 
and began to "gesticulate with his loose arm." Finally as 
Bryan reached his peroration about the cross of gold: "There 
was a sudden yell through the corridor, which caused the dust 
to fall from the skylight above. The man from the wiregrass 
gave a spontaneous shout, 'Hurrah for Bryan.' The cheer was 
taken up, and for several minutes the lobby resounded with 
shouts for Bryan."71 
Shouts and hurrahs would not, of course, elect Bryan 
president. But by October, as the campaign entered its final 
phase, the Populist leaders had consolidated their ranks to a 
surprising degree and were determined to contribute what 
they could to the great allied bid for reform. Disgruntled 
midroaders continued to protest and threaten, Tom Watson 
chief among them, but most of the rank and file and virtually 
all of the leaders saw, as one Wisconsin Populist put it, "the 
folly of kicking during the battle."72 
71 Atlanta Constitution, October 3, 16, 1896. 
72 C. W. Staples to Ignatius Donnelly, August 14, 1896, Donnelly MSS. 
4 
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DESPITE the initial confusion about notification caused by Butler's ambiguous statement to the press, the Pop-
ulists did notify their candidates in 1896 by letters, as had 
been done in 1892. Bryan and Watson, each in his own 
fashion, also accepted the nominations by letter.1 
Senator William V. Allen of Nebraska, as permanent chair-
man of the Populists' St. Louis convention, headed the com-
mittee to notify Bryan. Butler insisted that the letters of 
notification be sent not later than September 15 and that the 
one to Bryan precede or at least go simultaneously with the 
one to Watson. "Our people have gotten so worked up over 
this matter of notification," Butler confessed, "that we cannot 
get them to think of anything else until this matter is defi-
nitely settled. The quicker it is adjusted and over with, the 
better for Mr. Bryan and for us."2 
In Allen's letter of September 15, 1896, he explained first 
that the Populists had taken the liberty of nominating Bryan 
without consulting him because they considered it their 
patriotic duty to bring about a "union of all reform forces" 
and because "the money question is the overshadowing polit-
ical issue of the age." Allen continued: "It has at no time 
been expected, nor is it now, that you will abandon your 
adhesion to the Chicago platform, nor that you will accept 
all that is declared in the People's party platform, however 
gratifying the latter would be to all Populists. It must be 
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understood that the party does not abate one jot or tittle of 
loyalty to its principles. We have declared ourselves in favor 
of many important reforms, and go farther than you or your 
party have gone. These reforms are, in our judgment, es-
sential to the liberation of the people from present unjust and 
iniquitous industrial bondage." 
Allen and his committee assured Bryan that the Populists 
would exact from him no promises other than "those made in 
your public utterances and exemplified in a life devoted to 
the welfare" of the human race, nor would they ask him to 
abandon the Democratic party. Rising above "mere partisan 
surroundings," the Populists believed Bryan highly qualified 
to bring about reform "in a way that will work injury to none 
and [give] justice to all, thus making our Government in fact, 
as it is now in form only, a government 'of, by and for the 
people.' "3 
Bryan's reply began with the declaration that the honor 
had been tendered him "in such a generous spirit and upon 
such honorable terms" that he was able to accept the Populist 
nomination without departing from the Democratic platform. 
After lauding the Populists' "breadth of patriotism" which 
led them to sacrifice partisan advantage for the sake of union 
among reformers, Bryan alluded to the problems inherent in 
fusion: "While difficulties always arise in the settlement of 
the details of any plan of co-operation between distinct 
political organizations, I am sure that the friends who are 
working towards a common result always find it possible to 
agree upon just and equitable terms. The American people 
have proven equal to every emergency which has arisen in the 
past, and I am confident that in the present emergency there 
1 Hicks, Populist Revolt, 369, erroneously states that no notifications were 
made and that Bryan never accepted or rejected the Populist nomination. 
2 Butler to Allen, September 5, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
3 New York Times, September 15, 1896; also Bryan, First Battle, 430-31. 
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will be no antagonism between the various divisions of the 
one great body which is marching to repel an invasion more 
dangerous to our welfare than an army with banners."4 
The gamble in nominating Bryan that the Populists had 
taken in late July had finally come out all right. They had 
known full well, from the newspapers and General Weaver's 
speech, that Bryan did not wish the delegates at St. Louis to 
nominate him unless they also named Sewall. Yet in the clear 
light of this knowledge the Populists had done what they 
knew they had to do if they wished to remain a national party 
with a western as well as a southern wing. The alternative of 
nominating a Populist, or any candidate other than Bryan, 
would have effectively destroyed the party in the West and 
seriously weakened it in much of the South. 
In accepting the Populist nomination, moreover, Bryan was 
not necessarily acting purely in the interests of the Demo-
cratic party. As mentioned earlier, Governor Stone of Mis-
souri, an influential spokesman for the Democrats, urged 
Bryan to avoid the complications that arose from having the 
two vice-presidential candidates by tactfully declining the 
Populist nomination. Some Democratic newspapers, such 
as the Mobile Register, took the same line. And if Bryan 
had wished to destroy the People's party as a factor in national 
politics, the course urged by Governor Stone probably would 
have been the quickest and surest way to do it. To destroy 
Populism was not, however, Bryan's aim. 
His willingness to accept the embarrassment connected 
with having two running mates and his absolute self-restraint 
in the face of the increasingly bitter things said by some 
midroad Populists suggest that Bryan too, like the Populist 
majority, had in a sense "put principle above party" so that 
the election of 1896 would find reformers welded together in 
their great bid for a change. Fusion between the Democrats 
4 New York Herald, October 4, 1896; Bryan, First Battle, 432-33. 
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and Populists was not, in other words, the simple matter of 
Democratic gain and Populist sacrifice that many historians 
have depicted. 
Tom Watson, however, saw the whole thing in his own 
peculiar way and remained impenetrable to the slightest 
suggestion that he might be wrong. The Democrats, he was 
sure, wanted to "play whale to the Populists' Jonah." He 
thought there was nothing else to be said. Marion Butler, 
in his letter officially notifying Watson of the St. Louis con-
vention's nomination, steered clear of Watson's extremism 
but took a more partisan stance than Senator Allen had in 
the letter to Bryan. After a long sketch of the economic and 
political conditions that had given rise to the People's party, 
Butler claimed that it was the first party in a generation to 
make "an honest demand for the free and unrestricted 
coinage of silver" and also, among other things, the first party 
to "make definite and specific what is meant by opposition 
to monopolies, instead of indulging in glittering generalities." 
The Populist chairman developed the thesis that he had 
touched on in his keynote address at St. Louis: the Populists 
had driven the Democrats to make the sharp turn towards 
reform that they had made in their Chicago convention, and 
it was the People's party that held the older party to the 
proper course. If the Populists should be eliminated, "the evil 
and blighting influences that have dominated and corrupted 
the Democratic party in the past would creep into its council 
and control it again." 
When he came to the matter of Bryan's running mate, 
Butler ignored the Populists' internal division that had in-
spired the nomination of their own vice-presidential candidate 
and indirectly attacked, without naming, Sewall. Bryan was 
"a man who was ready to renounce the false gods of a 
corrupted Democracy," Butler declared. But when the Demo-
crats failed to be "true to the people" and to their platform 
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and named for the vice presidency a man whose past was 
"obscured in a silence suggestive of either ignorance or in-
difference to the struggle of the people with the money 
power," the Populists had been forced to nominate inde-
pendently. In doing so, Butler concluded, the Populists had 
found a "man worthy to have headed the ticket" and a "man 
who represents what Mr. Bryan represents." The Bryan-
Watson ticket, in short, was "not only the best silver ticket" 
but "the true co-operative ticket."5 
More than these flattering words were needed to placate 
Watson, for at the time that Butler's letter appeared in the 
newspapers the Georgian was pouring out his anti-Sewall 
version of electoral cooperation to a series of audiences in the 
West and feeding the resentment of the midroaders. Watson 
opened his tour with an address to about 5,000 Texans in 
Dallas. Although he asked his cheering followers to stand 
by Bryan, the dispatches of the press associations that ap-
peared in newspapers across the country emphasized Watson's 
fulminations against Sewall. Disharmony in the camp of 
the silverites made good copy, and Watson's speeches now 
proved to be a never-failing source of news. Claiming to be 
the true disciple of Populism, the Georgian insisted that, 
"so long as Tom Watson lives the People's Party shall not 
die."6 "You must burn the bridges if you follow me," Watson 
proclaimed. "I am for straight Populism (cheers) and I do 
not propose to be carried to one side of the road or the other 
(wild cheering)." Bryan and Watson, he asserted, would 
speak for the masses while Sewall talked for the banks and 
railroads. 7 
Reactions varied to Watson's first major speaking appear-
5 New York Times, September 15, 1896. 
6 New York Times, September 8, 1896. 
7 Dallas Morning News, September 8, 1896, and People's Party Paper, 
September 8, 1896, as quoted in Woodward, Watson, 319-20. 
The Campaign: Final Phase 91 
ance in the national campaign. Reed, traveling with Watson 
as the representative of the Populist national committee, 
reported to Butler that he and Watson had found Texas ripe 
for revolt against any fusion with the Democrats that would 
involve Sewall's remaining in the race. As for the reports 
about Populist cooperation with Republicans in Texas on 
some sort of McKinley-Watson ticket, Watson believed that 
he had successfully checked that for the time being. "Tom 
may not follow the course always that seems best to us," 
Reed commented, "but it seems to me that he possesses the 
genius of patriotism & true statesmanship in an unusual 
degree."8 
Loyal Democrats viewed Watson's campaign debut in a 
quite different light. The pro-Bryan St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
declared editorially that, "Tom Watson has thrown off the 
mask" and "declared himself the Judas of this campaign." 
The Post-Dispatch, which thought that Watson rather than 
Sewall had a patriotic duty to withdraw from the race, 
asserted: "No one who reads Watson's attack upon Sewall, 
his exaltation of himself, and his assertion that if Watson is 
defeated Bryan shall be defeated, can doubt what his purpose 
is .... If he is not on the pay roll of the Consolidated Hanna 
Trust, he is not getting his due. For no man is working harder 
for that Trust than Tom Watson of Georgia."9 
The sardonic amusement of the eastern newspapers about 
the Watson-Sewall imbroglio is well illustrated by the New 
York Times' editorial declaration that there was "more sense 
and pertinence, together with boundless impertinence, in half 
a column of Tom than in a page and half of Bryan." The 
Times suggested that Watson actually did represent the vot-
ing strength of the "Popocrat" Bryan more accurately than 
did Sewall. After all, "Sewall is a man of some social and 
s Reed to Butler, September 7, 1896, Butler MSS. 
9 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 8, 1896. 
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commercial standing, and is reasonably suspected of changing 
his linen three times a week. "10 
Bryan, when shown a copy of Watson's speech, would only 
say, "I do not care to discuss it." Butler employed the same 
tactic that he had used earlier in connection with Senator 
Jones' slur on the southern Populists: "I am not ready to 
believe that Mr. Watson was quoted correctly as saying that 
Bryan would be defeated if Sewall was not taken down from 
the ticket. Certainly he meant to make no threat, as this 
newspaper report would seem to imply." Butler went on to 
explain that Democrats had made a mistake in nominating 
Sewall and that Sewall's duty was clearly to "remove this 
friction" from the campaign. But whether Sewall took the 
high road or not, the Populist chairman insisted that "the 
People's Party can be depended upon to defeat the monopo-
lists and goldbugs in this fight, if it is in its power so to do."11 
In a private letter to the Populist vice-presidential candi-
date, Butler spoke as diplomatically as he could: "Allow me to 
suggest that you be careful to say nothing in your speeches 
that can possibly be construed into a threat. That is, we 
cannot afford to say anything which can be construed either 
directly or indirectly as a threat that Bryan shall be defeated 
and McKinley elected if the Democratic managers should fail 
to take down Mr. Sewall." Butler, a champion of the indirect 
approach, agreed that the Populists should push the Bryan-
Watson ticket as the truly cooperative one and the best silver 
ticket, but the job should be done in a manner best calculated 
to win support from Silver Republicans and even from 
Democrats. The chairman's view was that direct, personal 
attacks on Sewall merely gave him popular sympathy that he 
did not deserve. "In short, you have it in your power," Butler 
10 New York Times, September 9, 1896. The Times printed another 
editorial on September ll about Watson's attack on Sewall in the weekly 
journal, the Independent. 
11 New York Times, September 8, 1896. 
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pled to Watson, "to do more for the building up of your 
party, and more for insuring the defeat of the gold men and 
monopolies in this fight than any other man .... I beg you 
in the interests of our party, and in the interests of suffering 
humanity to consider well these matters, and have them in 
view with every public utterance that you make."12 
Before he could have received Butler's letter, Watson 
proceeded to Kansas, where the sentiment among the majority 
of Populists differed greatly from that in Texas, as the fusion 
arrangement in Kansas clearly reflected. In Abilene, Watson 
was quoted as saying: "You must be for me or for Sewall, 
there is no middle ground. I stopped the fusion of the Popu-
lists in the South, and propose to stop it in the North. You 
cannot afford to trade the national ticket for local spoils." 
Midroaders in Kansas were delighted, one of them declaring 
to Butler that the Kansas Populist leaders had sold the party 
out "soul and body" to the Democrats whereas the members 
"love Watson and hate Democrats, & their wholesale slaughter 
of the Party & our fearless leader of the South will be resented 
in a way that all may understand it."13 
Even Reed, however, admitted that he and Watson had 
"met with some coldness" in their reception in Kansas, 
though Watson was orator enough to warm up his audiences 
once he got started with them. Regardless of Watson's 
oratory, most Kansas Populists must have felt like the county 
chairman who admitted his bafflement to Butler. Describing 
himself as an admirer of Watson, this Kansan said that he 
had switched over to supporting fusion with the Democrats 
in the state when the Republicans had made their opposition 
to it blatant. He believed that those midroaders who were 
calling for a bolting convention were really working for the 
12 Butler to Watson, September 8, 1896, loose copy in Butler MSS and 
one also in Campaign Letterbooks. 
13 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 12, 1896; J. F. Willets, a national 
lecturer for the Farmers' Alliance, to Butler, September 9, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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Republicans. Perhaps Watson's "indefensible" speeches re-
flected his ignorance of the true situation in Kansas, but why 
had he not consulted Senator Peffer or Jerry Simpson, "who 
have gone through as much or more than he has for this 
cause"? The Kansan concluded that perhaps Watson's "sec-
tional background" was too different and kept him from tak-
ing a broad enough view of things.14 
Either Watson had received and heeded Butler's private 
counsel by the time he reached Lincoln, Nebraska, or else the 
intensely pro-Bryan atmosphere there inspired a more moder-
ate approach. Watson and Reed both admired Butler's letter 
of notification, and that may have placated him. At any rate, 
his speech in Lincoln contained no reference to Sewall nor to 
the Republicans' sweeping victory in the Maine election. 
Instead, with Mrs. Bryan sitting in one of the boxes on the 
side of the hall, the Georgian warmly praised Nebraska's 
presidential candidate and emphasized his own intention to 
stand firm in the common fight for reform. Reed considered 
the speech a great one and felt pleased that Watson had 
shown that he was not the "rantankerous cuss" that so many 
people thought. James H. Edmisten, the Populist chairman 
in Nebraska, informed Butler that the speech was one of the 
finest ever made in the state.11' 
Butler, no doubt vastly relieved at the new turn in Watson's 
course, congratulated him on the fine impression that the 
"masterly" speech in Lincoln had made and reported that it 
14 Reed to Butler, September 10, 1896, Henry McLean, Populist chairman 
of Marion County, Kansas, to Butler, September 16, 1896, Butler MSS. 
The state chairman of Iowa said that they could use Watson in the state 
"upon the condition that he in no wise touches upon the situation as regards 
the vice-presidential candidate." Good Populist doctrine "without reference 
to any personal matters and without attacking" the Democrats would be 
fine. J. Bellangee to Butler, September 11, 1896, ibid. 
u; Atlanta Constitution, September 17, 1896; Reed to Butler, September 
16, 1896, Butler to Washburn, September 18, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, 
Butler MSS. 
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was being printed as a campaign document. Since there were 
twice as many requests for Watson to speak as he could 
possibly accept, Butler asked the Georgian to indicate his 
preferences. The chairman also reported that the Populists' 
campaign handbook was about ready to roll off the presses 
but was being held for Watson's letter of acceptance.16 
Butler's satisfaction about Watson's role was short lived, 
and despite Watson's pleasure about the letter of notification 
his own letter of acceptance was a long way in the future. The 
Georgian had only temporarily subsided and had by no means 
changed his desire to be the vice-presidential candidate of the 
Democrats as well as of the Populists. With the silver parties 
in several important states, especially Missouri and Indiana, 
then engaged in negotiations about electoral fusion, harmony 
among Populist spokesmen was highly desirable. George F. 
Washburn, the Populist committeeman in charge of the 
Chicago headquarters, and M. C. Rankin, an Indianian and 
treasurer of the Populist national committee, traveled to St. 
Louis to meet Watson and Reed as they returned from the 
West. Although rumors and misinformation about the con-
ference filled the newspapers, Watson would only say that 
he had told the Texas Populists that he "would be ashamed to 
take a single vote that was not given to Bryan as well." "I am 
for Bryan and Watson," he declared. "I want free silver to 
win, and at the same time I want to preserve the party 
organization. We have other reform questions which must 
be taken up and settled."17 
16 Butler to Watson, September 22, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler 
MSS. 
17 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 22, 1896. In a hotel across the 
street from the one where the Populist leaders conferred, the president of 
the American Bankers' Association ended his annual address to the con-
vention then meeting in St. Louis: "Solemnly, with a fervor and honesty of 
purpose that were evidenced by closed eyes and reverent posture, [he 
concluded], 'From the folly of free silverites, from dishonesty and repudia-
tion, from Anarchy and ruin, 0 Lord, deliver us.' " Ibid. 
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Butler eagerly awaited word about the conference at St. 
Louis. He pressed Washburn for information: "I am anxious 
to know the result of your interview with Watson. How has 
the Western situation impressed him? Has it toned him down 
any, and what line do you think he will proceed on when he 
takes the stump again?" Butler agreed with Washburn that 
"the chief thing for us to do in this campaign, as far as party 
interests are concerned, is to make every move we can to 
strengthen our party in the future, and the way to do so is to 
show a greater desire to win a victory for silver than anybody 
else shows." Watson was in the position to do the Populist 
party the greatest good-or damage-but he seemed "to have 
overlooked this view of the situation entirely." Butler argued 
that, "The people that we must yet win to our party care 
nothing about his individuality, or your individuality or mine, 
or for any of our personal grievances."18 
Now deeply involved in the negotiations for electoral 
fusion in several states, Butler felt great relief when Reed 
came to Washington and reported, according to Butler's 
account, that Watson was "now ready to agree that the 
course the committee has pursued is best, and, beside, he will 
not mention the Vice-Presidential matter in any of his other 
speeches." In what must have been one of his few bright 
moments during the campaign, Butler happily counted on 
Watson's help in impressing the American voters that the 
People's party was more willing to make sacrifices for the 
success of reform than any other group was. Watson, making 
speeches that put Bryan first, could spend October in Indiana, 
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Iowa. "In fact, the battle 
is to be won or lost in these States," Butler argued. Bryan 
should be sent to concentrate his efforts there. Then if 
"Watson makes the same kind of speeches that he can make, 
18 Butler to Washburn, September 24, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, 
Butler MSS. 
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and that Mr. Reed now says he will make, when he gets out 
there and gets into the campaign, he will be almost as much 
of a drawing-card as Bryan himself." Why, Watson could 
help Bryan "carry the doubtful states and save the fight."19 
Whether or not the elusive Watson actually had agreed at 
St. Louis to follow a course more in harmony with that of 
Butler and the national executive committee is uncertain. 
Several of the participants in the conference clearly thought 
that at least he had consented not to lend active support to 
midroaders who were fighting fusion in the critical states. 
In Indiana the midroad Populists insisted that all of the 
fusion electors should be pledged to Watson. Paul Vander-
voort, a midroader from Nebraska who was a former Re-
publican and prominent in the Grand Army of the Republic, 
visited Indiana and other close states to encourage the Popu-
list opponents of fusion. 
Butler confessed his bewilderment about Vandervoort, who 
had no connection with the Populist national committee and 
whose efforts controverted those of the national leaders. "He 
certainly has an unusual amount of patriotism and more 
private funds to spare than most of us," Butler wrote to 
Rankin of Indiana, "if he can take it upon himself as an 
individual to go from Nebraska to your state to take a hand 
in your politics." Nebraska Populist leaders issued a statement 
characterizing Vandervoort as "a traitor, whose sole object 
is to defeat Bryan" and as a "Hannacrat" whose "reputation 
for twenty years has been that of a railroad capper around the 
Nebraska legislatures." 
When Vandervoort appealed to Butler to repudiate the 
statement of the Nebraska Populists, Butler replied that they 
knew the facts better than he did and that he could hardly 
repudiate the statement unless he knew it to be untrue. To 
Vandervoort's point that he had traveled through Indiana 
19 Butler to Washburn, September 28, 1896, ibid. 
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and other states merely to advance the interests of the Popu-
list party and Tom Watson, Butler responded that he might 
well have checked with the party's national headquarters 
before spending so much money and time in advocating a 
policy that the national leadership did not support. "It must 
be remembered that the People's Party has candidates for 
President and Vice-President," Butler added. "Therefore, 
any man who attempts to advance the interests of Mr. Wat-
son at the expense of Mr. Bryan is, whether he is conscious 
of it or not, acting against the interests of both and in the 
interests of McKinley and the gold standard. "20 
To counter the work of Vandervoort, M. C. Rankin re-
turned to Indiana from the meeting with Watson and the 
others in St. Louis and reported that both the national 
committee and Watson approved of the Indiana Populists' 
acceptance of electoral fusion with the Democrats. Although 
Watson promptly telegraphed his disavowal of this position 
to Indiana midroaders, the Populist committee voted eleven 
to one in favor of accepting the Democratic offer of five of 
the state's fifteen electors. This meant that there was still a 
good chance for the completion of fusion in the last of the 
most closely contested states in the nation.21 
20 Butler to Rankin, September 21, 1896, Butler to Vandervoort, Septem-
ber 22, 1896, ibid. 
21St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 17-30, 1896; Atlanta Constitution, 
September 26-30, 1896. In Missouri too Vandervoort and the midroaders 
failed to thwart the electoral fusion of the Populists and Democrats. When 
Watson denied that he had known anything about the Missouri arrangement, 
the chairman of that state's Populists declared: "When Watson went 
through St. Louis on his way to Georgia from Kansas, I met him at the 
Southern Hotel. The sole object of my call was to tell him what had been 
proposed in Missouri and what we were going to do. I told him that the 
sub-committee of the Populist committee had agreed that four [out of 
seventeen J electors were all the party were entitled to, or could get, and 
that fusion would be arranged on that basis." The Missouri Populist leader 
insisted that Watson "did not oppose it, and was fully informed as to every 
detail." Watson, he concluded, evidently wanted to disrupt the Populist 
party in every state where fusion had been arranged, and "the purpose in 
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Watson might have had a temporary change of mind from 
the time that he made the widely praised speech in Lincoln, 
Nebraska, until after the conference at St. Louis. But by the 
end of September he apparently had decided to cut loose and 
publicly go on the warpath against Butler and the national 
committee. Not only had North Carolina Populists finally 
agreed to fusion on September 21, but Bryan had proceeded 
up the East coast after his speeches in North Carolina and 
was enjoying a much needed rest at Sewall's home in Bath, 
Maine. 
Watson exploded. "Your deal in North Carolina," he 
announced to Butler, "is as indefensible as those in Kansas 
and Colorado." According to Watson, Butler had forced 
fusion where the Democrats needed Populist votes and not 
demanded it in Kansas and Colorado where "they had 
annihilated our party." "Your course is not only ruinous to 
the interests of the party you were chosen to represent," 
Watson declared, "but ruinous to Mr. Bryan also. You 
cannot deliver the Populist vote, as per your fusion deals 
with the Sewall men."22 
Not content with his private blast, Watson again favored 
the New Y ark World with an exclusive story in the form of 
advance sheets of an editorial that he had written for his 
People's Party Paper. This time Watson, in what the World 
played up as the "most important political utterance of the 
campaign," assailed not Sewall but the policy of the Populist 
national executive committee. The Georgian declared that 
Bryan's success was endangered by "the profound dissatisfac-
tion which exists among the humble, honest, earnest Populists 
who have built up the People's party." Ironically, in view of 
his own apparent interest in the vice presidency, Watson 
doing that could only be to promote the election of the Republican 
candidate for President." St. Louis Post·Dis{Jatch, October 19, 1896. 
22 Watson to Butler, September 27, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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avowed that deep in the hearts of men "who want no office 
and hunger for no pie, is settling the conviction that they 
have been tricked, sold out, betrayed, misled." "If McKinley 
is elected," he concluded, "the responsibility will forever rest 
upon those managers who had it in their power to control by 
fair means 2,000,000 [Populist] votes and lost them by 
violating the terms of the compact."23 
The Populist national chairman's optimism about the 
course of his party's vice-presidential candidate now collapsed 
almost as soon as it had risen. While newspapers over the 
nation gave front page coverage to Watson's declaration of 
war on his own party's leadership, Butler revealed his distress 
in private letters and refused to make any statement for 
reporters. To Reed, who had so recently brought hopeful 
tidings, Butler declared that Watson seemed determined to 
"pursue his own course, regardless of whatever you and I 
might agree upon, and, I might say, regardless of the con-
sequences." The chairman reminded Reed, his colleague on 
the Populist national executive committee, that when the 
committee met in August to organize and plan for the 
campaign there had been a choice of two courses of action. 
One was for the Populists to insist that there would be no 
fusion electoral tickets in any state as long as Sewall remained 
in the race. Butler continued: "In the first place, a number 
of our Western states would not have stood by us in such a 
position. Therefore, we would have been put in the attitude 
of starting out in the fight with a divided party. Secondly, by 
taking such a position we would have said to the whole 
country that we had laid down an ultimatum and order to 
23 New York World, September 28, 1896, as quoted in Woodward, 
Watson, 323-24. Watson shortly thereafter informed the World's special 
correspondent that, "I have been shamefully treated but I am not afraid 
to do my duty." He insisted that if North Carolina and Kansas had 
followed the Georgia precedent of refusing fusion except on Bryan and 
Watson electors, then Sewall would have had to withdraw. Ibid. 
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the Democrats, and that if they were not willing to accede to 
it, that then we were willing to see Mr. McKinley elected. 
Every sane man knows that the country was in no temper 
and would have had no patience with any party taking such 
a position, under the circumstances. We not only could not 
have gained any votes by taking such a position, but, in-
evitably, we would have lost them from the day such a 
position was taken. I admit, that if our party had been 
solidly united, by taking such a position we might have forced 
Mr. Sewall off the ticket, which would have been all right, if 
we could have done it; but, if he had not come off, then there 
is no doubting the fact that a large number of our people 
would have even swallowed Mr. Sewall rather than be a party, 
by their action, to indirectly electing Mr. McKinley." The 
only other possible course of action for the People's party 
was the one of cooperative electoral tickets, which, Butler 
recalled, the committee had unanimously approved. He was 
"more convinced to-day than when we took this position that 
it was the wisest and best course to pursue." 
But for the sake of argument, Butler suggested that they 
suppose that the committee had erred at the outset of the 
campaign. Even if it were so, could "any man say that, at 
this stage of the campaign, with joint electoral tickets having 
been made in three-fourths of the states, and negotiations 
already under way in the other states, that it is wise for the 
committee to reverse itself, proceed to try to break up the 
joint electoral tickets that we have, and put out straight 
Bryan and Watson electoral tickets in every state?" Could 
Watson possibly advise such a course with the campaign 
over half way through? "In short," Butler plaintively re-
quested, "tell me, if you can, what he means and what he 
wants?" 
Butler believed that Watson was "certainly putting himself 
in a very false light before the country, and one that he does 
102 The Climax of Populism 
not deserve to be put in." Any honest political observer had 
to admit "that the only effect that his position can have will 
be to inure to the benefit of the Republican party," and "he 
certainly does not mean this." His position was "peculiarly 
unfortunate for the country as well as for our party and for 
himself." 
Butler confessed that he had thought it barely possible that 
Watson had taken the peculiar course he had in an effort to 
win Republican support for the Populists in the Georgia state 
election in early October; but "upon reflection," Butler added, 
"I cannot conceive of him taking a position that endangers 
the fight all over the country, even if it would insure the 
success of the state ticket in Georgia." 
Watson's letter to the World had gone out of the way to 
attack the Populist committee and its chairman, but Butler 
insisted that he was "willing to overlook all of these matters 
while the campaign is in progress and we are under the fire 
of the enemy." If Watson wanted a controversy about the 
wisdom of Populist strategy it would be better to have it in 
the newspapers after the election; but Butler, who expressed 
his willingness "to assume all the responsibility for the mis-
takes of the Committee, if it has made any," declared that he 
would certainly not be a party to a public controversy during 
the campaign. Reed should, "for Heaven's sake, see him, and 
try to get him to agree on some line of policy that he and the 
Committee can act in harmony on until the campaign is 
over." There would not be, must not be, war between 
Watson and the Populist leadership "no matter what he says 
or does, unless we reach the point where I believe it is 
absolutely necessary for the Committee to publish a statement 
in order to prevent the odium of helping to elect Mr. 
McKinley rest [sic] upon us."24 
Butler sent virtually the same long letter to Watson that 
24 Butler to Reed, September 29, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
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he had sent to Reed. In addition, however, Butler noted that 
the tone of Watson's letters indicated the Georgian wished 
to cut off all communication between the committee and 
himself. "But in spite of the tone ... ," Butler wrote, "I still 
hope that some common plan of action between you and the 
Committee can be agreed on that will be effective in unifying 
all voters with a common interest against McKinley and the 
gold standard, and thus accomplish the greatest good to our 
party and our country." Watson faced "a great opportunity 
as well as a great responsibility," for he possessed the "power 
to do as much, if not more, than any other man to accomplish 
this result." "Therefore, I appeal to you to reconsider the 
position that you seem to have taken."25 
In his letters to the other members of the Populist com-
mittee Butler avowed perplexity about Watson's actions. 
John R. Sovereign, who was concentrating his efforts on 
industrial workers in the Chicago area, pointed out that "no 
power on earth can induce the labor organizations to make a 
fight on the vice presidency." He did not question Watson's 
honesty but observed that "as a national politician he is a 
failure." Butler replied: "If I did not believe that Watson 
was perfectly honest, I would have lost all patience with him 
before now, and would have gotten to a point where I would 
feel it was my duty to officially condemn his course. But, 
however much he may have angered and embarrassed me 
and the committee, I still have hopes of getting him to see 
the error of his course." 
Butler believed that while the Populist headquarters were 
being flooded with letters protesting Watson's course, the 
Georgian was "receiving letters from a few impractical men, 
or else dishonest men, who encourage him to pursue this 
course; while, on the other hand, those who disapprove of his 
course are not writing him at all." Butler urged Sovereign 
25 Butler to Watson, September 30, 1896, ibid. 
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and others to write directly to Watson and make their views 
known.26 
Butler wrote his frankest appraisals of the Watson problem 
to George Washburn in Chicago. While saying nothing 
harsh about the erratic Georgian and expressing confidence 
in his integrity, Butler mainly emphasized what he thought 
was a sadly lost opportunity. Butler alleged that at one time 
there might have been a chance of getting the Democrats in 
North Carolina to endorse Bryan-Watson electors. "But ever 
since Watson made his first speech in the campaign, the tide 
has turned against us, and the Democrats were making head-
way, and there was nothing left for us to do but to form a 
joint electoral ticket." The Populists, according to Butler, had 
been unable to answer the argument that no matter what 
they said about Sewall he at least maintained a dignified 
silence, not even replying to Watson's personal attacks. Now, 
Butler admitted, Watson's conduct lessened the chances 
every day for any adjustment of the Kansas situation. 
One idea that Butler and Washburn had discussed was the 
possibility of making their demand for Sewall's withdrawal, 
in case of a national victory for Bryan, soon after the election. 
Senator Jones, Butler explained, had insisted that Sewall's 
withdrawal would hurt Bryan's chances "especially in those 
[pivotal] states where the People's party is not relatively 
strong, and where unreasonable prejudice even among silver 
men has grown up against the People's party on account of 
the misrepresentations of our party and principles through 
the partisan press." Butler had been forced to admit that 
there was some truth in Jones' argument, but the Populist 
26 Sovereign to Butler, September 28, 1896, Butler to Sovereign, October 1, 
1896, ibid. To another member of the committee Butler declared that Wat-
son was "a brilliant young man, and is as true as steel, but he is not a good 
politician and has not used the splendid opportunity before him to the best 
advantage." He was a "peculiar compound" and Butler knew of "no one 
that could have any influence at all with him." Butler to Dr. C. F. Taylor, 
September 25, October 2, 1896, ibid. 
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chairman insisted that if that were the only valid reason to 
be advanced for Sewall's remaining in the race, then it would 
not be valid as soon as the election was over, and the Populists 
would then officially ask for Sewall's withdrawal before the 
electoral college met. "He [Jones] made no promises, and 
entered into no agreement with reference to this matter," 
Butler added, "yet he was bound to admit the justness of it, 
and, no doubt, this is what he had in mind when he said to 
you that Mr. Sewall could not be withdrawn before the 
election." 
But with Watson behaving as he was, Butler feared that 
the last chance of adjusting the vice-presidential situation in a 
manner satisfactory to the Populists was fast disappearing. 
If Bryan won now, the Populists would receive no credit, and 
if he lost, they would get the blame. And as for Washburn's 
statement that the Senate would probably have to elect the 
vice president even if Bryan won, since no vice-presidential 
candidate would have a majority of the electoral votes, Butler 
noted that according to the Twelfth Amendment the Senate 
would be limited to a choice between the two candidates who 
had received the highest number of votes, which would surely 
be Sewall and Hobart. "There is no possible way by which 
the Senate can elect Mr. Watson Vice-President," Butler 
concluded, "unless this matter is arranged before the electoral 
college meets." Clearly Watson's only hope was to go to 
work loyally and put victory for Bryan and national reform 
first and foremost.27 
What Butler did not understand was that Watson ap-
parently had no hope, or at least no rational and discernible 
one. The event that probably threw the Georgian into the 
final frenzy of anger and frustration was the sound thrashing 
that the Democrats gave the Populists, who were supported 
by Republicans and Prohibitionists, in Georgia's state election 
27 Butler to Washburn, October 1, 5, 6, 8, 1896, ibid. 
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on October 7, 1896. Midroad Populists had emphasized 
Sewall's failure to help the Democratic party carry Maine; 
now Watson's Populists had been whipped in Georgia, and 
neither of Bryan's running mates could be pictured as a 
decisive influence in his home state.28 
When the Georgia Populists met their defeat, Watson, 
according to Reed's alarmed reports, was already so badly 
upset by the electoral fusion in North Carolina and Kansas 
that he was about ready to decline the Populist nomination. 
Reed had talked him out of that, but now Watson threatened 
serious trouble if the Populist executive committee failed to 
make some changes-in a hurry.29 
Actually, though no one seems to have realized the situa-
tion at the time, Watson's power to damage Bryan's chances 
was rapidly diminishing. This was true not only because of 
the arrangement of fusion electoral tickets in the large ma-
jority of the states, including virtually all of the pivotal ones, 
but also because of Democratic victories in the early state 
elections of the deep South, where midroad sentiment was 
28 One factor in the Democratic victory in Georgia was that many Negroes 
supported the Democratic governor's bid for reelection because of his anti-
lynching record. Although the Populists had refused formal fusion with 
the Republicans, many Populist leaders in the state, such as James K. Hines, 
made no bones about their desire for Republican support. The Republican 
state chairman urged Republicans to vote for the Populist candidates, and 
the Republicans put out no state ticket. The leading Negro newspaper in 
Georgia, the Southern Age, furnished a clue to the Negro support for the 
Democrats when it declared that Negroes and the Southern Age had sup-
ported the Populists in 1892 and 1894, yet the third party consistently 
refused to give Negroes any recognition. The Populists, in other words, were 
accused of refusing to recognize the Negro Republican voters by sharing any 
offices with them. "It occurs to us that if they refuse to give us recognition 
now when they need us most," the Southern Age insisted, "they will give 
us less when they are safely in." 
This view is corroborated by the statement in the Savannah News that: 
"It is gratifying to note the movement of colored people toward the 
Democratic party .... This would seem to indicate that reasons for fear of 
negro domination are being rapidly dissipated." Atlanta Constitution, August 
17, 19, September 2, 18, October 2, 1896. 
29 Reed to Butler, October 7, 9, 1896, Butler MSS. 
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concentrated. And despite Watson's stand, the national 
Populist leaders took quick and largely effective measures to 
close ranks during the final three weeks of the campaign. 
As the political battle approached its hectic, closing weeks, 
however, neither the Populist nor the Democratic leaders were 
eager to face more trouble from Watson and his sympathizers. 
The race was, as far as anyone could tell, a close one. Every 
vote might count. Leaders in both parties began to take 
hurried steps to try to preserve unity among the forces allied 
for reform. 
The Populist executive committee had earlier selected 
Chicago, where two of the members were already and where 
the others could travel with relative ease, as the place for the 
next meeting. Butler sent out telegrams calling the session 
for October 13 and urged Watson to be present. Reed 
replied that Watson, who had a bad throat, was under doc-
tor's orders to remain at home for several days but could, if a 
meeting were really necessary, go up to Atlanta from his home 
in Thomson. 
Since getting a quorum of the committee in the Georgia 
capital would be difficult if not imposible, Butler stuck by 
the earlier selection of Chicago. And as for the Kansas 
situation that loomed so large in Watson's thinking and 
threats, Butler frankly warned Reed, and through him Wat-
son: "I have used all of my official power to adjust matters in 
Kansas, but having failed in that, I will not play the Samson 
and pull down the temple." If anything else were to be 
done, the committee would have to take the responsibility for 
doing it.30 
There were two principal results of the Populist commit-
tee's meeting in Chicago: a strong and widely publicized 
statement reaffirming the existing policy of electoral fusion 
so Butler to Reed, October 10, 1896, copy in Butler MSS; Butler to 
Breidenthal, October 10, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, ibid. 
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and another effort to placate Watson. From the standpoint 
of the national presidential campaign, the statement was the 
most significant result. Reporters speculated prior to the 
meeting that the Populist leaders, together with Senator 
Jones and his Democratic committee, would probably act to 
give the Populists a part of the Kansas electors. But before 
the meeting Butler would only say: "We are all pulling to 
defeat McKinley, and while there is some friction over the 
division of the electors in several of the States, no action will 
be taken that will in the least compromise the chances of our 
ticket. . . . You can state authoritatively that Mr. Watson 
will remain on the ticket. No thought of his resignation is 
entertained by us." The Populist chairman, in the inevitable 
fashion of party chairmen, insisted that Bryan's chances were 
growing better daily and added, perhaps a trifle wistfully: 
"One of the strongest factors in the Republican campaign 
until recently is now one of the greatest weaknesses and that 
is the prodigal use of money. There is a revolt among the 
workingmen especially against the apparent use of money 
by the Republicans."31 
The official statement that appeared in newspapers across 
the nation after the conference bore the marks of Butler's 
authorship, for the arguments were exactly the ones that he 
had used in his long letters of a few days earlier to Reed and 
Watson. The Populist committeemen first declared that they 
had hoped that "the patriotic action of the People's Party 
in National Convention in subordinating the interests of 
party to the success of the vital issues involved in this cam-
paign would be met by equally unselfish devotion to a com-
mon interest on the part of the Democratic party, and that 
all the friends of silver could present a solid front against the 
31St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 13, 1896. Butler did admit candidly 
that Illinois, Kentucky, and several other sharply contested states were still 
doubtful. 
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minions of greed by supporting one ticket, the truly co-
operative ticket, Bryan and Watson." 
But since that hope had been disappointed, the committee 
had faced the choice of supporting a straight Populist ticket 
in every state or of doing everything possible "to unite the 
voters of the country against McKinley and to overcome the 
obstacles and embarrassments which, if the Democratic party 
had put the cause first and party second, we would not have 
encountered." The committee had rejected the straight 
Populist ticket for every state because the party members 
were "incapable of such base betrayal of their country as 
would result from a division in the ranks" of reformers. The 
rank-and-file Populists would have repudiated "any action on 
the part of their leaders opposed to united effort at this time, 
as they repudiated the old parties for treachery to their 
interests." 
Therefore the committee had agreed at the opening of the 
campaign that division of the electors between Populists and 
Democrats was the wisest course, and these joint electoral 
tickets were in existence in three-fourths of the states. 
Through these tickets "the People's Party will not only secure 
in the Electoral College for Bryan and Watson several times 
as many votes as we could have possibly secured by making a 
straight fight, but we will secure the defeat of McKinley and 
the gold standard, which should now be the greatest desire 
of every citizen who believes in the principles of true 
democracy." 
Butler and his colleagues carefully refrained from naming 
either Sewall or Watson, but one portion of the manifesto 
was widely interpreted as a rebuke to Watson: "The danger 
lies in the possibility of a certain portion of the rank and file 
of the People's Party being misled by so-called leaders, who, 
for reasons best known to themselves, or for want of reason, 
are advising voters to rebel against the joint electoral tickets, 
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and put up separate electoral tickets, or to withhold their 
support from the joint electoral tickets." 
After a warning about the Republicans' best hope being 
the "corrupt use of an unlimited supply of money," the 
Populist leaders concluded their statement with the declara-
tion that the Populists had made "this revolution possible" 
and their boast would be that they were American citizens 
and "American citizens are more than partisans."32 
After the conference adjourned, Butler told reporters that 
although the committee was still unsatisfied about the fusion 
arrangements in Kansas and Colorado, there was nothing to 
be done now that would not help McKinley. The committee 
members were unanimous in believing that the "address was 
the best thing that could be done to unite the silver forces, 
which is our duty above all things." "The address issued by 
the committee does not reflect in any way upon Mr. Watson," 
Butler insisted, "and it will undoubtedly be approved by 
him." A delegation from the committee would visit the 
Georgian to explain the situation to him.33 
The Populist manifesto was cheered by ardent supporters 
of Bryan across the nation. Even some Democratic papers 
that had earlier been indifferent or scornful towards the 
Populists now praised the third party's role in the campaign. 
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, for example, entitled its editorial 
about the address "A Patriotic Party" and declared: "In spite 
of friction in arranging the details of an honorable adjustment 
and the obtrusive self-assertion of a few men whose motives 
32 Ibid., October 14, 1896. Although Edmisten of Nebraska and Dare of 
California did not attend the meeting, all of the other members were present 
and signed the statement with Butler. Butler urged Ignatius Donnelly to 
attend the meeting. Unable to do so because of speaking engagements, 
Donnelly telegraphed: "Treat Watson justly and kindly but insist Bryan 
must not be defeated by Populist votes." Butler to Donnelly, October 12, 
1896, Donnelly to Butler, October 13, 1896, Donnelly MSS. The telegram 
from Butler has his name mistyped as "Maurice Mutley." 
33 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 14, 1896; Raleigh News and Observer, 
October 15, 1896. 
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have been open to suspicion, the Populist party has risen 
grandly in this campaign to the necessity of patriotic action . 
. . . There has been much of self-sacrifice on the part of men 
whose patriotism has risen superior to selfish ambition."34 
The fusion policy which the Populists had now reaffirmed 
in their Chicago pronouncement gave genuine alarm to the 
badly frightened conservatives of the East. This fright was 
made clear by the widespread criticism that the Washington 
Post, an antisilver but politically independent newspaper, 
received when it suggested that the Democratic-Populist 
fusion policy gave Bryan 205 certain electoral votes. That 
number would put him within 19 votes of election, whereas 
from the still doubtful states McKinley would have to receive 
84 electoral votes in order to win. To the Eastern newspapers 
that bitterly resented any hint of a Bryan victory, the Post 
retorted: "We cannot elect McKinley by getting together 
under an umbrella and resolving that Bryan is as good as 
defeated at the present moment. It is foolish to blind our-
selves to the existence of the earnest millions who dwell 
beyond the Potomac and the Alleghenies. Those millions 
are there and they must be taken into account. We cannot 
dispose of them by making a great hullabaloo over here on 
the Atlantic coast."35 
In Indiana, one of the most bitterly contested of the doubt-
ful states, fusion had long been stalled. Now, just as the 
Populist statement appeared, the Democrats and Populists 
finally agreed on a cooperative electoral ticket that gave the 
former ten places and the latter five. The New York Herald, 
34 October 15, 1896. Concerning Watson, this editorial asserted that the 
man most highly honored by the People's party has been the "most con-
spicuous and persistent in thrusting his personality and his ambition between 
his party and its highest good," but he had lost whatever influence he might 
have retained when it had become known that "all his arguments against 
fusion, in the New York plutocratic press, have been paid for with pluto-
cratic money at so much per article." 
35 Post, October 2, as quoted in Raleigh News and Observer, October 3, 
1896. 
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rabid in its opposition to Bryan, reported that Hanna in 
Chicago was attending to Indiana where "the fusion between 
the popocrats and the populists on the electoral ticket has 
thrown most of the Hoosier Republican politicians into a 
panic." 
From Indianapolis, the correspondent of the Herald re-
ported that the Republicans had "done everything possible 
to stiffen the backs of the Populist leaders and prevent fusion, 
and are openly charged with attempts of bribery." Almost 
despite himself, the Herald's reporter paid this unwitting 
tribute to the allied silver parties: "The formidable showing 
of the Popocrats in the campaign in spite of the numerous 
drawbacks under which they labor is something phenomenal. 
Deserted by old time leaders, dismembered of their most 
influential followers, shorn of their sources of campaign 
revenue, practically without a dollar beyond what is con-
tributed by the insulted candidates, they present a front 
strongly suggestive of the naked African hordes throwing 
themselves upon the repeating rifles and Maxim guns of 
civilized troops. Against them are arrayed virtually all the 
corporate interests of the State. The combined business 
interests of every city and town, with small exceptions, are 
hostile to them .... If under these circumstances they were 
to win this fight it would be the most remarkable campaign 
ever known. Such a result seems impossible." 
The Herald's correspondent figured that despite the Demo-
cratic loss in Indiana of some 12,000 Gold Democrats, the 
Populists would bring about 25,000 votes to Bryan and that 
was close to the number of votes that the Republicans needed 
to put the state in the McKinley column. Indiana was said 
to have some 40,000 "floaters," a large percentage of whom 
were said to be "proverbially susceptible to financial influ-
ences." The newspaperman concluded that in Indiana "the 
whole thing depends upon the relative defections," and the 
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"Popocrats," who had "not a cent for fireworks or pictures 
or uniforms or other campaign tinsel," admitted "the venality 
of their own followers."36 
Clearly the fusion policy created alarm in Republican 
circles. The Populist committee's reaffirmation of that policy 
gained strength from the fact that other prominent Populists 
who were not on the committee joined in the appeal for a 
united front of all reformers. Reuben F. Kolb, the veteran 
leader of Alabama Populists, announced as early as October 
1 that since the only possible obstacle to Bryan's success in 
Alabama was the separate Populist electoral ticket for Bryan 
and Watson, he felt compelled to give his vote, and to urge 
other Populists to give theirs, to the Bryan-Sewall slate. 
Shortly after the statement from the Chicago conference, Kolb 
informed Butler that the midroad Populists had helped to 
block fusion in Alabama, although Kolb and other Populists 
had labored for it. Kolb believed, nevertheless, that Alabama 
was now safe for Bryan and that the Bryan-Sewall ticket 
would receive support from a majority of Populists in the state 
-"not because we love Watson less but Bryan more."37 
Ignatius Donnelly, one of the best known of the northern 
Populists, composed an address which the Populist national 
committee endorsed and released on October 24. Donnelly's 
statement, after lavishly praising both Bryan and Watson, 
urged Populists not to be discouraged by the fact that Bryan 
had two running mates: "There will be two months between 
the date of the election and the day when the electors are 
required by law to cast their votes. Surely there is wisdom 
enough in the two parties which support Mr. Bryan to adjust 
that complication during that time and in a manner satis-
factory to all." 
36 New York Herald, October 14, 15, 1896. 
37 Atlanta Constitution, October 1, 1896; Kolb to Butler, October 20, 
1896, Butler MSS. 
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As for the integrity of the People's party, Donnelly assured 
his "Brethren" that the Populist organization was intact and 
that there was no intention "to close the academy because 
the first class is about to graduate with honors." Populists 
were merely "educating Democracy from the inside." If 
reformers failed in their great opportunity of 1896, they might 
never win, so Populists should "Forget everything else and 
do your whole duty."38 
Even S. F. Norton, the Illinois Populist editor and author 
whom the midroaders had run against Bryan at the St. Louis 
convention, came out with a statement urging Populists every-
where to support Bryan. Norton argued that regardless of 
whether Bryan was a Populist in sentiment or not, one thing 
certain was "that every enemy reformers have encountered 
during the last twenty years we find today among Mr. 
Bryan's bitterest and most relentless opponents." That fact 
alone, according to Norton, made Bryan the friend of the 
Populists and his success the defeat of their enemies. Norton 
noted that many Populists regretted certain fusion arrange-
ments but since no one regretted them as noticeably as did 
Mark Hanna, Populists had no choice but "to loyally and 
earnestly support Mr. Bryan-not so much for the sake of 
elevating him to the Presidency as for the purpose of defeating 
what may be appropriately and most expressively termed 
Mark Hanna Republicanism."39 
With the achievement of such a large degree of unity 
as Raleigh News and Observer, October 25, 1896. In requesting Donnelly 
to write a "bugle call" that would stir and arouse all Populists, Butler had 
observed: "The individual voter is governed too much, as a rule, by his local 
surroundings. He is apt to be guided too much by local prejudice, and fail 
to comprehend in a crisis like this what his full duty is, and what the 
responsibilities are that attach to his action or non-action." Butler to Don-
nelly, September 18, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
39 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 21, 1896. Norton sent his statement 
to Butler, who thanked him for the "patriotic" service and secured national 
distribution for it. Butler to Norton, October 22, 1896, Campaign Letter-
books, Butler MSS. 
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among Populists as to the necessity of supporting the fusion 
electoral tickets, Watson had been effectively isolated in his 
opposition to that policy. Nevertheless, the other result of 
the Populist conference at Chicago was a last effort by the 
national committee to soothe the Georgian who had found 
his role in the campaign a difficult one to fill effectively. The 
Populist national executive committee wrote a long private 
letter to Watson, explaining in candid terms how and why 
the committee had come to conclude that there was no 
alternative to the policy of the fusion electoral tickets. A 
subcommittee of three-Butler, Washburn, and Reed-would 
deliver the public address to Watson in person and "make 
any further explanations of the work of the campaign that 
may be necessary." The Populist leaders concluded their 
letter with an appeal for Watson's consideration and help 
and reminded him that they were his personal friends as well 
as the Populist party's official committee.40 
Watson refused to meet the subcommittee in Atlanta but 
said that they could come to his home in Thomson if they 
wished. Although Butler returned to Washington from Chi-
cago rather than going to Georgia as had been announced, 
Watson denied the newspaper reports that he had refused 
to see the Populist chairman. At any rate, feverish and 
complicated negotiations now began, and politicians, Demo-
cratic as well as Populist, descended on Thomson, Georgia. 
Colonel Evan P. Howell, powerful Democrat and editor 
of the Atlanta Constitution, journeyed to confer with Wat-
son and soon after informed him that Senator Jones found 
it absolutely impossible to visit Atlanta on October 19 but 
would send a representative. "As well as I could I outlined 
to him without using any names the ideas advanced by 
myself to you," Howell wrote, "and he telegraphed me late 
40 National Executive Committee to Watson, October 15, 1896, Thomas 
E. Watson MSS, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina 
Library. 
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to-night his hearty concurranc [sic] in the idea, and stated 
that the member of the National Committee would be here 
Monday [October 19] and would be fully authorized to act 
in his behalf and for the committee."41 
Reed and Washburn next spent a day at Watson's home 
but would only say, "We have spent a quiet day in private 
conversation and have greatly enjoyed this perfect October 
day in this genial Georgia climate." Upon their return to 
Atlanta, the Populist committeemen called on Howell. Clark 
Howell, the editor's son, attended the meeting as Senator 
Jones' representative; other prominent Democrats, including 
Patrick Walsh, who was from Augusta and one of Watson's 
old Democratic antagonists in Georgia's tenth congressional 
district, also attended the meeting. Although Washburn 
made some innocuous comment about a "Bryan wave" that 
was allegedly sweeping the country, he and Reed refused to 
comment on the frantic political negotiations going on in 
Georgia.42 
Upon returning to Chicago, Washburn hurried to see 
Senator Jones with what the press association despatches 
referred to as an ultimatum from Watson in the form of an 
"alternative proposition" for submission to the Democratic 
campaign committee. Washburn, just prior to his conference 
with Jones, announced: "Mr. Watson would rather be 
vindicated in his own town, in his own district, in his own 
state and in the whole nation than be vice president. His 
southern pride is aroused and the people of Georgia are 
rallying around him because he is a Southerner. The nomina-
tion he received at St. Louis was forced upon him to unite our 
forces, and being at the head of a larger force than that which 
41 Howell to Watson, October 17, 1896, ibid. Woodward, Watson, 325, 
mentions Howell's visit and says, "Nothing carne of these conferences that 
was announced." Woodward does state that newspaper reports had Senator 
Tillman visiting Thomson to promise Watson a cabinet post if he would 
retire from the race. 
42 Atlanta Constitution, October 18, 20, 1896. 
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elected Lincoln, he demands recognition and vindication or 
he will fight." 
Washburn explained that there was a danger to Bryan 
from the disgruntled Populists who might stay at home on 
election day, and Watson could bring them out with a 
"thrilling proclamation to his party to line up" for Bryan. 
Watson would not accept a cabinet post, according to 
Washburn, and was "only anxious that his party should come 
out of this contest in a manner that will reflect honor on it."43 
All of these negotiations came to naught, and the news-
papers lost sight of the matter as Watson again took to the 
campaign trail in Alabama and Tennessee. Letters in the 
papers of Marion Butler, however, reveal that the subject 
under consideration had been a drastic plan for conciliating 
Watson. "I must confess that I am very much surprised 
at Mr. Watson's proposition to withdraw from the Vice-
Presidential race to go to Congress from his district," Butler 
wrote Washburn. Butler thought that the switch could be 
arranged with the Democrats, but he feared the effect of such 
a move on Bryan's campaign and the Populist part in it. Did 
Watson think he could write an appeal to the Populists 
strong enough to line them up solidly for Bryan and Sewall in 
consideration for his being sent to Congress? "In view of his 
past utterances and the position which he has taken," Butler 
ventured, "I must say that this position of his seems to be 
very inconsistent, not to say absurd. I know of no man in the 
party who would be worth more to it in Congress than Mr. 
Watson, however. It is really the field where his talents 
peculiarly fit him for." Still, Butler advised against the plan 
and urged Washburn in Chicago to concentrate his efforts 
with Jones on an understanding about Sewall's withdrawal 
after the election.44 
43 Ibid., October 21, 1896; New York Times, October 21, 1896. 
44 Butler to Washburn, October 24, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler 
MSS. 
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Butler's opposition to Watson's retirement from the Popu-
list ticket together with the Democratic leaders' ultimate 
rejection of the scheme led to its collapse. After the election, 
when Watson continued his bitter attacks on Butler and his 
management of the campaign, Butler drafted an answer 
which among other things charged that Watson played the 
part of "knave or fool" and had done "valuable work for the 
gold ring for which he could have gotten good pay, though 
we think he did it for nothing, but from another cause." As 
evidence that Watson had been "simply guilty of playing 
the fool," Butler referred to the negotiations about the 
congressional seat and mentioned Watson's willingness "to 
sell out his party to get a two years term in Congress, with a 
string on the speakership." 
Washburn and Reed both counseled Butler against pub-
lishing the answer to Watson, and Butler never did. Wash-
burn expressed strong objections especially to any mention 
of the negotiations with Jones about a congressional seat for 
Watson. "That was a most sacred party secret and was urged 
by Watson's friends and not by himself and was simply one 
of the alternatives I was permitted to use with Senator Jones 
and is not public property," Washburn argued, "but was 
given to you [Butler] in confidence and should not be used 
under any circumstances as it would arouse much feeling."45 
Butler remained silent about the strange episode, and, as in 
many other aspects of the tangled events of Populist history 
in 1896, Watson's version of the campaign and Populist 
policies received most of the publicity at the time and has 
highly colored historical accounts as well. 
Whether or not Watson himself could have been so 
"inconsistent" and "absurd," as Butler put it, as to have 
seriously considered a deal, one whereby he went to Congress 
45 Butler's unpublished answer to Watson entitled "Some Facts the Public 
Should Know," December, 1896, Washburn to Butler, January 13, 1897, 
Butler MSS. 
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in exchange for withdrawing as vice-presidential candidate, is 
debatable. The Georgian had repeatedly attacked office 
seekers and pictured himself as the disinterested spokesman 
for the agrarian masses. His followers saw Watson during the 
campaign of 1896 as "an uncompromising idealist." And only 
a day or so before Clark Howell and the other emissaries 
began to descend on Thomson, Watson telegraphed the Kan-
sas midroaders that the "fusionists have abandoned principle 
and got into a mad scramble at the pie counter."46 
On the other hand, Washburn did make a cryptic public 
statement at the time about Watson's preferring more to be 
"vindicated" at home than to be named vice president. And 
the correspondence between Washburn and Butler before 
and after the election was clearly not designed to raise false 
charges against Watson. From 1892 on Watson had tried 
harder to regain the tenth district congressional seat than to 
do anything else in his life. Although he had stubbornly 
contested the elections whereby his Democratic opponent 
repeatedly piled up allegedly fraudulent majorities in Augusta, 
Watson had been unable to win the prize he sought. 
Perhaps Tom Watson did dream momentarily in mid-
October 1896 of what seemed to be a way out of his dilemma 
as the Populist candidate who found himself so sadly out of 
step with the majority of his party and its leaders. If he did 
so dream perhaps the most charitable as well as most accurate 
thing to say about him would be what he himself later said 
about his condition in 1896: "Politically I was ruined. 
Financially I was flat on my back. How near I came to loss 
of mind only God who made me knows-but I was as near 
distraction, perhaps as any mortal could safely be. If ever a 
poor devil had been outlawed and vilified and persecuted and 
46 Woodward, Watson, 326; Watson's telegram in Atlanta Constitution, 
October 16, 1896. Watson and the Kansas midroaders tried to keep his name 
from appearing on the Populist ballot in the state, but Breidenthal took 
legal action that thwarted the move. 
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misrepresented and howled down and mobbed and threatened 
until he was well nigh mad, I was he."47 
Among the Populists only the minority of midroaders 
would have agreed with Watson's paranoiac portrayal of 
persecution, but his last actions in the closing days of the 
campaign of 1896 did match the "distraction" that he later 
admitted. Even among the Georgia Populists he seemed to 
be losing his grip. After the Georgia Democrats again refused 
electoral fusion with the Populists on the basis of all thirteen 
electors' voting for Watson for vice president, the newspapers 
reported that the Populist state committee might withdraw 
their straight Bryan-Watson ticket in the state rather than 
make the weak showing that would be inevitable with four 
other tickets in the field-Republican, Democratic, National 
(Gold) Democratic, and Prohibitionist. Watson, then in 
Birmingham for a speech, declared: "The Georgia electors 
will not be withdrawn. The convention named them and 
they accepted the trust. They owe it to Populism in Georgia 
and elsewhere to stay in the field."48 
In Alabama, where Kolb and other Populists had already 
rebelled against the straight Bryan-Watson ticket of the 
midroad Populists, Watson's continued attacks on Sewall 
brought cheers from the midroaders in his audiences. "When 
anybody says to me, 'Come down, you Southern man,' when 
I am asked to lie down in the dust and let this Eastern pluto-
crat wipe his feet on my neck,'' Watson declared, "would 
you want a Southern man to do it? (Cries of 'No!')." 
Reminding his listeners that they had been "wearing sack-
cloth and ashes long enough," Watson proclaimed that the 
South had been for too long "a hewer of wood" and "drawer 
of water" for the East and before he would betray the People's 
47Watson in Atlanta Journal, August II, 1906, as quoted in Woodward, 
Watson, 3 3 I. 
48 Atlanta Constitution, October 21, 22, 1896. 
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party, the best hope of escape from the old sectionalism, he 
"would die the death of a dog ten times over."49 
While \:Vatson proceeded to Tennessee, where electoral 
fusion between Populists and Democrats had also failed, the 
Georgia Populist committee defied Watson and withdrew 
the Bryan-Watson electoral ticket. As one newsman put it, 
this sounded the "death knell" of Georgia Populism in the 
national campaign. Judge Hines, the Populist gubernatorial 
candidate in 1894, announced that he would vote for the 
Democratic electors on the grounds that "because others have 
done wrong there's no use why Populists should do so." But 
other Populists announced that they would vote for McKinley 
rather than help Sewall become vice president. Watson 
virtually retired from the campaign after even his Georgia 
followers had disregarded his views, but he did advise one 
audience near his home that if they could not stomach either 
the Democratic or Republican electoral ticket, they could 
surely stay at home on election day. A solemn "Amen" from 
someone in the crowd greeted this pronouncement. 50 
Watson's letter accepting the Populist vice-presidential 
nomination provided an almost comic touch of mystery to 
the last two weeks of the presidential campaign. The metro-
politan newspapers of the East especially exploited the mat-
ter, but all over the country people speculated about the 
"case of the missing letter." When he mailed the letter to 
49 Ibid.; New York Times, October 22, 1896. Watson attracted sympathy 
by suggesting that he was being urged to withdraw from the race, which 
was certainly not the case with the Populist committee and, at that late 
stage of the campaign, not true of Jones and the Democrats either. When 
told that in Alabama the electoral ticket only required a plurality to win 
and that there was danger of a Republican victory, Watson is quoted as 
having said: "Then why don't you get together-our boys are willing for it-
while I am primarily opposed to fusion, I am willing to [accept] it where it 
will insure against McKinley electors being elected." Atlanta Constitution, 
October 23, 1896. If this was his view, it was one that he had succeeded in 
hiding from the public as well as from the Populist national committee. 
50 Ibid., October 24, 25, 1896; Woodward, Watson, 327. 
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Chairman Butler in mid-October, Watson dropped hints 
about its explosive contents, and the anti-Bryan editors and 
newsmen began to quiver in anticipation of another sensation. 
A few days later, when the Populist and Democratic 
representatives swarmed into Thomson, Washburn telegraphed 
Butler to withhold the letter from publication until further 
notice. Butler, who was baffied by all the furore, confessed 
to another member of the national committee that five days 
after Watson said he had mailed the letter it had not reached 
Washington. "I notice that Watson said in an interview one 
day that he had mailed it to me at Chicago, and another day 
that he had mailed it to me at Washington," Butler ex-
plained. "Unless it has miscarried in the mail, he certainly 
has not mailed it at all."51 
The midroaders promptly added another chapter in the 
story of Butler's villainy and the dark conspiracy against 
Watson. Butler meanwhile requested Washburn to check 
the mail in the branch headquarters in Chicago. The Populist 
campaign handbook still stood in type waiting for Watson's 
letter, for Butler explained that he feared that on account of 
Watson's "sensitive disposition" he would "consider it as a 
reflection or slight upon him" if the book appeared without 
the vice-presidential candidate's letter. "I would rather pub-
lish his letter even if it is a bad document," Butler declared, 
"than to have the publication of the book delayed and also 
the suspense among our party to continue longer."52 
Butler's own suspense ended several days before the na-
tion's. Watson's letter had been mailed on October 14, as he 
claimed, and it had been postmarked as received in Wash-
ington on October 15. But it was postage due two cents. 
51 Butler to Dr. C. F. Taylor, October 19, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, 
Butler MSS. Butler's secretary wrote Watson on the same day saying that 
the letter of acceptance, which the newsmen kept writing about, had not 
been received. 
52 Butler to Washburn, October 22, 1896, ibid. 
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Somehow in the shuffle between the postage due clerk in the 
Washington post office, the Senate messenger, and the Senate 
postmaster, the letter had lain there for over a week while 
the nation's curiosity built up. 53 
Contrary to what Butler had earlier said, he refused to 
release Watson's letter of acceptance to the public when it 
finally did arrive. Since the campaign would end in little 
more than a week, on Tuesday, November 3, Butler refused 
to take the responsibility for disseminating the views that 
Watson expressed. Watson, who had earlier not been the 
least bit reluctant to publicize his statements and opinions, 
refrained from releasing the letter himself until after the 
election was over. 
"It is solely because of my promise to do so, that I accept 
the nomination," Watson began his remarkable letter. He 
explained that he would have preferred a straight Populist 
ticket at St. Louis but allowed his name to be presented for 
the vice-presidential place in order to harmonize the party, 
"it being understood that if the Populists accepted the Demo-
cratic nominee, the Democrats would accept the nominee of 
the Populists." Watson interpreted the fusion electoral tickets 
not only as a violation of the "St. Louis contract" but also as a 
Democratic plot to secure Populist endorsement of Sewall. 
After repeating his argument about the necessity of recog-
nizing the South, Watson charged Butler with the responsi-
bility for the failure of the Democrats to remove Sewall from 
the race. No Populist could vote for Sewall without abandon-
ing Populism, Watson argued, for "Whenever Right com-
promises with Wrong, it is the Right which suffers." Betray-
53 Butler to Senate postmaster, October 24, 1896, J. P. Willett, the Wash-
ington postmaster, to F. H. Hoover, Butler's secretary, November 2, 1896, 
and J. H. Doyle, postage due clerk, to Willett, November 2, 1896, Butler 
MSS. Watson's letter was a long one, and his carelessness about such 
details as stamps and fees is illustrated by a letter from the Librarian of 
Congress to Watson, August 29, 1896, Watson MSS. 
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ing a certain immodesty as well as his ignorance of the actual 
sentiment among a majority of Populists, Watson declared: 
"I did not seek this nomination nor desire it. Had I asked 
the Presidential nomination of the People's Party and gone to 
St. Louis to claim it, no power of the Democratic emissaries 
could have kept it from me." He concluded by declaring 
that the Populist "rank and file" would never vote for Sewall 
electors, and if the Democratic leaders really wanted to defeat 
McKinley "let them lose no time in realizing this truth."54 
Butler's reply was brief. Refusing to debate his own actions 
and the reasons for them, he merely pointed out that Watson 
was urging Populists everywhere not to support the joint 
electoral tickets that existed in a majority of states. "Is it 
possible that you fully appreciate the effect of such advice?" 
Butler asked. If followed, it not only would mean Bryan's 
defeat but would result in the Populists not receiving a single 
vote in the electoral college and the loss of any number of 
Populist congressmen and senators, not to mention state 
officials. Butler pointed out that in Georgia and the few other 
states that had followed Watson's advice the Populists would 
"not get a single elector, and I fear not many congressmen, 
if any." "Therefore, I beseech you to change at least that 
part of your letter that gives advice, which, if followed, would 
surely help the common enemy." Otherwise, Watson would 
have to assume the responsibility for releasing his letter.51' 
"The truth is Senator," Watson shot back, "you feel your-
self to be a deeply guilty man, as indeed you are." According 
to Watson, the letter of acceptance had been in the Populist 
headquarters all along, but Butler did not dare publish it 
because "you felt its arraignment of you to be unanswerable." 
Butler had allowed his personal ill will towards him, Watson 
54 Watson to Butler, October 14, 1896, in Raleigh Caucasian, December 3, 
1896. 
55 Butler to Watson, October 26, 1896, Butler MSS. This was also 
published after the election. 
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charged, to divert him "into a tortuous, narrow, jealous and 
disloyal policy which has shipwrecked the People's Party and 
brought the success of Mr. Bryan to a crisis of extreme peril." 
After the inevitable diatribes against Sewall and the Demo-
crats who had nominated him, Watson assailed Butler for 
making the fusion deals and then claiming that it was too 
late to apply the remedy of straight Populist tickets. Butler 
had not consulted, helped, or informed Watson. But the 
Populist committee backed Butler, the Democratic com-
mittee was against Watson-"1 stand alone," the Georgian 
declared.56 
Luckily for Bryan, Butler, and perhaps even for Watson, 
the Georgian's strange and bitter letters to the duly elected 
national chairman of the Populist party were kept from the 
public until after the election. The dominant contribution 
of the Populists to the last phase of the campaign was neither 
Watson's antics nor the speculation about his "missing" 
letter but the national committee's appeal from Chicago for 
Populist support of Bryan. 
That manifesto, together with the statements from Don-
nelly and Norton and other Populists, more than offset in the 
newspapers and the public mind the erratic and perverse 
course of Tom Watson. Electoral fusion held in twenty-
eight states, and in those most of the Populists apparently 
marched to the polls to vote for Bryan and reform on 
November 3, 1896. The Populists and their Democratic allies 
were not able to elect Bryan, but it was not the midroaders 
who caused his defeat. That was beyond the power of the 
Populists. 
56 Watson to Butler, October 28, 1896, Butler MSS. This is a fifteen-
page, handwritten letter. 
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ALTHOUGH the claim was small comfort in the face of McKinley's victory in the election, the national Pop-
ulist leaders were able to say with truth that Bryan's defeat 
was not to be attributed to any failure on the part of the 
People's party. The leading Populist states-Texas, North 
Carolina, Kansas-all went for Bryan, despite the failure of 
Democratic-Populist electoral fusion in the first of those. In 
fact, Bryan carried all of the southern states except Delaware, 
Maryland, Kentucky, and West Virginia; and there was fusion 
in the last two. In all of the deep South, where the failure of 
fusion was the joint responsibility of both Democrats and 
midroad Populists, Bryan proved victorious anyhow. 
West of the Mississippi Bryan won all of the electoral votes 
except those of California, Oregon, North Dakota, Iowa, and 
Minnesota; and there was electoral fusion in all five of those 
states. But Bryan and the cause of reform that he symbolized 
lost most decisively in those very states where the battle was 
hardest fought, in the north central states of Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Despite the 
fact that Democrats and Populists effected fusion in all of 
them and the additional fact that the number of midroad 
Populists in sympathy with Watson's sectional appeal was 
highly limited there, the Republicans won every electoral 
vote in those states.1 
More or less in defiance of his own wishes, Tom Watson 
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received twenty-seven electoral votes for the vice presidency, 
five more than General Weaver had received for the presidency 
in 1892. Watson's largest block of votes, ironically, was the 
five of North Carolina's eleven that had been assigned to the 
Populists in the fusion arrangement in that state, and all of 
Watson's other votes came from states where fusion had 
been effected. The 217,000 or so popular votes cast for 
Watson electors were no proper measure of Populist voting 
strength, not only because of the failure of Kansas and Colo-
rado Populists to demand places on their fusion electoral 
tickets but also because of Watson's and the midroad Popu-
lists' refusal to allow fusion in a number of southern states. 
Many Populists, in other words, voted for the Democratic 
electors or, as in the deep South, midroad Populists sometimes 
voted for McKinley or simply stayed home on election day. 
Despite the "we told you so" that came from Watson and 
the midroad Populists after Bryan's defeat, there is little 
probability that their disgruntlement had anything to do 
with the defeat of the national reform movement.2 The real 
question about the outcome of the election is this: why was 
Bryan unable to win any of the north central states? With 
their relatively large number of electoral votes, the addition 
1 The most convenient summary of the election results is to be found in 
Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1896 (New York, 1897), 673, 770. McKinley 
received 271 electoral votes to 176 for Bryan; in the popular vote the former 
received over 7,000,000 votes and the latter about 6,500,000. 
2 In California the straight People's party electoral ticket polled 22,234 
votes but the Republican lead over the Democratic-Populist fusion ticket 
was 23,613. In Kentucky, the Republicans won by a scant 277 votes; there 
was no separate Populist electoral ticket and the 5,084 votes for Palmer on 
the National (Gold) Democratic ticket obviously hurt Bryan there much 
more than any midroad Populist disaffection. Given California's nine and Ken-
tucky's eleven electoral votes, however, plus the narrowness of the Repub-
lican victory in those states, those were the two states where midroad Pop-
ulist sentiment could have been important. In Kansas and Texas, both of 
which voted for Bryan, midroaders polled, respectively, 1,240 and 77,985 
votes. Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932 (Stanford Uni-
versity, California, 1934), passim. 
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of them-Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin-plus either Kentucky or California to the Bryan 
column would have meant a victory for reform in 1896. 
Marion Butler, the Populist chairman, and his committee, 
no less than the leaders of the two major parties, fully 
appreciated the strategic role of the north central states from 
the outset of the campaign. Despite the fact that Populism's 
center of gravity, as determined by actual voting strength and 
membership, was in other sections of the country, the Popu-
lists opened branch headquarters for the campaign in Chicago 
and worked assiduously to help win support for the fusion 
electoral ticket in the surrounding states. 
These were the states that clearly did not fit into the simple 
pattern of an alliance of South and West that some agrarians 
liked to talk about in 1896. The Democratic national con-
vention itself in its initial preference for a vice-presidential 
nominee from the East and Bryan in his warm and courteous 
treatment of Sewall throughout the campaign displayed 
sensitivity to the sectional issue and a desire to escape the 
charge of ignoring the most populous part of the country. 
Most of the national Populist leaders likewise saw that a too 
simple geographical or sectional approach hurt more than it 
helped in the most crucial states, and they accordingly 
emphasized an economic and class analysis of the campaign 
issues. 
Tom Watson, on the other hand, never seemed to discern 
the limitations of his sectional appeal as far as the states of 
the old Northwest were concerned. He occasionally men-
tioned the importance of Illinois or Indiana or one of the 
other states in his correspondence, but the approach more 
typical of him was illustrated by this declaration to an audi-
ence at Stone Mountain, Georgia, shortly before the state 
election: "I thought from the first that this campaign should 
be made on sectional lines-the south and west against the 
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north and east. That is the real issue, and why not be honest 
and say so? Our interests are opposed to those of the east."3 
A Republican wag quipped during the campaign that 
Bryan had "two vices to McKinley's one," and all enjoyed 
the joke. Bryan himself could hardly be said to have enjoyed 
the fact of the two running mates during the campaign, 
especially with the midroad Populists screaming as they did. 
But he reconciled himself to the anomaly and apparently 
opposed the idea of Watson's withdrawing from the race in 
mid-October just as he had stood staunchly by Sewall during 
the Populist convention in St. Louis. Composing his still 
useful memoir of the campaign immediately after its termina-
tion, Bryan announced his own conclusion about the matter: 
"Looking back over the campaign I am now convinced that 
under the conditions then existing two Vice-Presidential 
candidates were better than one, and that, notwithstanding 
the embarrassment at the time, the silver cause made a 
better showing than it would have done if Mr. Sewall had 
withdrawn in favor of Mr. Watson, or Mr. Watson in favor 
of Mr. Sewall."4 
Bryan's point may be conceded, but the fact remains that 
he was not strong enough to win in the north central states. 
Economically those states had long been drawing closer to 
the East, and with reference to the Civil War the dominant 
sentiment in them was certainly northern and Republican. 
The presence on the Democratic ticket of a New England 
businessman did not prevent some Republicans from harking 
back to the "bloody shirt," the venerable type of sectionalism 
that had proved so useful to Republicans since 1865. One 
innovation in the pattern in 1896 was that the Gold Demo-
crats too were not above resorting to the charge of neo-
a Atlanta Constitution, October 2, 1896. 
4 Bryan, First Battle, 298; the earlier quip is from Wayne C. Williams, 
William Jennings Bryan (New York, 1936), 173. 
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Confederate aggression. J. Sterling Morton, for example, 
Cleveland's secretary of agriculture from Nebraska and a rabid 
foe of financial reform, declared that in "the Southern Con-
federacy the same leaders who are in command of the picket 
guards for free silver at 16 to 1 were leading financiers [in the 
war]." Morton charged that the "Confederate Generals now 
in command of the Bryan campaign seem to desire to accom-
plish, by false finance, that which they failed to bring about 
by arms, national dishonor and disgrace."5 
Although McKinley himself carefully eschewed appeals to 
the "bloody shirt" in his front-porch speeches, lesser Republi-
cans and other Gold Democrats besides Morton joined in the 
tried-and-true chorus that had for so long made reform 
impossible and furnished protection for economic conserv-
atism. Even the New York Times, which criticized the 
Republican party's past record with reference to the South, 
warned that for "the old Confederate States to be massed 
together in a solid support of Bryan and the policy of disaster 
and dishonor which he stands for would make a very bad 
impression." Such a southern voting pattern, according to 
the Times, would "be evidence of a certain lack of patriotism 
and of loyalty to our institutions, and will be damaging to 
that confidence which has been slowly growing between the 
people of the North and South." 
When various "goldbugs" attacked the Bryanites for being 
in league with former slaveholders and plotting "another 
scheme of secession more treasonable than the first," the St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch pointed out that the "effort to 'fire the 
5 Raleigh News and Observer, October 16, 1896. One of the Southerners 
whom Morton had named in his attack, Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, 
replied: "I have never thrown any stones at that barn rat, and I do not see 
why he should refer to me by name as a rebel. I am not aware that in the 
army I had to fight any member of this administration. I may have had to 
fight Mr. Cleveland's substitute, and I have long since forgiven the substi-
tute, because he was man enough to fight." Ibid., October 17, 1896. 
Defeat and Aftermath 131 
Northern heart' has the very obvious purpose of changing the 
subject." The St. Louis paper insisted that because southern-
ers chose to "align themselves with Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
and Kansas rather than with Wall Street" they had again to 
face the old charges of disloyalty, but the "attempt to revive 
the old sectionalism is mere Wall Street imbecility."6 
Whether an imbecility or not, the Republican and Gold 
Democratic appeal to the old sectionalism was merely one 
factor that hurt Bryan in the north central states. Probably 
much more important in explaining the reformers' loss of 
those states was their apparent inability to win massive 
support from the industrial workers who already crowded 
Chicago, Indianapolis, and the other cities of the region. 
Failure to win the workers' votes was not due to any lack 
of effort on the part of the Populists. One of the reformers' 
most widely circulated documents was a petition for bimetal-
lism which the heads of the various labor organizations had 
signed and presented to Congress in 1895. Demanding an 
"immediate return to the money of the Constitution as 
established by our fathers, by restoring the free and unlimited 
coinage of both gold and silver at the present ratio of 16 to 1," 
these allied leaders of farmers and industrial workers fore-
shadowed the political alliance of the campaign of 1896. 
Some of the signers and their organizations were: J. R. 
Sovereign, Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor; 
Samuel Campers, President of the American Federation of 
Labor; Marion Butler, President of the National Farmers' 
Alliance and Industrial Union; H. H. Trenor, President of 
6 New York Times, October 31, 1896; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 
18, 1896. Ignatius Donnelly asserted that the popular prejudice against the 
Democratic party caused Bryan to lose Minnesota. "The Republican speakers 
claim[ed] that the Peoples' Party men have all turned Democrats, and 
then they raked over the Democracy during the War, and drove our Repub-
lican friends back to their 'first love.'" Donnelly to W. A. Bentley, De· 
cember 29, 1896, Donnelly MSS. 
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the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners; P. M. 
Arthur, Grand Chief of the United Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers; C. A. Robinson, President of the Farmers' 
Mutual Benefit Association; Frank P. Sargent, Grand Master 
of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen; and John Mc-
Bride, President of the United Mine Workers.7 
In addition to the silver issue on which the organized 
farmers and workers had agreed long before the campaign, 
both Democrats and Populists included other planks in their 
platforms that were especially designed to appeal to the 
workers. The Democratic platform echoed one of the strong-
est demands of the labor groups in calling for the protection 
of American labor by the prevention of the "importation of 
foreign pauper labor to compete with it in the home market." 
The Populist platform called for a program of public works 
to relieve the unemployed during industrial depressions. Both 
parties endorsed the income tax and condemned "government 
by injunction" as it had been most conspicuously displayed 
in the Pullman strike of 1894 and the subsequent arrest, 
conviction, and imprisonment of Eugene Debs. 
To capitalize on these obvious bids for labor support, the 
Populist national executive committee assigned one of its 
members, John R. Sovereign of the Knights of Labor, to the 
Populists' branch headquarters in Chicago and gave him the 
special assignment of organizing the campaign among the 
industrial workers. Marion Butler too, despite his wholly 
agrarian background, revealed a clear awareness of the crucial 
nature of the workers' votes. When certain railroad com-
panies distributed an antisilver circular among their em-
ployees, Butler prepared and had printed an answer. "If this 
is not the correct answer," he declared to Senator Jones, 
7 Bryan, First Battle, 166-67. For evidence of this petition during the 
campaign and its cheering effect on Bryan's agrarian backers, see the Raleigh 
News and Observer, October 4, 1896. 
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"then we must have one. The only hope of the gold men 
now is to array the wage earner against the farmer, and we 
must meet it."8 
To Debs, who strongly supported Bryan and who con-
sequently had refused to allow Henry Demarest Lloyd to 
nominate him at the Populist convention in St. Louis, Butler 
also sent a copy of his answer to the railroad companies' 
antisilver appeal. Requesting Debs to publish the Populist 
answer in the newspaper of his American Railway Union, 
Butler also took the occasion to explain the part he had 
played in the Senate in attempting to pass legislation that 
would prevent such injustices in the future as Debs had 
allegedly suffered at the hands of the federal courts.9 
John McBride, head of the United Mine Workers and 
former president of the American Federation of Labor, 
declared that "not one single bona fide labor paper in the 
United States" was supporting McKinley and that every labor 
organization of any consequence had declared for silver and 
against government by injunction. "When the moneyed 
men of the land all rush to the support of McKinley and the 
gold standard," McBride insisted, "it is time for the labor 
leaders to get on the other side, because experience has 
demonstrated that there is nothing in common between the 
men who make wealth and the men who take wealth."10 
The loyal support of Bryan from Debs, McBride, Gompers, 
and other leaders of organized workers was clear enough, but 
s Butler to Jones, September 7, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. 
9 Butler to Debs, September 12, 1896, Butler to the Legal Adviser, Chicago, 
September 7, 1896, ibid. 
10 Raleigh News and Observer, September 6, 1896. McBride was attacking 
the views of Terence V. Powderly, former head of the Knights of Labor, who 
was one of the few labor leaders who campaigned for McKinley. Even the 
Republicans admitted that organized labor was against them. One of them 
wrote from Chicago: "The labor organizations are against us to a man. 
Impossible to teach them. They are more interested in the question of 
Federal jurisdiction over strikes than the money question." New York 
World, September 12, 1896, as quoted in Josephson, The Politicos, 691. 
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the important question was about the views of the vast 
majority of the workers who were still unorganized. Henry 
George, famed author of Progress and Poverty, was in many 
ways the pioneer and giant among the reformers of the 
Gilded Age. Not only did he declare his enthusiastic ad-
herence to the silver cause, but he also traveled around to 
various industrial centers during the campaign to write first-
hand accounts for the New York Journal. 
In Chicago George found that the leaders in the Bryan 
campaign were confident about support from organized labor 
but doubtful about the unorganized majority of workers, and 
he was especially interested in ascertaining if the same pattern 
held in Cleveland. As well as he could determine, George 
reported, pro-Bryan sentiment among the organized laborers 
was, if anything, even stronger in the Cleveland area than in 
Chicago. The National Plasterers' Association had held its 
annual meeting in the Ohio city a week earlier and the 
National Carpenters' Association met while George was 
there; the support for Bryan in both groups seemed to be 
strong and general. George also found that the workers in the 
Cleveland area felt some bitterness and suspicion about labor 
trouble in a local plant where, the workers believed, the 
company was determined to break the union. "There is an 
idea among the men that if McKinley wins this effort will be 
generally made," he added. 
In one of the public squares of Cleveland, Henry George 
found another colorful facet of the campaign. Bryan had 
spoken there almost a month earlier, and "from that day to 
the present moment, a sort of perpetual discussion has gone 
on in this public square." The men who formed the changing 
audience, many or most of whom were unemployed, insisted 
on certain proprieties and on each side's having a fair hearing. 
The more or less permanent chairman who presided over the 
openair meetings was "a round, full-built man, named Orr, 
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who was a foreman of dock ore handlers in the employ of 
Mark Hanna until he attended the St. Louis Populist con-
vention as a delegate" and was discharged upon his return. 
Mark Hanna's agents would have been smart to retain the 
man, George asserted, for he devoted "his enforced leisure 
to the most effective work toward defeating McKinley, by 
acting as a sort of common consent chairman for this common 
people's perpetual parliament." All the information that 
George could get suggested that the unemployed men were 
nearly unanimous for Bryan.11 
Intrigued by the widely publicized accounts of the large 
delegations of workers who visited McKinley's home, Henry 
George went to Canton, Ohio, then the Republican Mecca, 
to see for himself. He joined a delegation that had been 
brought in on a special train from a "tin plate mill" and 
marched up to the front yard of McKinley's residence. "Gov-
ernor McKinley is a very careful man in such matters," 
George found. "The speaker who is to make the address [for 
the visiting delegation] is first called in, and if a copy has not 
been furnished in advance, the candidate learns what is to be 
said by him, in order to provide against such disaster as befell 
Blaine at the hands of Rev. Dr. ["Rum, Romanism, and 
Rebellion"] Burchard. He then comes out, listens to the 
address and reads his reply, which is afterwards revised before 
being sent to the press." George concluded, after this care-
fully staged affair, that he had rather "travel around like 
11 Henry George to New York Journal, as quoted in Raleigh News and 
Observer, September 23, 25, 1896. When a government official suggested 
that Bryan's unprecedented speechmaking tours were undignified and would 
cause him to be beaten badly, George asked Governor Altgeld his view 
and reported that the Illinois governor thought that: "Bryan was doing more 
for the success of his party than any other hundred of the ablest speakers 
could possibly do, and that the effect on the people of seeing and hearing 
the man they were asked to vote for, and even where it was impossible for 
them to do that, of knowing that he was doing his utmost to get among 
them, and talk to them face to face, was counting for more than an elab-
orate organization and an army of the best speakers." Ibid. 
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Bryan, hard as that must be, than stay in one place and make 
speech after speech, especially if I felt it necessary to write 
and revise them."12 
After talking with his own acquaintances in Canton and 
with silverites who gathered around the local courthouse, 
George believed that there was "the same coercion and the 
same reaction from it, and the same word goes about among 
workingmen to wear [McKinley] buttons or join clubs, or to 
'spoil the Egyptians' by taking anything that is offered from 
the Hanna funds, but to express their real opinions at the 
polls." The Bryan workers in Canton were even optimistic 
about their chances for carrying the county; Populists and 
Democrats were cooperating, and the Populists were "working 
in their own way like beavers." 
As for himself, Henry George declared on the eve of the 
election and after completing his tour that he would vote for 
Bryan "with firmer confidence and a clearer conviction of 
duty" than he had felt since his first vote was cast for 
Abraham Lincoln. "In form the struggle is on the currency 
question," Henry George wrote. "But these are only symbols, 
and behind them are gathered the world-opposing forces of 
aristocratic special privilege and democratic freedom. I can 
have no question of how I ought to vote."13 
Another account of a workers' delegation at Canton, writ-
12 Ibid., September 28, 1896. Mrs. Mary E. Lease, the well-known 
Kansas Populist, obtained an interview with McKinley. She reported, no 
doubt with gleeful malice, that after desultory conversation about how 
weary McKinley was from all the visitors, she threw out a reference to 
"the octopus of mortgaged indebtedness." "A startled look, half fear, lest 
he had given utterance to an unguarded statement, leaped into Major 
McKinley's eyes," Mrs. Lease declared. Every effort to renew the conversa-
tion failed, and she concluded that, if a man could not act unless he first 
had knowledge, "then action cannot be expected from Major McKinley, 
for apparently he is not in possession of any knowledge." With his apparent 
lack of self-confidence, he impressed the female Populist as little more than 
"a mile-stone having engraved upon it the distance more or less from the 
National capitol." Ibid., October 18, 1896. 
13 Ibid., September 28, 1896; St. Louis, Post-Dispatch, November 8, 1896. 
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ten from a perspective quite different from that of Henry 
George and by a reporter who apparently was unconscious 
of the ironies involved, suggests some of the obstacles that 
the reformers faced among the unorganized workers in 1896. 
Three special trains delivered 2,500 "brawny workingmen" 
from Homestead, Pennsylvania, which had earlier been the 
scene of one of the bitterest and bloodiest lockouts of the era. 
Marching up the streets "with military precision behind its 
own squad of Homestead policemen," the delegation was 
said to have made an imposing sight. After the "Homestead 
Glee Club sang lustily and tunefully several campaign songs," 
the superintendent of the transportation department at An-
drew Carnegie's vast plant spoke first: "We are of the Home-
stead Steel Works, which employs over 5,000 men and turns 
out 90,000 tons of finished material per month and under the 
McKinley [tariff] law we could double that. It is too bad to 
see such men and such a plant lie idle, all caused by a lot of 
theorists. They surely do not expect to get something for 
nothing, or change the law of supply and demand; nor yet 
do they expect that Coxey and his hoboes will ever be made 
rich by an act of Congress. We are perfectly satisfied with 
the Republican platform and with you for our leader, and 
when you are elected, which you will be as surely as the sun 
shines, enact a tariff law that shall give us protection from the 
pauper labor of Europe, and pass a law declaring gold the 
standard money of the country, and the women and children 
who are now living on black coffee and bread, will say, 'God 
bless you, McKinley, and long may you live to bless mankind.'" 
After mounting a chair to respond and being greeted with 
a "tumultous outburst" by these happy, unorganized steel-
workers, McKinley began: "The Republican party has always 
believed in 'Homesteads.' (Laughter and applause.) Whether 
it be the homesteads upon the public domain in the far West 
or whether it be homesteads in the busy centres of manu-
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facturing industries .... If there is one day's labor for sixteen 
workingmen, you would not get as good wages as though 
there were sixteen days' work for one workingman. (Laughter 
and applause.) And that is the sort of 16 to 1 we want in the 
United States." Then as the delegation from Homestead left, 
"music of advancing bands announced the approach of a 
thousand employees from the office of the Pennsylvania Rail-
way in Pittsburgh" and 700 workingmen from McKeesport, 
Pennsylvania.14 
If industrial workers had been subjected only to railway 
excursions to Canton and McKinley's carefully censored 
platitudes, no Bryanite could have fairly complained. But 
the intensity of feeling about the issues involved in the 
campaign of 1896 led to a pattern of intimidation, some of 
it subtle and some brutally overt, that effectively robbed an 
incalculable number of citizens of their freedom of choice. 
This quickly becomes apparent to any one who spends some 
time with the newspapers of the period. There was no 
employers' conspiracy. Mark Hanna did not exercise vast and 
mysterious power to control factory owners scattered across 
the nation. Such measures were not necessary when the 
battle lines were as clearly drawn as they seemed to most 
Americans to be in 1896. To catalog all of the instances of 
the intimidation of workers would be as tiresome as it would 
be impossible, but perhaps a few examples may serve to 
suggest the situation that existed. 
That a major depression had prostrated the economy was 
true enough. But a bad situation seemed to get drastically 
worse in the summer of the great campaign. The New York 
Times, then certainly no purveyor of stories slanted to arouse 
sympathy for underlings, reported that the last shaft of the 
14 New York Times, September 13, 1896. When the Populist committee 
could not find funds to send out speakers, it is noteworthy that the Repub-
licans could pay for large audiences to visit McKinley. 
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Rockefeller iron mines in Bessemer, Michigan, had been 
closed down, leaving fewer than 1,000 men with jobs out of 
the 8,000 who had once been employed there. The president 
of the company explained that, "Our regular customers have 
not bought their supply, and they tell us that they find it 
impossible to sell their pig-iron product because the agitation 
in favor of free silver has stopped investments in enterprises 
which would otherwise have enabled them to operate their 
works as usua1."15 
In St. Louis, Missouri, an iron works that employed about 
700 men closed its door on August 1, and the president 
informed a newsman that he attributed the decline in orders 
"to the free silver agitation, and to the [Democrats'] Chicago 
platform." The reporter discovered that shortly before the 
mills were closed each worker had been given a copy of an 
antisilver speech, "How Free Coinage Will Affect the Work-
ingman," by John G. Carlisle, President Cleveland's secretary 
of the treasury. At the end of August another factory in St. 
Louis that employed about 170 men closed down until after 
the election. On the night that it closed the vice president 
in charge of the factory's operation informed the Eighth 
Ward Republican Club that the agitation for free silver 
had led to the cessation of work and that he had made an 
"exhaustive explanation" of the evils of free silver to all the 
employees before discharging them.16 
Although supporters of reform from Bryan and Senators 
Jones and Butler down to the humblest Democrat or Populist 
vigorously protested these widely repeated incidents, redress 
of the workers' grievances was rare. One blatant case, how-
ever, presented the rare spectacle of an overbearing employer 
15 New York Times, August 4, 1896. 
16 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 2, September 1, 1896. These stories 
were not written in the sensational, biased manner that characterized much 
of the journalism of the time but were calm and factual. 
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who had to back down in the face of public pressure. The 
owner of a department store in St. Louis discharged a dozen 
of his employees, including a department head or two, al-
legedly because they were advocates of free silver and there-
fore "anarchists" and unfit to work in the store. When the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch published the story along with affi-
davits from the discharged employees and the Democratic 
state committee threatened legal action, the employer hastily 
bowed before a part of the public's anger. He reinstated the 
twelve employees and took half-page advertisements to an-
nounce that the company had never paid any attention to the 
"Religious Belief, Politics or Nationality" of any person seek-
ing employment there. Furthermore: "Our store will be 
closed on Election Day, Tuesday, Nov. 3d, at 1 P. M., so 
that all our employees will have ample time to VOTE AS THEY 
PLEASE."17 
Unfortunately for the reform parties, factories, mines, and 
railways were not so susceptible to the outraged opinion of a 
part of the public as a locally owned department store was. 
Consequently, the number of closed mills, discharged workers, 
and orders placed on condition of Bryan's defeat increased 
as the campaign continued. The New York Times noted 
that in addition to hundreds of orders conditioned on Mc-
Kinley's election at the iron and steel mills in Pennsylvania, 
there was a long published list of proposed issues of municipal 
bonds which had been deferred until after the election. In 
most of the cases the money was needed to construct public 
works. The election of Bryan would deprive laborers of the 
much-needed employment but "the election of McKinley will 
give it to them with very little delay." 
17 Ibid., October 11, 12, 13, 1896. The Post-Dispatch on October 16 re-
ported that the World was the only newspaper in New York to mention 
the incident at the St. Louis department store-but the World had it that 
the discharged workers were for McKinley and that this was a "case of flagrant 
intimidation on the part of a free silver enthusiast." 
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As opposed to Bryan as the Times was, even it speculated 
editorially that businessmen might be "aggravating a state of 
mind that is unhealthy in itself, and that will, after the elec-
tion, produce a reaction that may easily be mischievous." 
While nineteen out of twenty businessmen were confident of 
Bryan's defeat, they were "waiting and hesitating, 'taking in 
sail' for possible stormy weather, or, at best, not letting out 
any." The Times considered the business world's "curious 
state of mind" as "a striking commentary on the character of 
Bryan and his party and their policy." The Nebraskan 
possessed the "belief of an ignorant fanatic in the doctrine 
he represented" and was, moreover, "a demagogue and a 
revolutionist by nature without any anchorage of knowledge, 
or experience, or sober purpose to steady him." The New 
York newspaper concluded that his election would not be a 
fatal disaster to the nation but "it would be terrible." Still, 
businessmen for their own good as well as the country's 
might "wisely act with more courage and decision."18 
Given the defenselessness of the vast majority of unorgan-
ized industrial workers, there is nothing surprising in the 
fact that Bryan was unable even to carry the larger cities of 
the Midwest, much less to pile up the large majorities there 
that helped elect Democratic presidential candidates after 
18 New York Times, October 21, 22, 1896. The businessmen's confidence 
apparently returned with something of a rush after McKinley's victory. The 
"world's largest" refrigerator company in Michigan announced that it would 
resume work after being closed all summer and would reemploy from 300 
to 450 men. There was an order for 3,000 ice-boxes that had been condi-
tioned on Republican victory. Silk mills in Hartford, Connecticut, were 
resuming full-time operation after running on short time for several months, 
and manufacturers in the area reported an "improved feeling in business" 
and confidence that as surely as it had been promised an era of prosperity 
was at hand. A textile mill in New York state resumed full operation with 
a single order that had been placed conditionally for "5,000 pairs of pants," 
and in Terre Haute, Indiana, two rolling mills hired 400 more men than had 
been used during the summer. Atlanta Constitution, November 9, 1896. 
These are only a few of the instances of renewed business activity reported 
in one day's issue of the Atlanta newspaper. 
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1932.19 Leaders who were sympathetic with labor hinted 
during the campaign that the unorganized workers con-
stituted a highly vulnerable portion of the farmer-labor 
phalanx that was the hope of reformers in 1896. Eugene 
Debs, for example, declared early in the campaign that if 
the election were held then, Bryan would carry even the 
eastern states with the exception of Pennsylvania. "In Penn-
sylvania labor is more completely subjugated than in any 
other State of the Union, and corporate influences better 
organized," Debs explained. "The miners are largely Italians, 
Hungarians, and Poles, who have displaced American labor 
and they do not hesitate to vote according to the orders they 
receive." An Iowan Populist declared it was "a great fight" with 
silver "a mere bauble compared with the real bottom struggle 
now going on for human rights." But the outcome depended 
on the labor vote. "Will they have sense enough to see beyond 
a day's work?" the Iowan asked. "I think the plutes fear 
defeat and are playing a desperate game and risking all." 
Florence Kelley in Chicago feared that wholesale coercion in 
Chicago and elsewhere meant that Altgeld and Bryan would 
lose the state. "There may be more moral courage among 
the wage earners than I'm calculating upon," Miss Kelley 
realistically admitted. "But I see no reason for expecting 
much."20 
19 William Diamond, "Urban and Rural Voting in 1896," American 
Historical Review, XLVI (January 1941), 289-90, shows that in the east 
north central section-Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio--
neither the cities nor the rural areas gave majorities to Bryan and there was, 
in general, little of the tension between urban and rural voting that Diamond 
found in most other sections in varying degrees. In the west north central sec-
tion-Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri-Bryan carried the 
last three states but lost the cities in all. 
20 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 8, 1896; A. W. C. Weeks to Lemuel 
H. Weller, October 22, 1896, Weller MSS, Wisconsin State Historical So-
ciety; Florence Kelley to Henry D. Lloyd, October 15, 1896, Lloyd MSS. 
Pollack, Populist Response to Industrialism, 61-63, suggests, correctly in this 
writer's opinion, that the reason for the failure of the farmer-labor coalition 
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Just as Populist and Democratic efforts to win support 
from the urban workers in the pivotal states apparently failed 
with the unorganized majority, Bryan and his associates in 
the campaign were likewise unsuccessful in persuading the 
majority of the rural farm population in those states to vote 
for reform. Not only were farmers in Iowa, Wisconsin, Min-
nesota, and Michigan traditionally Republican from the Civil 
War on, but historians agree that agriculture in the north 
central states never suffered as cruelly as it had in the drought-
stricken regions farther west and in the South. As one his-
torian has put it, "Bryan failed to carry the farmers with him 
where he needed them the most, in the Old Northwest and 
upper Mississippi Valley."21 
Despite their traditional Republicanism, farmers in the 
pivotal states did suffer in the major depression that began 
in 1893. Plummeting farm prices coupled with other griev-
ances shared with agrarians in other regions created unrest, 
and the Republican campaign leaders in 1896 concentrated on 
soothing the uneasiness of the farmers in the crucial states no 
less than the Populists and Democrats tried to capitalize on it. 
Professor Gilbert Fite has shown how the Republicans flooded 
the section with campaign material arguing the thesis that 
low farm prices had nothing to do with the gold standard 
but derived solely from domestic overproduction and foreign 
competition. The Republicans furnished no inkling as to 
how supply and demand might be brought into balance 
in 1896 lay with labor and that historians have erred in regarding the agrari· 
ans as the stumbling block. Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism, 
1885-1914 (Chicago, 1957), 66, states that the largest of the labor organi-
zations, the American Federation of Labor, had only 278,000 members in 
1898. 
21 Gilbert C. Fite, "Republican Strategy and the Farm Vote in the Presi-
dential Campaign of 1896," American Historical Review, LXV (July 1960), 
804-805. Professor Fite notes that Minnesota, Iowa, and Ohio had voted 
Republican in every presidential election between the Civil War and 1896 
and Illinois and Wisconsin had voted Democratic only in 1892. 
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other than through the general prosperity that they promised 
with the return to the higher protective tariff which they 
perennially stood for. But their headquarters in Chicago, 
"the real centre of the educational part of the campaign" 
according to Mark Hanna's biographer, lavishly dispensed 
pamphlets and materials especially prepared for distribution 
to the rural weekly newspapers and farm journals and all 
stressing the theme of overproduction.22 
Farmers who could not be persuaded that overproduction 
and President Cleveland's trifling reductions in the tariff 
rates were the sources of agricultural depression might have 
been influenced in other ways. Farmers obviously could not 
be discharged or even intimidated about their political views 
in the way that industrial workers were. But the enemies of 
silver had other approaches that could be used in the hinter-
lands. A reporter for a British journal found that eastern 
insurance companies that owned mortgages on farms in Iowa, 
Indiana, Illinois, and surrounding states sent their numerous 
agents into the presidential campaign in October. The com-
panies, "fearing things were running in favor of Bryan, sent 
these agents to see personally every farmer and come to an 
understanding that if McKinley were elected they would 
grant five years' extension of the loan at a low rate of 
interest. "23 
22 Ibid., 794-98. With regard to the political effect of the rise in wheat 
prices just prior to the election, Fite admits that the times were not actually 
improving for farmers late in 1896 but suggests, quite correctly, that many 
midwestern farmers may have thought they were. "Voters do not necessarily 
act on what is true, but on what they think is true. The possibility should 
not be overlooked that the widespread and intense prosperity-is-coming cam· 
paign may have won a sizable number of farm voters, many of whom were 
traditionally Republican anyway, but who had temporarily deserted the party 
in protest against low prices and hard times." Ibid., 801. Hanna's superb 
organizational work is described in Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna: 
His Life and Work (New York, 1912), 209 ff. 
23 St. James Gazette, November 6, 1896, as quoted in Josephson, The 
Politicos, 702. North Carolinians, and probably others, received notices from 
their insurance companies that the free coinage of silver would result in 
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And for those farmers, and workers too for that matter, 
who displayed a stubborn interest in the possibility of relief 
from the grinding deflation through the free coinage of silver, 
the Republicans also had an answer. Its logic may have 
clashed with that of the theme of overproduction, but Ameri-
can politicians of whatever party have seldom paid much 
attention to logic. Not only did the Republican platform 
promise an effort for silver through "an international agree-
ment with the leading commercial nations of the earth," but 
McKinley himself had a strongly prosilver record during his 
earlier incarnation as a congressman from Ohio. "I have 
always been in favor of the free and unlimited coinage of the 
silver product of the United States, and have so voted on at 
least two occasions during the time I have been in public 
life," he had declared in 1890. "With me political and 
economic questions are a conviction."24 
Early in 1896, months before the conventions and cam-
paign, a Republican senator had frankly asserted that to secure 
an international agreement for silver would be just as impos-
sible "either now or hereafter, as to secure a railroad con-
nection between here and the planet Mars." Conservative 
eastern newspapers like the New York Evening Post, which 
frankly adhered to the gold standard, assailed the talk of 
international bimetallism as "solemn fooling, if not worse." 
Another spoke of "chasing a moonbeam" which fed among 
the unemployed and the chronically poor "a restless fever, 
which is death to genuine prosperity." Democratic and Popu-
list editors and political leaders were, for once, quite in 
agreement with the candid advocates of monometallism 
about the essential unreality of any international agreement. 
policies being paid in dollars worth only fifty cents. Raleigh Caucasian, 
August 13, 1896. 
24 Congressman Wm. McKinley, Jr., to E. S. Perkins, September 27, 1890, 
as quoted in New York Times, September 30, 1896. 
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England's attachment to the gold standard was too unshak-
able. But that did not prevent Mark Hanna and the Republi-
can headquarters in Chicago from utilizing the idea of an 
international agreement to the fullest, wherever and when-
ever it was needed.25 
"The free-silver disease is yielding to treatment . . . ," 
Hanna announced in New York at one point during the 
campaign. "A great deal more work is being done [in the 
Midwest] than in the Eastern States." Another and more 
famous remark of Hanna's was, "He [Bryan] is talking silver 
all the time, and that's where we've got him."26 These 
remarks of the Republican generalissimo of 1896 have often 
been interpreted as evidence of Bryan's mistake in emphasiz-
ing silver, the issue that all the reform parties had agreed to 
push to the forefront. 
Another and more likely interpretation is that Hanna and 
Republican campaigners treated the "free-silver disease" in 
the Midwest as in the South not by talk of the gold standard 
but by pushing forward the idea of an international agreement 
as the safest and surest route to bimetallism. The Republi-
cans, in other words, could "get" Bryan for "talking silver 
all the time" because they could "talk silver" too. The lines 
were drawn more clearly and the issues posed more honestly 
in 1896 than in any campaign in many decades. But the 
Republican party's promise of an effort for an international 
agreement on silver, no matter how unrealistic the promise, 
furnished the precise and critical ambiguity that may have 
been one of the decisive factors in McKinley's victory in the 
north central states.27 
25 New York Evening Post and other Republican newspapers as quoted in 
Raleigh News and Observer, October 3, December 25, 1896. 
26 New York Times, September 24, 1896; the second quotation is given, 
among other places, in Faulkner, Politics, Reform, and Expansion, 206. 
27 After the election the New York Evening Post deplored Hanna's state· 
ment that "farmers and laborers in the western cities were won over to the 
support of McKinley by explaining to them that we stood on the St. Louis 
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There is evidence, finally, that some shrewd observers at 
the time understood why Bryan had lost the election. Marion 
Butler explained to a prominent Populist in Kentucky that 
the "great northwestern states" had to be captured before the 
fight for reform could be won; they had been lost in 1896 
when the Republicans succeeded in winning too much of the 
farmer-labor vote. Josephus Daniels, visiting Washington not 
long after the election, talked with Senator Jones and with 
other prosilver leaders. The Tarheel editor found that Jones 
and his allies "got exactly what they expected from the East 
-nothing." They knew too that they "lost in the central 
West in the great cities, and in the disinclination of Republi-
can farmers to break away from their party in view of Mc-
Kinley's votes in Congress for silver."28 
In addition to the above reasons for Bryan's failure in the 
pivotal states, the role of the churches, both Protestant and 
Roman Catholic, is an imponderable factor that should be at 
least mentioned. Professor Richard Hofstadter in his devastat-
ing essay on "Bryan: the Democrat as Revivalist" manages to 
convey the impression that the Nebraskan was uniquely naive 
and simple minded in thinking that morality had much to do 
with the issues in 1896. Declaring that the "Great Com-
moner was a circuit-riding evangelist in politics" and always 
a "provincial politician" who followed "a provincial populace 
in provincial prejudices," Hofstadter argues that Bryan prem-
ised his whole political career on the belief that "social 
problems are essentially moral-that is to say, religious." And 
from 1896 to the Scopes trial and his death, Bryan "was 
[Republican] platform, which advocates bimetallism under an international 
agreement, and that we were not gold monometallists." E. L. Godkin's Post 
assailed Hanna's frank explanation as "Bryanism pure and simple." Quoted 
in Atlanta Constitution, November 16, 1896. 
28 Butler to Jo A. Parker, December 19, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, 
Butler MSS; Daniels' letter from Washington in Raleigh News and Ob-
server, January 3, 1897. 
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simply carrying this variety of political primitivism to its 
logical end."29 
The truth is that most Americans in 1896, regardless of 
which side they were on, interpreted the campaign and its 
issues in moral terms. Ironically, it was neither Bryan nor 
any of his followers who cried, "At no time since 1860 have 
the issues of a Presidential campaign been so distinctively 
moral." That was the New York Times in an editorial 
demanding that the religious journals of the churches throw 
their full influence "on the side of honesty and right," which 
meant, to the Times, on the side of gold. 
Again, not Bryan but the Times asserted in a later editorial: 
"If there ever was a crisis in the history of this country when 
the teachings of the Gospel of peace and justice were in-
volved in the duty of the citizen it is the present crisis." The 
metropolitan newspaper charged that the inevitable effect of 
Bryan's teachings was to "sow envy and uncharitableness in 
the hearts of large classes and to stir them to conduct which 
would imperil law and order." It was clearly the duty of 
religious teachers "in the pulpit or the press" to fight such 
evil influences.30 
Eastern clergymen needed no pushes from the Times about 
their anti-Bryan zeal. Both Protestant and Catholic spokes-
men took highly partisan stands with surprising boldness in 
1896. "The present political discussion is moral, rather than 
political," a leading Baptist divine in New York city an-
29 The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (Vintage 
edition; New York, 1954), 186-205. 
30New York Times, August 17, 23, 1896. It might be suggested here 
that some historians, who read backwards from the shabby and pathetic 
Bryan of the Scopes trial, do both him and millions of Americans who ad· 
mired and voted for him an injustice. A great deal happened in and to the 
United States between 1896 and 1925, and H. L. Mencken's savagely witty 
portrait of Bryan, who was about to die, is not necessarily the truth about 
the younger presidential candidate. Bryan's simple but fervent Protestantism, 
for example, was not nearly as "provincial" in 1896 as it had become in 1925 
and later. 
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nounced, "and no pulpit can keep silent when this country 
is threatened and the political situation casts a dark cloud 
over this great Republic." The same preacher soon asked 
from his pulpit whether "Americanism or Anarchism" should 
prevail. The Democratic platform threatened the stability 
of the republic and promised to revive Robespierre and the 
Jacobins. There were but two parties, this man of God con-
cluded, "patriots and traitors."31 
More important for the Midwest perhaps were the state-
ments made by various prelates who were high in the hier-
archy of the Roman Catholic church. Archbishop John 
Ireland of Minnesota declared that the Democratic platform 
and candidate represented a menace to the social order. 
Neatly introducing his own touch of the "bloody shirt," the 
Archbishop explained that he considered free silver, as bad 
as that would be, as of minor importance in comparison to 
the reincarnation of the doctrine of "secession" in the Demo-
cratic plank against arbitrary federal interference in local 
affairs. Worse than all, the Archbishop concluded, was the 
"spirit of socialism that permeates the whole movement that 
has issued from the [Democratic] convention at Chicago." 
It was "the 'International' of Europe, now taking body in 
America." 
Bishop Francis F. Chatard of the diocese of Indiana then 
declared: "I consider that what Archbishop Ireland says 
about the Chicago platform . . . is exactly true." Bishop 
Chatard also joined in especially "deploring the arraying of 
class against class and the resulting bad and dangerous senti-
ments that may have the saddest consequences." And the 
Catholic bishop of Omaha, Nebraska, denied that he had 
called the Populists anarchists. "But I did say, and I now 
31 New York Times, July 26, August 3, 1896. For example of equally 
partisan sermons by other preachers in other denominations, see ibid., Oc· 
tober 5, 12, 1896. 
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say," he explained, "that Populists, Anarchists, and Com-
munists must not be permitted to destroy the financial credit 
of our country." The Nebraska prelate, who knew Bryan and 
described him as "light" and "tonguey," felt sure that the 
American people would be "keen enough to escape this silver 
mania" and vote for the candidates who respected American 
treaties and financial honor.32 
Republicans were naturally pleased with the clerical pro-
nouncements, especially since they had come in the cam-
paign's midwestern battleground. Concerning Archbishop 
Ireland's statement, the chief of the literary bureau in the 
Republicans' Chicago headquarters noted that Ireland was 
not a man "to be swayed by partisan prejudices" and whatever 
he said was "bound to carry with it a great deal of weight." 
Senator Jones merely commented that he had nothing to say 
about the matter beyond the fact that he had no desire to 
criticize the Archbishop or any other citizen "who sees fit to 
express his opinions concerning National issues." The pre-
vailing opinion in Washington political circles was reported 
to be that the Archbishop's declaration would "increase the 
sound-money vote in Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illi-
nois 50,000 or more."33 
George F. Washburn, the Populist leader in charge of the 
party's Chicago headquarters, was himself a Catholic. Appar-
ently, neither he nor any other Populist spokesman publicly 
answered Archbishop Ireland. Although the People's party, 
especially in the South, had inherited a certain rural Prot-
estant flavor and tone from the Farmers' Alliance, Populists 
32 Literary Digest, XIII (October 24, 1896), 806, for Ireland; New York 
Herald, October 17, 1896, for Chatard; and New York Times, August 9, 
1896, for Bishop Newman of Omaha. 
33 New York Times, October 13, 1896. James H. Moynihan, The Life of 
Archbishop John Ireland (New York, 1953), 261-63, describes Ireland's close 
association with the Republican party and mentions how he helped to keep a 
plank opposing any union of church and state out of the Republican plat-
form in 1896 on the grounds that it was uncalled for and would be interpreted 
as a concession to the American Protective Association. 
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in 1896 were concentrating on winning vital economic re-
forms and were not in the least interested in being drawn into 
any quarrel about church-state relations. However much 
Populists might have regretted the statements of Ireland and 
the others, the voluminous correspondence to and from 
Chairman Marion Butler's office contains no evidence of 
anti-Catholicism. 
Likewise the charge of anti-Semitism that various writers 
have recently leveled against the Populists is one for which 
absolutely no evidence can be found in the private letters that 
poured into Butler's office from Populists in virtually every 
state of the union. North Carolina's leading Populist news-
paper, the Raleigh Caucasian, contained the usual stereotyped 
references to the Rothschilds but the emphasis clearly was 
on the fact that they were prominent world, and especially 
British, bankers rather than on their Jewishness.34 
If the Populists had been seeking scapegoats rather than 
rational, governmental cures for their grievances, certainly the 
irresistible target for them in the South would have been the 
Negroes. But, as Professor C. Vann Woodward has pointed 
out, "perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the whole 
Populist movement was the resistance its leaders in the South 
put up against racism and racist propaganda and the de-
termined effort they made against incredible odds to win back 
political rights for the Negroes, defend those rights against 
brutal aggression, and create among their normally anti-Negro 
following, even temporarily, a spirit of tolerance in which the 
34 For example, the Raleigh Caucasian, September 12, 1896, carried a car· 
toon showing one of the Rothschilds in London sending congratulations to 
McKinley. For a recent article that attacks the view that the Populists were 
anti-Semitic, see Norman Pollack, "The Myth of Populist Anti-Semitism," 
American Historical Review, LXVIII (October 1962), 76-80. The most 
impressive refutation of the charge of Populist anti-Semitism, however, is in 
Walter T. K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists: Kansas Populism and Nativism 
(Chicago, 1963). Many of Professor Nugent's carefully researched conclu-
sions concerning Kansas Populism parallel or supplement those of the writer 
concerning the national party. 
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two races of the South could work together in one party for 
the achievement of common ends."35 
Populist efforts to win Negro votes were not, in general, 
successful in the South, since the Negroes, when left free to 
choose and to vote, usually voted Republican. The Negroes, 
like so many of the whites, were the victims of their history 
and of the traditions that clustered around Abraham Lincoln's 
party, the "party that freed the slaves." But through Populist-
Republican cooperation in state and local elections, coopera-
tion that was either formal and open or informal and tacit in 
most of the Southern states, the Populists continued to have 
a vital stake in the Negro's vote. 
In North Carolina, with its relatively strong Republican 
party and its vigorous Populists, fusion for state and local 
purposes was formally arranged in 1896. The Democrats in 
North Carolina, unlike those in Georgia and Texas, proved 
unable to win any significant number of Negroes from their 
traditional loyalty to the Republicans. When the Democrats 
began to realize that they might lose the governorship for 
the first time since Reconstruction, they made a desperate 
last-minute effort to arouse racial passions and prejudices 
against the Negro minority in the state. 
Furnifold M. Simmons, who was destined to lead the 
Tarheel Democrats in their successful "white supremacy" 
crusades of 1898 and 1900 and then represent the state in the 
United States Senate for thirty years, was unable to prevent 
his party's defeat in the state election of 1896. But Simmons 
furnished a hint of the technique that would soon lead to a 
second "redemption" of the state by the Democrats and to 
disfranchisement and legalized, mandatory segregation for 
35 "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," in Burden of Southern 
History (Baton Rouge, 1960), pp. 156-57. This brief essay of Professor 
Woodward's is a cogent and dispassionate refutation of the charges of anti-
Semitism, isolationism, McCarthyism, etc., that were made against the Popu-
lists in the last half of the 1950's. There is also a convenient list of many 
of the works in which the charges were made on page 146. 
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the Negroes. Although himself a late and none too enthusi-
astic convert to Bryanism, Simmons loyally labored for the 
Democratic party. In a speech delivered towards the end of 
the campaign in 1896, he warned: "At one time I thought I 
saw signs of a desire on the part of the colored people to vote 
intelligently and to be instructed as to their best interest, and 
I always took pleasure in trying to point out to them what I 
thought was to their interest. ... The day is not come and 
will not come when the white people of North Carolina will 
permit the colored man to rule over them. The Anglo-Saxon 
neck has never yet been bended to such a yoke. . . . I am not 
drawing the color line, the colored man has already drawn it, 
and it is that fact, that danger, which I desire to impress 
upon the white people of this country and of North Car-
olina."36 
Another Democrat reported from the eastern part of the 
state, where the Negro population was concentrated, that 
"Hanna's black emissaries" were both numerous and effective 
in persuading the Negroes that the "free silver scheme was 
gotten up by the Democrats only to fool the negroes, and if 
the Democrats get in power, it will be good-bye Mr. Nigger." 
One of the Negro Republicans' themes was alleged to be: 
"With us, my colored brethren, it is a question of free silver 
or free nigger. You can take whichever you please. I am a 
free nigger man myself, and therefore I am against your free 
silver."37 
The Populists' motivation in defending the Negroes' right 
36 Raleigh News and Observer, October 15, 1896. 
37 Ibid., October 22, 1896. The intense passion and frequent violence that 
characterized the election of 1896 in the South is illustrated by an incident 
in which the author's great-uncle was involved: "At the opening of the polls 
[for the Georgia state election] at Monte, Emanuel County, this morning, 
William Durden and a negro hand walked up to vote, when a Democratic 
ticket was snatched out of [the Negro's] hand by C. W. Williams, a negro 
third partyite. Several Democrats rushed for him and Williams pulled his 
pistol and killed S. S. Middleton. He made an effort to escape, but was over-
taken and shot to death." New York Times, October 8, 1896. 
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to vote was clearly a mixture of self-interest and more generous 
purposes. At any rate, the leading Tarheel Populist newspaper 
said a great deal in a brief space when it announced to the 
Democrats: "This sort of [racial] business is too old, gentle-
men. Stick to the issues."38 
The truth was that racism and nativism held little attrac-
tion in 1896 for the Populists. Desperate men in a sense, 
they were also politically oriented, and they hoped to capture 
the federal government and use it for a whole series of 
reforms beginning with the currency. Populists, many of 
whom were poorly educated and most of whom were poverty 
stricken, were certainly not any more immune to sin and 
shortcomings than anyone else. In other circumstances and 
times many of them, but by no means all, abandoned their 
hopes of reform and sought refuge in violent hates and 
morbid fears. But in 1896 Populists were in no mood for 
false issues that merely distracted from the great economic 
questions of the day. 
In view of the denunciation of Bryan and all that he stood 
for by certain leaders of the Catholic church, perhaps it was 
not strange that in the last phase of the campaign a story 
began to be whispered around and finally published to the 
effect that the Democratic-Populist presidential candidate was 
in league with such anti-Catholic and nativist organizations as 
the American Protective Association. Actually, the A. P. A. 
itself had come on lean days by the time of the presidential 
campaign of 1896. For example, its newspaper in St. Louis, 
the True American, collapsed for want of subscribers as the 
campaign got underway. 
But it is also clear that what was left of the organization 
supported McKinley and the Republicans. When John W. 
ss Raleigh Caucasian, October 15, 1896. On October 29 the Populist 
journal declared that the Democratic party in the state had remounted 
"its old 'riding hoss'-the howl of 'nigger' hoping that his old 'hoss' will 
carry them back from where they were driven .... " 
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Echols, the president of the A. P. A., was criticized by some 
Democrats for using the society and his office against Bryan, 
Nichols countered that he had only obeyed the orders of the 
A. P. A.'s Supreme Council in making public Bryan's attitude 
"toward the principles of the order.'' He had not done the 
same thing for McKinley, "because the Supreme Council had 
already passed upon him and his record and declared him 
unobjectionable to the order.''39 
Bryan's position was peculiar. He had been severely at-
tacked by various Catholic leaders. But in Kentucky the 
A. P. A. was reported to have distributed widely a circular 
charging that Bryan had sold out to the Catholics and would 
be under their control if elected. Meantime, in the upper 
Mississippi valley the story was that Bryan, as an alleged 
anti-Catholic and nativist, was a member of the A. P. A. 
To cope with this confused and distorted situation Bryan 
finally moved to clear the air at the very end of the campaign: 
"I have not attempted to answer all of the misrepresentations 
which have been circulated in this campaign, but in the 
closing days I feel that it is necessary to call your attention 
to an attack which has recently been made by the enemy .... 
I am not and never have been a member of the American 
Protective Association or of the Junior Order of American 
Mechanics, or of any other society hostile to any church, 
religion or race; nor have I ever applied for membership in 
any such organization. While I am a member of the Pres-
byterian church, I have always believed that there should be 
no religious test applied in the holding of public office, and I 
have not allowed religious differences to affect my conduct 
in the discharge of the duties of public office .... I have tried 
39 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 4, 1896; New York Times, October 31, 
1896. John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Pattems of American Nativism, 
1860-1925 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1955), 80-87, discusses the pro-Republican 
bias of the A. P. A., and Donald L. Kinzer, An Episode in Anti-Catholicism: 
The American Protective Association (Seattle, 1964), 224-28, describes the 
organization's disarray in 1896. 
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so far as I could to conduct this campaign in an open and 
honorable way, and have insisted that those who are with us 
should refrain from personal criticism of my opponent and 
leave the people to pass judgment upon the principles which 
we represent."40 
BY ENTITLING his book about the campaign The First Battle, 
Bryan meant that one defeat did not mean the loss of the war. 
There would be, there had to be, another battle for silver and 
all the other reforms that it symbolized. Several million 
Americans, Democrats and Populists alike, shared this view. 
But opinions differed sharply as to just what form the cam-
paign of 1900 should take and which party should lead the 
next great effort for reform. 
Marion Butler staked out the Populist claim immediately 
after Bryan's defeat was clear. Deemphasizing the mid-
roaders' disgruntlement, he insisted that the People's party 
was the only one that "supported solidly and unitedly the 
great and vital issues represented in the candidacy of Mr. 
Bryan." The Populist chairman suggested that "had it not 
been for the prejudice against the Democratic name, as well 
as want of confidence in Democratic promises, for which it 
must be frankly admitted past experience furnished ample 
ground, a majority of the voters of the country ... would 
have cast their votes for financial reform and American inde-
pendence." The defeat was not the fault of Bryan personally, 
for his "remarkable and brilliant campaign" would have 
aligned the majority of Americans who opposed all that 
McKinley stood for "if any candidate or leader in America 
could have done so under the Democratic banner." Butler's 
boldly partisan conclusion was clear enough: the Populists 
would be in 1900 "the nucleus around which the patriotic 
hosts must and will gather to redeem a betrayed republic and 
40 New York Times, October 31, 1896; Bryan, First Battle, 593. 
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to restore prosperity to an oppressed and outraged people."41 
Loyal Democrats could not be expected to accept Butler's 
analysis and prognosis. Governor Stone of Missouri insisted 
that reformers had no reason for discouragement. "A year ago 
the Democratic party was nearer destruction and dissolution 
than ever before in its history," Stone declared. "It was 
almost a wreck. Then the people revolted against the [Cleve-
land] Administration which was trying to betray the party 
into an abandonment of its principles." With the full power 
of the Cleveland administration as well as the Republicans 
and Gold Democrats pitted against Bryan, reformers were 
left "an almost impossible task in the time and with the 
limited means" at their disposal to organize their previously 
antagonistic forces. "We relied almost wholly upon the plain 
people, widely scattered over the country, and almost wholly 
unorganized at the beginning of the fight in July," the Mis-
sourian concluded. "In the face of all these advantages the 
goldbugs won only by the skin of their teeth."42 
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch optimistically asserted that the 
eastern people were fundamentally "all right" and would 
"vote with the plain people of the West as soon as they 
understand the issues." If the Democratic party only had a 
half dozen newspapers in the East to discuss the issues and 
print the news fairly, the St. Louis editor argued, it could win 
there. Reformers in the meantime would not abandon the 
East but educate it "on the currency question as it was 
[educated] on the tariff." Another prominent Democratic 
newspaper, the Atlanta Constitution, also took the long view 
and emphasized that the campaign had been a profoundly 
educational one in which many voters "who have been 
brought up on war issues have had an opportunity to receive 
much-needed instruction."43 
41St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 7, 1896. 
42 Ibid., November 8, 1896. 
43 Ibid., November 7, 1896; Constitution, November 14, 1896. 
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In the East and among the antisilver newspapers in general 
across the country, rejoicing was great that the country had 
escaped "anarchy" and "dishonor." But one independent 
newspaper in the heart of New England had the courage to 
pay Bryan a gracious tribute. The Springfield, Massachusetts, 
Republican declared that one could "dissent from many of 
his opinions and yet recognize the brilliant, persistent, des-
perate fortitude that has made his leadership pervasive beyond 
precedent." No other man, in the Republican's opinion, 
could have led the reform forces with their "disorganized 
and clashing interests with the same courage and untiring 
faith, or directed a crude campaign to any better results."44 
The Boston correspondent of the Springfield Republican 
dared to put the matter even more bluntly when he suggested 
that rather than saying that "the country rose as a man" 
against Bryan it would be more correct to say that the North-
east rose as a mouse, for "a more frightened people as to the 
possible result of Bryan's election I have never seen in any 
of the Presidential contests that I remember." The irreverent 
correspondent guessed that "our Calvinistic and Federalist 
grandfathers were more alarmed when Jefferson was running 
in 1800,- and they slandered and voted against him." They 
had not been able to defeat the Virginian but "did their best 
by voting steadily for that pink of political wisdom and social 
morality, Aaron Burr, until wiser and calmer men further 
south allowed Jefferson to be chosen by the House." 
Four years after that even Massachusetts had voted for 
Jefferson, and the newspaperman predicted that the future 
probably held in it a victory of the same sort for the defeated 
Bryan. McKinley's election had settled nothing except the 
breaking up of the older political parties; it certainly did not 
mean any permanent victory for the minority of the voters 
who adhered to the gold standard. Not only was Bryan's 
44 As quoted in the Atlanta Constitution, November 7, 1896. 
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record at the age of thirty-six more dazzling even than 
Lincoln's at the age of fifty but: "Bryan convinced the 
Chicago convention by his personal qualities that he was the 
best candidate; and as such he has dominated his party, held 
its discordant elements together, converted a million voters 
to the heresy of free silver, and got more electoral votes by 50, 
at least, than any other Democrat could have had in this year 
of party deliquescence and party treachery. He has done it 
too with the newspapers generally and impudently against 
him; with the financial interests of the country against him 
10 to 1; with the whole force of the national administration 
wielded against him .... To have succeeded as he has done, 
under these circumstances; to have retained the respect of all 
his supporters, and forced the most impudent of his news-
paper maligners to treat him better at the end of his contest 
than at the beginning-this is a personal triumph which 
ought to console him for the failure of too enthusiastic 
hopes."45 
Bryan probably was consoled by his strong showing in the 
face of unprecedented difficulties, and he definitely was look-
ing ahead to the next battle in 1900. He wrote in longhand 
to Butler to thank him for his services during the campaign 
and to request a copy of Butler's "best" photograph for 
inclusion in the forthcoming memoir of the campaign. In his 
only reference to the vice-presidential matter in the letter, 
Bryan declared that he believed that Butler had "made as 
good use as it was possible" to make of the situation.46 
45 As quoted in the Raleigh News and Observer, November 10, 1896. 
46 Bryan to Butler, December 5, 1896, Butler MSS. Bryan's book was dedi-
cated to "three pioneers" who were "the foremost champions of bimetallism 
in their respective parties," Richard P. Bland, James B. Weaver, and Henry 
M. Teller. It also contains photographs of most of the politically prominent 
figures in the campaign of 1896. Concerning Watson, Bryan wrote: "I had 
intended to present the picture of Mr. Watson ... together with a bio-
graphical sketch and some extracts from his campaign utterances, but have 
refrained from doing so at his request. I may add here that, while I did not 
fully agree with him as to the methods to be employed during the campaign, 
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Butler continued to have cordial relations with Bryan, but 
the Populist chairman now saw his primary obligation as 
being to the People's party, an obligation that should now be 
fulfilled in a more partisan manner than had been possible 
during the campaign. To preserve the party's organization 
and prepare it for future campaigns would require not only 
the most tactful handling of the midroaders but also a careful 
keeping of distance from Bryan and the Democrats. Butler 
complied with the Nebraskan's request for the photograph 
and other material but in doing so took advantage of the 
occasion to suggest that the transportation question, which 
Butler thought was growing more and more important, 
deserved treatment in Bryan's forthcoming book. Butler 
conceded that finance and taxation would probably always 
be the most vital matters, but modern conditions had made 
the transportation question almost equal in importance. The 
activities of the railroad companies in behalf of McKinley and 
the gold standard in the campaign just concluded had forced 
to the front the question of private control of a vast natural 
monopoly. "In fact, it seems to me," Butler argued, "that this 
issue will have to be fought out along with the financial 
question in the next national campaign."47 
Aside from keeping his distance from Bryan and the Demo-
crats, Butler believed that his and his party's largest problem 
was to stop the tendency of the southern and western wings 
of the party to pull further and further apart. Butler and the 
majority of the large North Carolina delegation to the 
I never questioned his good faith or his right to pursue such a course as he 
thought to be best for the success of the reforms in which he was inter-
ested." First Battle, 622-2 3. 
47 Butler to Bryan, December 16, 1896, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler 
MSS. Bryan offered the Populist organization a portion of his royalties from 
The First Battle but Butler declined the offer on the grounds that Bryan 
belonged to the Democratic party, the Populist-Democratic alliance had been 
only for 1896, and the future alone would determine what course the People's 
party would take in 1900. Butler to G. L. Spence, April 10, 1897, ibid. 
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Populist convention at St. Louis had played an essentially 
national role in helping to prevent the open and final split 
between extreme midroaders and extreme fusionists that had 
been threatened. Butler still regarded the prevention of this 
split as his primary task. 
Tom Watson, on the other hand, took his bitter grudge 
against Butler into the newspapers and charged that the 
Populist chairman was everything from "a liar and traitor" to 
a "selfish, unprincipled trickster." "To be foxy, double-faced, 
false of tongue and treacherous at heart is natural to him," 
the Georgian declared, "and when he betrays those who trust 
him and deceives those who are silly enough to take him at 
his word, he has no more sinned against his nature than does 
our friend, the 'William goat,' when it fights with its horns 
rather than mouth or feet." Butler, on the advice of Reed 
and Washburn, refrained from answering Watson's personal 
attack as well as from publishing a point-by-point refutation 
of Watson's specific charges about the recent campaign. 
Instead, Butler sought help wherever he could find it in 
checking the sectional breach that still threatened the party.48 
In Nebraska, where most Populists accepted and even 
thrived under national as well as local fusion with the Demo-
crats, J. A. Edgerton, the secretary of the Populist national 
executive committee, liked the idea of the nonpartisan silver 
clubs which Bryan had proposed as a means of keeping the 
educational work going and the various reform parties in 
harness together. Butler, fearful lest the autonomy of the 
People's party might be further jeopardized, was cool to the 
idea for the time being. To a Populist leader in Missouri who 
was almost ready to abandon hope of reconciling the southern 
midroaders, Butler wrote: "You are entirely wrong in con-
cluding that the only Populists there are [are] in the West, 
48 Raleigh News and Observer, December 9, 1896; Washburn to Butler, 
January 13, 1897, Reed to Butler, January 15, 1897, Butler MSS. 
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and I must submit that it is not in the interest of party 
harmony for the Western Populists to become parties to 
making divisions between Southern and Western Populists. 
Instead of deserting the Southern Populists, who are Populists 
from principle, the Populists of the West, where the organiza-
tion is strongest, should join hands with us in the fight against 
Hanna's agents who are masquerading as Populists."49 
Butler was right in saying that the heart of midroad 
Populism was in the South, in the deep South in fact, but 
there were Populists in the West who, for various reasons, 
sympathized with and encouraged the midroaders in their 
angry determination to oust Butler from the party chairman-
ship and have the Populists nominate their own candidates 
for the presidency and vice presidency even if they had to 
do it as early as 1898, two years before the Democrats would 
again hold a national nomination convention. Paul Vander-
voort, the Nebraskan president of the Reform Press Associa-
tion, was still, as he had been during the campaign, one of the 
most prominent and active of the western midroaders. 
Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota hesitated and initially 
refused to join in the midroaders' demand for Butler's scalp, 
but he too eventually joined them. One of Donnelly's 
political allies in Minnesota was discouraged by the election 
results to see "the misguided fool farmers and laborers go 
back on their friends at the critical moment" and feared that 
Donnelly's grim prophesy of authoritarian rule in Caesar's 
Column, his earlier political novel, might be all too true. 
Donnelly obviously felt the same thing. In his melodramatic 
and pseudoliterary manner he confessed to his diary immedi-
ately after the election: "All our high-blown hopes have burst 
under us .... It seems useless to contest against the money-
49 Edgerton to Butler, December 12, 1896, Butler to A. Rozelle of St. 
Louis, February 16, 1897, Campaign Letterbooks, Butler MSS. Butler called 
on S. F. Norton of Illinois, February 16, 1897, for help in stopping "at once 
this tendency of the Southern and Western Populists to pull apart." 
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power. Every election marks another step downward into the 
abyss, from which there will be no return save by fire and 
sword. The people are too shallow and too corrupt to conduct 
a republic. It will need a god come on earth, with divine 
power, to save them. And are they worth saving? Will they 
stay saved? ... Never were the circumstances more favorable 
for success. We had a splendid candidate and he had made 
a gigantic campaign; the elements of reform were fairly 
united; and the depression of business universal, and yet in 
spite of it all the bankrupt millions voted to keep the yoke 
on their own necks .... I tremble for the future."50 
Donnelly's dire forebodings for the future were only slightly 
more pointless than all of Butler's efforts to preserve a national 
Populist party and all of the midroaders' efforts to force 
drastic and premature decisions on whatever fragment of the 
party that might follow them. Although men at that time 
could hardly be expected to have realized the fact immedi-
ately, the climax of Populism, the zenith of its impact on the 
nation's history, had been reached in the campaign of 1896. 
Events totally unforeseen at the time and certainly beyond 
the control of the Populists brought the gradual death of the 
party. 
In the first place, prosperity did return to the nation in the 
last years of the decade, and Populism, which had reached its 
greatest national strength after the panic of 1893, could retain 
neither its militancy nor its membership without the sharp 
prodding of massive poverty. The brighter economic scene 
after 1897 did not mean that the fundamental ills which 
affiicted farmers and laborers had been cured in any penna-
50 F. C. Culver to Donnelly, November 10, 1896, Donnelly's diary entry 
for November 6, 1896, Donnelly MSS. One of Henry D. Lloyd's radical 
friends was less philosophical when he wrote: "A really popular measure of 
reform would be one that would make the poor rich and the rich immensely 
wealthy. Any levelling up and down measure will meet condemnation from 
the top and bottom and be given the cold hands by the middle class." A. B. 
Adair to Lloyd, November 11, 1896, Lloyd MSS. 
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nent way, for they had not. Both groups still suffered from the 
grievances that had inspired the Populists' many-sided plat-
form concerning currency and banking, transportation, the 
influx of cheap immigrant labor, and other matters. But the 
economy had ground its way through the painful cycle of 
deflation, mass unemployment, and bankruptcy and had 
finally come upon better times. The blunting of the sharp 
edge of the depression spelled death for the People's party as 
a major force in American political life. 
On the specific issue of free silver, the denouement is well 
known. The increase in the volume of the currency and relief 
from the acute deflation which reformers had sought through 
silver came about in the years immediately after the election 
-but came through the decisive increase in the world's supply 
of gold. By 1897 the output of gold was double the total 
amount produced in 1890, and by 1899 it was on the way to 
trebling the figure for 1890. By 1900, when the Republicans 
enacted the Gold Standard Act, even the most ardent silverite 
of 1896 had to admit that the old issue had lost its political 
potency.51 
The Spanish-American War was another development that 
hastened the disappearance of Populism. The humanitarian 
fever to help liberate the ill-treated Cubans hit Populists no 
less than most other Americans in 1897-1898. "The blare of 
the bugle drowned the voice of the Reformer," as Tom 
Watson put it, and with "the cannon-boom shaking the 
world, men had no ear for political economy-or economy of 
any other sort."52 Before the "splendid little war" with Spain 
could be decently concluded, the United States had embarked 
on the adventuresome course of making colonies out of the 
Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii, and the nation 
was plunged into a great debate about imperialism. 
51 Hicks, Populist Revolt, 389. 
52 Watson's Jeffersonian Magazine, V (October 1910), 817. 
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The return of prosperity, the increase in the gold supply 
and the decline in appeal of the reform groups' common 
denominator of free silver, the popular crusade to liberate 
Cuba, and the ensuing imperialism-all of these things 
combined to kill Populism on the national scene. On the 
state level there were other developments that helped destroy 
the third party. In the West local fusion was the bridge by 
which many Populists gradually moved into the Democratic 
party, but in the South such a step was one that many Popu-
lists could never bring themselves to take. The fate of the 
Populists in the southern states is perhaps best illustrated by 
what happened to the vigorous party in North Carolina. 
There in 1898, when Cleveland Democrats and Bryan 
Democrats could cooperate in the absence of a presidential 
election, Furnifold M. Simmons, aided by Josephus Daniels 
and others, led the "white man's party" in a "white supremacy 
crusade" to regain control of the legislature. Populist-Republi-
can or "Fusion" rule in the state had brought with it a highly 
limited amount of office holding by Negroes, mostly in the 
eastern counties and in minor local offices. But the mere fact 
of large-scale Negro voting combined with the office holding 
allowed the Democrats to revive the Reconstruction cry of 
"nigger domination." Making a calculated play on racial 
passion and prejudice and using mounted and armed "Red 
Shirts" in various counties, the Democrats succeeded in re-
capturing the legislature. 
In 1900 the Democrats not only recaptured the governor-
ship but, through an even more violent and revolutionary 
process than in 1898, secured the enactment of a state con-
stitutional amendment that effectively disfranchised most 
Negro voters. Butler and many other Populists joined with 
Republicans in the state to fight these Democratic measures. 
Butler even secured help from some of the Texas Populists, 
such as Harry Tracy and "Stump" Ashby, in the crucial state 
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election of 1900. But Tarheel Democrats were ruthless in 
their determination to "redeem" the state once and for all 
and to end all threats to the hegemony of the "white man's 
party." 
Butler received hundreds of letters in the closing years of 
the century that poignantly suggest how the fate of the 
southern Populists and that of the Negroes had become inter-
twined. Requesting strict privacy, one rural Negro wrote: "A 
large number white men Democrats come to my little store & 
drove me inside & said not come any more, but my wife heard 
what they were doing & she & her aunt come down to the store 
& demanded that they [stop] it & I be let to go home with her, 
& so they let me go home & and all night they were shoting 
around my store, & run a rope from my store across the street 
& made a coffin & put on the rope & marked on [it] dead 
negro, this morning I cut the rope into, & they cursed & 
abused me, & I went in store & they demanded that I not 
come out any moore, & said that I had to leave here, did't I 
would see what become of me, that one 0' clock today that 
they were going to bury me in that coffin & preach my furnerl, 
& so on, that I could leave & live, or stay & be hurried. So what 
must I do? & what can I do? Is there a place you could put 
me in or give me something to do? I am in a terrible con-
dision now, & must do something."53 
Another foe of the disfranchising amendment reported that 
about fifty Redshirt Democrats visited Negro homes in the 
community, warned the Negroes not to dare to try to register, 
and shot a hundred or more pistol shots in the air. The 
Democrats were said to "swair vengins against any Justice of 
the peace that offers to assist or help the negro to register or 
... to fill out the blanks that the Populist and Republicans 
has been sending out." The frightened registrar was said to 
53 S. S. Strother of Eureka, Wayne County, North Carolina, to Butler, 
August 3, 1900, Butler MSS. 
Defeat and Aftermath 167 
keep a pistol lying on the table beside him but "if there is any 
federal law to resort to he ought to be attended to at once."114 
The white Populists in North Carolina who followed Butler 
in vigorously fighting the Democrats and their disfranchise-
ment of the Negroes did not do so out of liberal convictions 
on the race question. Political circumstances and expediency 
led the white Populists to side with the Negro. Thus, one 
Populist wrote: "I am not in favour of the negro but I do 
beleave in giving the pore negro his dues. I live in Dunn N.C. 
where they say you [Butler] wold never be aloud to speak in 
no more. And this negro that I want to tel you [about] went 
to register and [they] wold not let him and he come to me 
and told me about it." Another white Populist reported that 
the local "white supremacy" clubs admitted boys from age 
twelve on up and trained them "to have prejudice towards his 
fellow man who differs in opinion with him." "I have 
thought this was a God fearing people," he concluded, "but 
it seems as if the devil has gotten possession of their minds 
and hearts."55 
The frauds and violence that accompanied the return to 
complete political power of the Tarheel Democrats and their 
victory for disfranchisement in 1900 threw the remaining 
Populists into despair. One declared after the state election 
that he felt he had "nothing to vote for and don't know that 
I ever shall vote again." Another requested Butler to send a 
copy of the national Republican platform. The irony of the 
total political situation in 1900 was not lost on the Populists: 
114 A. D. Sprivey of Ellerbe, North Carolina, to Butler, July 20, 1900, ibid. 
N.C. Cooper of Nashville, North Carolina, wrote Butler on August 4, 1900, 
immediately after the state election, that the Democrats refused to let Re· 
publicans register and walked around on election day with pistols showing. 
"I hope my dear Senator when Congress meets that you will pass a law that 
soldiers shall count the votes of every county in the state .... It was a shame 
and disgrace to see how Christian people did in this election." Ibid. 
55 Neal A. Butler of Dunn, North Carolina, to Butler, July 16, 1900, W. 
H. Brown of Rosemead, North Carolina, to Butler, July 5, 1900, Butler MSS. 
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while Bryan and the national Democratic party staunchly 
opposed the denial of liberty to the Filipinos, Bryan's party 
in North Carolina and other southern states resorted to 
violent, even revolutionary, tactics to disfranchise the Negro.56 
Despite the irony, Butler did not immediately join the 
Republican party, as many other Populists did in North Car-
olina after the state election of 1900. Unwilling to ignore 
the national issues that were before the country, Butler con-
tinued to serve as a leader in the national Populist party and 
campaigned in South Dakota and other western states for the 
Populist presidential nominee in 1900, who was once again 
William Jennings Bryan.57 
Butler had helped earlier in the year to have the Populist 
national convention nominate Bryan, even before the Demo-
crats could do so, and to name as his running mate Charles 
A. Towne, a Silver Republican of Minnesota. When the 
Democrats nominated Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois as 
Bryan's running mate and Towne withdrew, Butler and 
other Populist fusionists stuck to Bryan in preference to 
McKinley or the midroad Populist ticket that consisted of 
Wharton Barker of Pennsylvania and Ignatius Donnelly of 
Minnesota for the presidency and vice presidency respec-
tively.58 
56 J. E. Avery to Butler, August 5, 1900, Joseph W. Farabow to Butler, 
August 4, 1900, ibid. The Raleigh Caucasian on August 16, 1900, declared 
that Josephus Daniels' News and Observer was so mesmerized by the race 
issue that "if it should stumble upon a single truth, it would fall over it 
and then get up and swear she had been assaulted by a 'nigger.'" 
57 The Aberdeen, S. D., Sentinel, as quoted in the Raleigh Caucasian, 
October 25, 1900, reported that Butler emphasized in his speeches the neces· 
sity of controlling the trusts and anti-imperialism. The same issue of Butler's 
paper carried a story entitled "Cotton Is King" about the high price com· 
manded by the southern staple. After the feverish state election, the Cau-
casian often referred to the widespread apathy toward the national election. 
58 The best account of the quarrels between the Populist factions after 
1896 is still Hicks, Populist Revolt, 380-403. Ridge, Donnelly, 366 ff., traces 
the Minnesotan's role, and Woodward, Watson, 3 5 5-63, treats the 1904 
campaign when the midroaders finally had what little was left of the party 
to themselves and nominated Tom Watson for the presidency. 
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That some Populists "soured" in the twentieth century 
and became hatemongers or reactionary demagogues is a 
familiar fact. Tom Watson, with his later career as baiter of 
Negroes and Jews and Catholics, is the most famous example 
of the degeneration of Populism. But the case of Watson 
and a few others like him should not lead to the conclusion 
that this was the typical pattern. Although statistical and 
biographical information is not available to prove the point, 
there were probably just as many or more Populists like Butler 
who remained interested in reforms, especially for the farmers 
of the nation, and who never resorted to hate campaigns 
against religious or racial minorities as an outlet for frustration 
and despair. 
By 1904 Butler had become a Republican, both in North 
Carolina and the nation. Theodore Roosevelt was president 
and was nominated to succeed himself, while the Democrats 
in running Alton B. Parker of New York had in one sense 
reverted to their habits of the Cleveland era. Butler and the 
several thousand other Tarheel Populists who became Re-
publicans enthusiastically supported Roosevelt, even in the 
famous split in the party in 1912. And after Woodrow 
Wilson's victory, as the Progressive Movement approached its 
climax in the New Freedom, Butler's wife remembered the 
1890's when an earlier reform effort had failed and wryly 
noted: "Twenty years ago, when we were advocating the 
things that the whole country is standing for now, we were 
called 'long-haired cranks.' Does it not seem funny how soon 
people forget, or, rather, I might say, how long it takes them 
to learn?"59 
Though too many complacent observers at the time, as well 
as some historians, did see the Populists as mere "long-haired 
cranks," from the climax of Populism in 1896 to the begin-
59 Mrs. Butler to F. H. Hoover, November 9, 1912, in the Mrs. Marion 
(Florence Faison) Butler MSS, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina Library. 
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nings of Progressivism in the early Twentieth century was not 
so long a period. The Populists, caught in the changed 
economic and international circumstances of the last years 
of the old century, had finally been forced to "close their 
academy." But they had provided political education for 
many Americans, leaders as well as the led, education about 
the need for expanded governmental action, state and federal, 
to redress the economic grievances that afflicted both the old 
majority who were farmers and the rising class of the nation's 
future who were urban industrial workers. 
Note on Sources 
IN VIEW of the footnotes scattered throughout the text and 
the analytical index that also covers the notes, a listing of 
all the printed sources that are cited hardly seems necessary; 
but a brief description of the chief manuscript and newspaper 
sources that were used, together with a critical discussion of 
the key printed studies that bear on the role of the Populists 
in the election of 1896, might be helpful to other historians. 
MANUSCRIPTS 
Marion Butler Papers-This large holding in the Southern 
Historical Collection of the University of North Carolina 
Library furnished the documentary backbone for the two 
chapters dealing with the Populist part in the campaign of 
1896 and had valuable material for the other three chapters 
as well. Chronologically arranged in folders, hundreds of 
letters from Populists, important ones as well as unknown 
ones, give incomparable information on state and national 
aspects of the political battle. Two large letterbooks, together 
with scattered carbon copies, give the views of Butler and of 
the national executive committee of the Populist party. 
Butler's incoming correspondence dealt extensively with North 
Carolina politics, so the historian who wishes to concentrate 
on the national aspects of the campaign must go through 
many folders in which national and purely local letters are 
mixed. 
Thomas E. Watson Papers-Also in the Southern Historical 
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Collection of the University of North Carolina Library, this 
is not a rich source for 1896. There are several letters from 
Butler and other members of the national committee to 
Watson and the one tantalizing letter from Evan P. Howell 
to Watson about the mysterious, abortive negotiations aimed 
at conciliating Tom Watson. 
Ignatius Donnelly Papers-This collection in the State His-
torical Society of Minnesota has been extensively used by 
historians for many years, but Donnelly's diary furnished a 
unique and still fresh view of Bryan and the campaign. The 
incoming letters also afford one of the best insights into the 
thinking of many northern Populists. Donnelly's scrapbooks 
afford a handy sampling of midwestern newspapers. 
Henry Demarest Lloyd Papers-Caw Lloyd's published 
biography contains excerpts from many of Lloyd's influential 
letters, and historians have long found them useful. But the 
extensive collection in the State Historical Society of Wis-
consin is still well worth studying, and letters to Lloyd, 
especially from his sister and from Florence Kelley, proved to 
be illuminating. 
William Jennings Bryan Papers-Although this collection 
in the Library of Congress is notoriously skimpy for 1896, 
there were several items, including letters from Arthur Sewall 
of Maine and Governor Stone of Missouri, that proved useful. 
NEWSPAPERS 
The absence of any official record of the Populist conven-
tion in St. Louis forces the historian to rely exclusively on 
newspaper sources and to do so with considerable care in view 
of the hostility of many reporters and editors to the Populists. 
The St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Republic, and Post-Dis-
patch contained the most detailed, continuous accounts of 
the convention. The last-named newspaper also proved help-
ful in its coverage of the national campaign as well as of the 
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local variations in several western states. Friendly to Bryan 
and silver, the Post-Dispatch gradually grew more appreciative 
of the Populist role during the campaign. 
Marion Butler's Raleigh Caucasian was only a weekly, but 
eye-witness reports of the St. Louis convention by the editor, 
Hal Ayer, were revealing, and many pertinent stories and 
editorials from large dailies across the nation were reprinted 
during the campaign, to the great convenience of the his-
torian. There are files of the Caucasian in the Duke U ni-
versity Library, but the most complete file seems to be that 
in the State Library in Raleigh, North Carolina; the Depart-
ment of Archives and History has recently microfilmed the 
paper. 
Josephus Daniels also wrote first-hand accounts of the 
Populist convention for his Raleigh News and Observer, and 
the Populist role in the campaign received extensive coverage, 
favorable as far as the national campaign was concerned and 
hostile with reference to the Populist-Republican cooperation 
within North Carolina. The Atlanta Constitution, another 
Democratic daily, was lively, good on national coverage, and 
especially helpful for Watson and the Georgia Populists. 
Of the New York newspapers, the Times and the Herald 
were used the most extensively, the former furnishing a 
conservative, eastern perspective as well as good national 
coverage. Since several of the newspapers that were read 
reprinted extensively from the New York World and the 
Journal those two sources were used only indirectly, as were 
many other newspapers that are mentioned in the text and 
notes. 
SELECTED PRINTED STUDIES 
No attempt is made here to offer an exhaustive bibliography 
on either Populism or the election of 1896. Rather, the pur-
pose is to discuss briefly selected articles and books, especially 
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the newer ones, that bear directly on the role of the Populists 
in the Battle of the Standards. The starting point for any 
study of Populism is still John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt 
(St. Paul, 1931; Lincoln, Nebr., 1961), which includes a 
valuable bibliography and is, despite a debatable interpreta-
tion of the Populists in 1896, an excellent, pioneering book. 
Surely for some time henceforth the starting point for an 
understanding of the election of 1896 will be Stanley L. Jones, 
The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison, 1964) . This 
comprehensive and careful study appeared after the manu-
script for this monograph had been not only completed but 
revised. While the Populists are not of course spotlighted in 
The Presidential Election of 1896, they are, together with all 
the parties and leaders, discussed dispassionately. Perhaps the 
most important difference in interpretation between Professor 
Jones' book and this one is that he sees the People's party as 
more or less doomed as a separate organization after the 
reformers had captured the Democratic party and nominated 
Bryan. The documentation in The Presidential Election of 
1896 is meticulous, but the brief bibliography does not include 
any of the secondary literature. For that, Paul W. Glad, 
McKinley, Bryan, and the People (Philadelphia, 1964), is 
useful; although his version of the Populist role in 1896 
borrows heavily from Henry Demarest Lloyd's socialist view, 
Professor Glad's brief synthesis is readable and well adapted to 
classroom use. Another attempt at an even briefer synthesis 
is Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform, and Expansion, 1890-
1900 (New York, 1959), which also has a useful bibliography. 
Next to Professor Hicks, the most influential student of 
Populism has been C. Vann Woodward, and his first book, 
Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938, 1955), right-
fully enjoys a reputation as an artistic model of its kind. With 
all its merits, however, the biography presents the tangled 
events of 1896 essentially from Watson's highly personal and 
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strange point of view. Professor Woodward's Origins of the 
New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge, 1951), has less of a 
pro-Watson bias concerning the Populists and includes an 
indispensable bibliography where the numerous state studies 
of Populism, among other things, may be conveniently found. 
His essay on "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual" in 
The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge, 1960), con-
cedes that American reform movements "have all had their 
seamy side and their share of the irrational, the zany, and the 
retrograde," yet Professor Woodward refutes the charges of 
anti-Semitism, proto-McCarthyism, nativism, and many other 
unlovely things that became fashionable to say about the 
Populists in the 1950's. There is a convenient list of a number 
of the more important works in which the charges were made 
on page 146. 
A new study of the leading anti-Catholic organization of 
the era, Donald L. Kinzer, An Episode in Anti-Catholicism: 
The American Protective Association (Seattle, 1964), also 
suggests that the A. P. A. made little or no headway in Popu-
list ranks, even where it was strongest in the Midwest, and 
that among the various regions the nativist group found least 
success in the South. The most recent biography of an 
important Populist leader who has figured largely in the 
criticisms of Populism is Martin Ridge, Ignatius Donnelly: 
The Portrait of a Politician (Chicago, 1962). 
Peter Viereck, Talcott Parsons, Seymour M. Lipset, and 
a number of other writers echoed the attacks on the Populists, 
but the most influential historian among the critics of the 
1950's was Professor Richard Hofstadter. In his Age of Re-
form, From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York, 1955), he elabo-
rately qualified his strictures against the agrarians, yet the 
prevailing impression left was that they really were, despite 
all the reservations, anti-Semites, zenophobes, and perhaps 
even proto-fascists who sought not specific political reforms 
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for concrete economic grievances but rather scapegoats as 
psychological outlets for their essentially irrational drives. 
Despite the brilliance of his writing, the fact remains that 
Professor Hofstadter built elaborate theses about the Populists 
that were based largely on a few allusions in third-rate political 
novels by Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota and a small group 
of other, more obscure agrarian writers of the 1890's. At the 
opposite pole in research technique and probably the most 
effective rehabilitation of the Populists that has appeared to 
date is Walter T. K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists: Kansas 
Populism and Nativism (Chicago, 1963). Professor Nugent 
has combed the files of scores of newspapers, manuscript 
collections, election returns, census data, and other such 
sources to get impressively close to the grassroots of Populism 
in Kansas, the western center of the movement. His prin-
cipal conclusions are: 1) that the Kansas Populists, far from 
being nativistic, were "friendlier and more receptive to foreign 
persons and foreign institutions than the average of their 
contemporary political opponents"; 2) that rather than being 
neurotically "conspiracy-minded" they were concerned with 
tangible facts, especially economic ones; 3) that they "got 
along well with their Jewish neighbors and consistently 
refrained from extending their dislike of certain financiers, 
who happened to be Jews [the Rothschilds], to Jews in gen-
eral"; 4) that the Populists as a group supported intervention 
in Cuba on humanitarian rather than jingoistic grounds and 
"strongly opposed the imperialism that the war engendered"; 
and 5) that Populist fusion with the Bryan Democracy in 
1896 was not a betrayal of reform principles but a "legitimate 
means to the accomplishment of real, if limited, reform." 
Professor Norman Pollack develops a similar thesis in The 
Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist 
Thought (Cam bridge, Mass., 1962), although he uses a dif-
ferent approach from Professor Nugent and has chosen to 
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write intellectual history with a m1mmum of attention to 
specific political developments. Professor Pollack concludes 
that Populism, far from being retrogressive and anti-Semitic, 
was a progressive, even a radical social force that accepted 
industrialization and sought a political alliance with urban 
labor. Emphasizing the fact that Populists did not sullenly 
resist social change and hanker nostalgically for a bygone era, 
he tentatively suggests that the failure of the farmers and 
urban laborers to coalesce in 1896 may have been more the 
fault of the latter than of the former and that Populist fusion 
with the Democrats in 1896 was "the last chance to advance 
radicalism" rather than a grab for spoils or a humiliating 
capitulation for the Populists. 
The usefulness of Professor Pollack's study is limited by the 
fact that he chose to ignore the southern Populists, whom 
Professor Woodward has portrayed as more radical than their 
western allies. There is also a certain confusion in The Popu-
list Response to Industrial America as to the role of Henry D. 
Lloyd. At one point Professor Pollack writes a bit defensively 
that Lloyd "after all, was a Populist." But later there is the 
emphatic assertion that, "Populism was certainly not Marx-
ism; its vision of America was not socialized production and 
the collective farm." 
Henry Demarest Lloyd has been and will probably continue 
to be a fascinating, central figure in the history of Populism. 
In the first place, aside from his active participation as a 
leader of the party in Chicago and Illinois, Lloyd's impressive 
intellectual and literary powers have made him a major source 
used by most of the students of Populism on the national 
level. His article on "The Populists at St. Louis," Review of 
Reviews, XIV ( Septem her 1896), is one of the handiest and 
most widely cited of all the contemporary accounts. Passages 
from many of his highly quotable letters, including the famous 
one where he portrayed free silver as the "cow-bird of the 
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reform movement," have long been available in Caro A. 
Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd, 1847-1903 (2 vols.; New York, 
1912) . The most perceptive study of the Populist phase of 
Lloyd's career is in Chester M. Destler, American Radicalism, 
1865-1901 (New London, Conn., 1946). This earlier work 
seems sounder, at least where Populism is concerned, than 
Professor Destler's more recent biography, Henry Demarest 
Lloyd and the Empire of Reform (Philadelphia, 1963). In 
the biography Professor Destler is not convincing in his chap-
ter on the Populist crisis of 1896 when he concludes, without 
offering any evidence for the charge, that "the great business 
interests whom Lloyd's crusade for social justice had chal-
lenged since 1888, via the agency of the free-silver Bryan 
Populists," blocked Lloyd's plan to carry the Populist con-
vention at St. Louis for "Labor-Populism and antimonopoly 
from the floor." 
Although Lloyd had no use for William Jennings Bryan and 
Lloyd's predilections on that score have been shared by a large 
number of later historians, the Nebraskan is inevitably a 
pivotal figure in any discussion of the Populist party's actions 
in 1896. The lack of a reliable biography of Bryan has long 
been a major gap in our historiography. Paolo E. Coletta 
has already published a number of useful articles, including 
"Bryan, Cleveland, and the Disrupted Democracy, 1890-
1896," Nebraska History, XLI (March 1960), and he re-
portedly will publish, possibly even before this appears in 
print, the first volume in a projected two-volume biography. 
Paul W. Glad, The Trumpet Soundeth: William Jennings 
Bryan and His Democracy, 1896-1912 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1960) 
is an interpretative, readable essay; but perhaps the most 
widely read and influential portrait of Bryan in recent years 
is the chapter entitled "William Jennings Bryan: The Demo-
crat as Revivalist" in Richard Hofstadter, The American 
Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (Vintage edi-
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tion; New York, 1954). There the Great Commoner is 
variously described in a witty and unfair manner as "a circuit-
riding evangelist in politics," "a boy who never left home," 
and "a provincial politician following a provincial populace 
in provincial prejudices." Although Professor Jones in the 
above-mentioned Presidential Election of 1896 also sees Bryan 
as "one of the last among nineteenth-century men to give 
shape and voice to the agrarian political ideologies of Jefferson 
and Jackson," he at least does not start with the shabby, old 
Bryan of the Scopes trial and read backwards nor does he 
employ a subtle double standard to hit at Bryan's admittedly 
simple Protestantism. Bryan's Presbyterianism probably had 
no more to do with his reform ideas than the Catholicism or 
Jewishness of various political leaders of a later generation had 
to do with their public stands. 
The book which Bryan, with the help of his wife, put 
together immediately after his defeat for the presidency, The 
First Battle: A Story of the Campaign of 1896 (Chicago, 
1897), is useful not only for the straightforward narrative but 
also for the many documents, such as party platforms and 
speeches, that are included. James A. Barnes, "Myths of 
the Bryan Campaign," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
XXXIV (December 1947), is an important revisionist analysis 
that attempted to correct many of the persistent misconcep-
tions about the Nebraskan and the silver issue. The role of 
another preeminent Democratic reformer, Governor Altgeld 
of Illinois, is described in Harvey Wish, "John Peter Altgeld 
and the Background of the Campaign of 1896," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XXIV (March 19 38) . 
For those conservative Democrats in 1896 who much 
preferred McKinley and the high tariff to Bryan and silver, 
Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage (New 
York, 1933), is standard but biased in favor of its subject and 
his policies. Horace S. Merrill, Bourbon Leader: Grover Cleve-
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land and the Democratic Party (Boston, 1957), is much more 
critical of Cleveland's party-splitting "courage," and J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth, The Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of 
Cleveland and Bryan (Chicago, 1963), treats the two glaringly 
dissimilar Democrats with cool impartiality in his analysis of 
the party's vicissitudes between 1893 and 1904. 
The minority of Republicans who were reform-minded in 
1896 is best approached through Elmer Ellis, Henry Moore 
Teller: Defender of the West (Caldwell, Idaho, 1941) and 
particularly the same author's article, "The Silver Republicans 
in the Election of 1896," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
XVIII (March 1932). Gilbert C. Fite, "Republican Strategy 
and the Farm Vote in the Presidential Campaign of 1896," 
American Historical Review, LXV (July 1960) , focuses on 
the agrarians in the crucial north central states and the 
Republican approach to them. 
Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna (New York, 1919), 
is still the most helpful study of the sagacious Republican 
campaign manager, but two newer biographies of McKinley 
have appeared: Margaret Leach, In the Days of McKinley 
(New York, 1959), presents a colorful narrative emphasizing 
the personal aspect while H. Wayne Morgan, William Mc-
Kinley and His America (Syracuse, 196 3), is more useful to 
the scholar. Professor Morgan has also edited a volume of 
essays, The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal (Syracuse, 1963), 
treating various aspects of the period; one of the most helpful 
of these essays is Paolo E. Coletta, "Greenbackers, Goldbugs, 
and Silverites: Currency, Reform and Policy, 1860-1897." 
Although economists appear more sharply and certainly less 
intelligibly divided than historians about the economic aspects 
of the late nineteenth century, Milton Freedman and Anna 
Jacobson Schwartz in A Monetary History of the United 
States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, 196 3), present the most recent 
scholarly, and controversial, analysis that indirectly supports 
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those reformers of the 1890's who emphasized the volume of 
the currency as a prime factor in the economic health of the 
nation. 
Finally, a trail-blazing article that appeared more than two 
decades ago still proves fundamentally important, William 
Diamond, "Urban and Rural Voting in 1896," American 
Historical Review, XLVI (January 1941). Carl N. Degler, 
"American Political Parties and the Rise of the City: An 
Interpretation," Journal of American History, LI (June 1964), 
offers a provocative view of the trend toward Republican 
primacy that began with the elections of 1894 and 1896 and 
is but one of the more recent studies which builds in part on 
the foundation laid by Professor Diamond. 
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